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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

) SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011
)

-vs-

) Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941
)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, ANGUS JERRY PETERSON )
and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
)
Defendant-Appellant,
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Appeal from the District court of the i h Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
DANE H. WATKINS, JR.
DISTRICT JUDGE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

, Robin Dunn
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

DeAnne Casperson
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Filed this the 24th day ofAugust, 2011.
Christine Boulter, Clerk 0 the District Court
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VOLUME 2
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011

)

-vs-

)

Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941

)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, ANGUS JERRY PETERSON )
and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
)
)

Defendant-Appellant,

)
)

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District court of the

i

h

Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for

THE
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
DANE H. WATKINS
DISTRICT JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

Robin Dunn
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

DeAnne Casperson
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

------------------------)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company; and
JARAMIE MAGERA, an individual,
Counter-Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

------------------------)

Case No. CV-08-941

AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING
DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
OF JARAMIE MAGERA

fl i)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ., attorney for defendants,
RAOEL H. CLARK, JANET C. CLARK, JERRY PETESON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, shall take the deposition upon oral examination, pursuant to the Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure ofJARAMIE MAGERA, commencing at 8:30 o'clock a.m. on the 13th day
of April, 2010, at the office of DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC, 477 Pleasant Country Lane,
Rigby, Idaho, before a qualified court reporter and officer authorized to administer oaths.
Please bring any and all documents you intend to utilize at any hearing/trial of this
matter.

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a duly licensed attorney for the State of Idaho,
resident of and with my office at Rigby, Idaho; that I served a copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM by mailing, with postage prepaid

.,

thereon, a true and correct copy thereof to the following person(s) this ./ i",::) day of April,
2010.
~ ~

~~'

--,)

---'""-"

--,

/'~---"--y/'\

0~,( "~. y~ 5L~
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Dick Telford Reporting Service
P. O. Box 51020
Idaho Falls, ID 83405·1020
DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P. O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
AMENDED NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF JARAMIE MAGERA
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL !WIN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riven¥alk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

2010 NOV 16 PI1 5: 02

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETIY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.

Case No. CV-08-941

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This memorandum is filed in support of Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiffs'
allegations in their Verified Complaint and as to Defendants' remaining Counterclaims.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff has previously supplied the Court with an extensive Statement of Facts in its
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 5, 2009.
Consequently, Plaintiff will not repeat these facts here. However, Plaintiff provides the
following facts which are pertinent to this Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
On August 30, 2007, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC (hereinafter "Plaintiff' or
"Buku") entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Defendants Raoel H. Clark and
Janet C. Clark (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Clarks") (the "Clark Agreement") for
the purchase of approximately 80.17 acres of property located in Jefferson County, Idaho,
owned by the Clarks (hereinafter the "Clark Property"). On or about August 30, 2007,
Plaintiff also entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Angus Jerry Peterson and
Betty Jean Peterson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Petersons") (the "Peterson
Agreement") for the purchase of approximately 73 acres adjacent to Defendant Clarks'
property (hereinafter the "Peterson Property").
The Clark Agreement denoted a purchase price for the Clark Property in the amount
of$1,044,075.18. (Magera Aff., ~ 5, Ex. A). The Clark Agreement provided Buku with a
four-month due diligence period for Buku to ensure it was satisfied with the condition of the
2-
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property prior to closing. (Magera Aff., Ex. A). The Clark Agreement specified that Buku
would provide the Clarks with $25,000.00 in earnest money, and that such sum would be
fully refundable until closing. (Magera Aff., Ex. A). Buku tendered the earnest money to
Clarks.
The Peterson Agreement was structured similarly. The Peterson Agreement denoted
a purchase price for the Peterson property in the amount of$980,OOO.00. (Magera AfC ~ 10,
Ex. B). The Peterson Agreement provided Buku with a four-month due diligence period to
ensure it was satisfied with the condition of the property prior to closing. (Magera Aff.,
Ex. B).

The Peterson Agreement specified that Buku would provide Petersons with

$327,000.00 in earnest money, and that all but $10,000.00 of such earnest money was fully
refundable until closing. (Magera Aff., Ex. B). Buku tendered such earnest money to
Petersons.
Pursuant to the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement, closing was to occur on
December 21,2007. However, no such closing occurred due to Buku's concerns with the
zoning of the properties. Buku demanded its earnest money back from Clarks and Petersons,
but Clarks and Petersons refused to return the funds. As a result, Buku filed suit against
Clarks and Petersons. Defendants brought various causes of action against Buku in a
counterclaim, including a cause of action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
Plaintiff filed its prior Motion for Summary Judgment on October 6, 2009. In its
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff sought dismissal of all of Defendants'
counterclaims, and return of the earnest monies to which it was entitled under the Clark and
3-
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Peterson Agreements. Plaintiffs causes of action included (1) Refund of Earnest Money
Under Contract, (2) Conversion, and (3) Unjust Enrichment. Defendants' counterclaim
included (1) Specific Performance, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Unjust Enrichment, (4)
Estoppel, (5) Promissory Estoppel, and (6) Consumer Protection. The Court heard Plaintiff s
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 14,2009. The Court issued its Memorandum
Decision with regard to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on January 27,2010. The
Memorandum Decision held that:
[T]he written contracts between the parties are unambiguous and definite;
however, issues of fact remain as to Buku's entitlement to the earnest money
under the contracts. The behavior of the parties after the December 2007
closing date persuades the Court that the "agreement" between the parties may
not have ended after the closing date. After the failed closing, the parties'
behavior suggests that an arrangement possibly still existed between the parties
for the sale and purchase of the property. It is unclear what that arrangement
was or what it means. Nevertheless, it seems clear to the Court that the
parties' behavior subsequent to closing could be due to a later agreement that
might affect Buku's entitlement to earnest money under the earlier
Agreements.
(Memorandum Decision, p. 8-9).

Additionally, the Memorandum Decision directly

dismissed Defendants' cause of action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
The only contractual agreement alleged in Defendants' Counterclaim are the written
Agreements entered into between the parties. (Counterclaims

~~ H through X).

Defendants

have not alleged an oral agreement separate and apart from the written Agreements. Plaintiff
now seeks to resolve, as a matter of law, the remaining issues in this case with regard to
whether any alleged agreements or arrangements between the parties after the closing date

4-
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had any material effect on Plaintiffs entitlement to a return of the earnest money under the
terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements, plus interest.

III. ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should grant

summary judgment based on the pleadings and affidavits where "there [are] no genuine
issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."
I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Idaho Building Contractors Assoc. v. City o/Coeur d'Alene, 126
Idaho 740, 742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). The Court will construe all disputed facts in favor
of the non-moving party as well as all reasonable inferences. Hayward v. Jacks Pharmacy,
Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005).

B.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE CLARK AND PETERSON
AGREEMENTS PROVIDES THAT ANY AMENDMENTS OR WAIVERS TO
THE AGREEMENTS MUST BE IN WRITING AND SIGNED BY THE
PARTIES TO BE VALID
The Court delayed ruling on whether Buku is entitled to the return of its earnest

money because it had concern that there may have been subsequent agreements between the
parties after the Clark and Peterson Agreements failed to close. However, by the very terms
of the Clark and Peterson Agreements themselves, such an alleged additional, unwritten
agreement is not valid and would not have affected the terms of the contracts entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendants. Further, Defendants have alleged in the Counterclaim
only the written Agreements enter into by the parties. (Counterclaim ~~ H through X).

5-
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Paragraph 21 of the Clark and Peterson Agreements states as follows:

21. Amendments and Waivers. No amendment of any provisions of this
agreement will be valid unless the same shall be in writing and signed by the
parties. No waiver by any party of any default, misrepresentation or breach of
warranty or covenant hereunder, whether intentional or not, shall be deemed
to extend to any prior or subsequent default, misrepresentation, or breach of
warranty or covenant hereunder or effect in anyway [sic] any rights arising by
virtue of any prior or subsequent such occurrence.
(Magera Aff., ~ 10 & 11, Ex. A & B). This paragraph specifically states that no amendments
to the Agreements will be valid unless "in writing and signed by the parties." Although
Plaintiff attempted to amend the agreement by offering an extension of the closing date to
both parties (see Magera Aff.,

~ 20,

Ex. E and Ex. F), neither Clarks nor Petersons executed

the memorandum to extend the closing date, and in fact outright rejected the offer to extend
the closing date. (Magera Aff.,

~

23, Ex. G). No other attempts were made in writing to

amend or modify the Clark or Peterson Agreements, and, further, no written agreements
amending or modifying the agreements were ever executed. Because the agreements were
never amended or extended in writing and the closing date was never extended, closing had
to happen on or before December 21, 2010, for the transaction to occur. However, that date
went by without closing occurring as a result of Buku's concerns after its due diligence
review. Clarks and Petersons knew the only way to amend their agreements with Buku was
to have a writing signed by the parties. "When the terms of a contract are unambiguous,
interpretation of the contract and its legal effect are questions oflaw." Iron Eagle Dev., LLC

v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.2d 509, 513 (2003). Even if
Defendants could prove the parties had a new oral agreement or the parties' course of
6-
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conduct suggested an orally revised agreement, such agreements are invalid according to the
clear and unambiguous terms ofthe Clark and Peterson agreements. Further, it is the written
Agreements that govern the return of the earnest monies. Pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of the
Agreements, Buku is entitled to a full refund of the earnest money it paid to Clarks and a
refund of all earnest money but $10,000.00 it paid to Petersons, plus prejudgment interest.

C.

ANY ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT PERTAINING TO THE SALE OF
THE PROPERTY IS PROHIBITED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Even if Clarks and Petersons can assert claims beyond the unambiguous express

contract terms, the statute of frauds prohibits their claim of a "new" deal. Pursuant to Idaho
Code § 9-503:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
in writing.
This proposition has been further reiterated in Idaho case law. See, i.e., Lawrence v. Jones,
124 Idaho 748, 750, 864 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating "a contract for the sale of
real property is not enforceable unless it is in writing"). None of the parties involved contend
that there are any additional written contracts regarding the sale of the property at issue and
Defendants have not alleged a separate oral contract. Defendants' Counterclaim alleged
specific performance and breach of the written Agreements. Even if Defendants had alleged
an oral contract in the Counterclaim, pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-503 and Idaho case law, any
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alleged oral agreement between the parties regarding the sale of the property would be
invalid and unenforceable. Such an agreement could not affect the terms of the Clark or
Peterson Agreements. Consequently, the terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements must
be enforced as written, and Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of its earnest monies and interest.

D.

DEFENDANTS CANNOT RELY ON EQUITABLE CLAIMS TO DEFEAT
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS
Because the Court has already determined that the written Agreements are clear and

unambiguous, Defendants cannot rely on equitable claims for their alleged damages as a
result ofthe Agreements. "Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal
remedy is available." "When parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity
is not allowed because the express contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims." Id.
(citing In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 673, 8 P.3d 664, 668 (Ct. App. 2000)). Iron
Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,492, 65 P.3d 509,514
(2003) (citing Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404-05,690 P.2d 333,339-40 (1984)).
"Only when the express agreement is enforceable is a court precluded from applying the
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract." Bates v.
Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,776-77,203 P.3d 702, 706-07 (2009).
The purpose of a written contract is so that the obligation and expectations are known
to all parties. As a result of the written Agreements, Clarks and Petersons were both put on
notice that any revisions to the Agreements had to be in writing. Both refused to extend the
closing date in writing as requested by Buku so the zoning issue identified as part ofBuku's
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due diligence efforts could be potentially resolved. As a result, Clarks and Petersons cannot
bring claims of unjust enrichment, estoppel, and promissory estoppel to defeat the clear
language of the Agreements. The unambiguous Agreements govern the dispute and Buku
should have its earnest monies returned.

E.

ANY INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AFTER THE CLOSING
DATE DID NOT ALTER THE TERMS OF THE CLARK OR PETERSON
AGREEMENTS SO AS TO INVALIDATE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO A
RETURN OF THE EARNEST MONIES
Assuming arguendo that the unambiguous language of the Agreements does not

resolve the dispute, Defendants' claims fail. Defendants have asserted that actions which
occurred after the Agreements terminated for failure to close somehow entitle Defendants
to retain the earnest monies which should have been refunded pursuant to the terms of the
Agreements.

Defendants have asserted, among other things, that Plaintiff exercised

dominion and control over their properties based upon Defendants' allegations that Plaintiff
leased out the Clark Property to a third party, or that Plaintiffs agent farmed the Clark
Property in 2008, and/or that Plaintiff or Plaintiffs agent controlled the Peterson home.
Defendants have further asserted that Plaintiff orally promised to purchased the Clark and
Peterson properties after the Clark and Peterson Agreements terminated, although such an
agreement is clearly banned by the statue of frauds and the express language of the written
Agreements.
However, Defendants' own testimony and the testimony of Brad Foster, Kipp
Archibald and Jaramie Magera prove these allegations untrue. Regarding Defendants'
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assertion that Plaintiff somehow farmed the Clark property in 2008 or exercised dominion
and control over the property, Defendant Clark admitted in his deposition that he allowed

F oster Land & Cattle to run his farm ground, he allowed his son to use the house, and he
received the proceeds:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

10 -

. ... But with regard to your allegation that Buku somehow exercised
dominion and control over your property, what are you asserting that
they did?
The whole property?
The whole property.
Well, maybe I assumed this, but I felt that where he's made an offer to
buy my property, that that was so. I was going to sell it to him to
become his.
But you received the benefit of the tax assessment that was paid by Mr.
F oster, correct?
Yes.
And you received the benefit of the water assessment payment?
That's correct.
And you received the benefit of whatever leasing arrangement you had
with your son. I don't know whether you required him to pay you or
not, correct?
That's okay. I understand that.
SO how did Buku control that property after the agreement did not close
in December.
Well, I was hoping that it would continue on. But as to whether - I
don't know who owned what. The property never left my ownership,
and it wouldn't until it was paid for.
Okay. And you agreed to allow Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct?
Sure. You know, if you let it go, it turns to weeds. Somebody had to
make a call on it.
And you agreed you were the person that did that?
I did. I mean, I was told by Brad that Mr. Magera asked him to call me
and see if it was all right.
SO you're not alleging that Buku actually received any profits off of
you property, correct?
I don't know that they did. I don't see how they could.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Casperson Aff.,

~

2, Ex. A ("Clark Depo."), p. 24-31).

Defendant Clark's testimony

indicates that Plaintiff never exercised dominion and control over the property. Foster Land
& Cattle farmed the property after getting approval from Clark, not Plaintiff. (Foster Aff.,

'6-9). Plaintiff received no compensation for any of the Clark property. (Foster Aff., ~ 6-9).
Rather, as Defendant Clark stated in his deposition, and Mr. Foster is his affidavit, Foster
Land & Cattle paid the water assessment and taxes on the Clark property pursuant to the
arrangement Clark had made with Mr. Foster. This arrangement also was corroborated by

Mr. Magera. Mr. Magera provided in his deposition that Brad Foster approached him about
farming the Clark property, but that he informed Mr. Foster that the deal with the Clarks fell
through and that he could contact Mr. Clark directly if he were interested in farming the
property. (Casperson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. C ("Magera Depo."), p. 31, In. 6-24).1 Additionally,
Defendant Clark admitted that he leased the home located on the property to his son during
the time period in question and that at no point did Buku exercise dominion and control over

Q. [MS. CASPERSON] Did any fanners ever approach you about farming the Clark
property?
A. [MR. MAGERA] Yes.
Q. And who was that?
A. Brad Foster.
Q. And what infonnation, if any, did you give to Mr. Foster?
A. Brad Foster took me to lunch, asked me ifhe could fann another piece of ground we
have in Hailey Creek. And he said - he asked me too if - I heard you bought Raoel
Clark's piece, could we fann that. And I said no, we didn't buy it. The deal fell through,
I said, but here's Raoel Clark's number, if you want to call him you can ask him to farm
it.
Q. Did you receive any - you meaning Buku Properties or any entity that you have an
interest therein, receive any money from Brad Foster?
A. For the Clark property?
Q. Correct.
A. No.
(Magera Depo., p. 31, In. 6-24).
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the home. (Clark Depo., p. 28-29, In. 22-8, p. 35, In. 20-24). Buku never leased the Clark
Property to any third party, nor did any agent ofBuku ever farm the Clark Property. Buku
never exercised dominion and control over any portion ofthe Clark Property, as admitted by
Mr. Clark, Mr. Foster, and Jaramie Magera. Further, Mr. Foster denied that Foster Land &
Cattle has any agency association with Mr. Magera or Plaintiff. (Foster Aff.,

~

12 & 13).

As a result, Clark's previous assertion that Plaintiff exercised dominion and control over their
property is unsupported.
Defendants also have asserted that Buku exercised dominion and control over the
Peterson property. However, Mr. Peterson testified his son ran the farm and Buku had no
control over it. (Casperson Aff.,

~

3, Ex. B (Peterson Depo., p. 57, In. 7 - p. 59, In. 5)). In

fact, Mr. Peterson testified as follows:
Q. And specifically tell me what you can recall Mr. Foster told you.
A. Mr. Foster said that Jaramie called him and wanted him to rent the farm.
He asked me if it was in pasture. I said yes, but J aramie hasn't bought the
place yet. He said oh, he hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I said,
well, when he buys it, he can do what he wants, but ifhe don't buy it, why, I'm
going to let Steve run it.
Q. And that's what you did, correct?
A. That's what I did.
Q. SO any profits that were made with regard to that farmland came to you,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. Why didn't you take actions to lease the house out if you were no longer
living there?
A. Because I didn't want to lease it out. It was in good shape, and I didn't
want people to move in. If he didn't take it and we got it back, why, then I
would sell it.
Q. SO you were concerned that any renters would damage the property?
A. Yes.

12 -
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(Peterson Depo., p. 57, In. 7 - p. 59, In. 5). Consequently, Petersons' claim that Buku
exercised control over the farm ground is untrue.
More particularly, Petersons claim Buku exercised control over the residence on the
Peterson property which is a small portion of the total Peterson Property. Defendants have
claimed that Plaintiff actively marketed the property through ERA real estate agent Kipp
Archibald and that Defendant Peterson had no involvement with the marketing of the
property and no control over the property. However, Defendant Peterson's deposition
testimony reflects a different scenario. Defendant Peterson testified that Kipp Archibald
called him on January 3,2008, to ask him what he wanted to do regarding the continued
marketing of the property. Defendant Peterson instructed Mr. Archibald to speak with his

attorney, Robin Dunn, or with Jaramie Magera. (Peterson Depo.,p. 47, In. 2-8; Archibald
Aff.,~11-17).

Further, Mr. Peterson testified he did not want to rent the house because he

was concerned about damage from renters. (Peterson Depo.,p.57,In.7-p.59,In.5). Thus,
Peterson clearly had authority to direct the marketing of the Peterson Property and simply
opted not to make any decision themselves with regard to the continued marketing of the
Property. Kipp Archibald called Defendant Peterson in August 2008, to again inquire as to
what he wanted to do regarding the sale of the property. Defendant Peterson again told Mr.
Archibald to speak with Mr. Dunn or Mr. Magera, apparently opting not to make any
decision. (Peterson Depo., p. 53-54, In. 22-2: Archibald ~ 16).
Defendant Peterson acknowledged that throughout this entire time period, he still held
title to the property and that if the property had sold, he would have had to execute all
13 -
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Defendant Peterson acknowledged that throughout this entire time period, he still held
title to the property and that if the property had sold, he would have had to execute all
documents transferring title to the property. (Peterson Depo., p. 57, In. 2-5). Further,
Defendant Peterson admitted that the only evidence he relied upon in asserting that Plaintiff
had dominion and control over the Peterson property was his assumption that Mr. Archibald
was acting on behalf ofBuku, even though he never had any discussions with Mr. Archibald
as to whom he understood he was representing. (Peterson Depo., p. 66, In. 4-11; p. 67, In. 1216). In his deposition, Mr. Magera noted that, although he asked Kipp Archibald to help sell
the Peterson home when the Peterson property was under contract, he never asked Mr.
Archibald to take any other action, he never had any kind of listing agreement with Mr.
Archibald, and he never received any payment of any kind for the lease of any ofthe Peterson
property. (Casperson

Aff.,~4,Ex.C

(Magera Depo., p. 30, In. 5-24; p. 48, In. 16-19)).

Additionally, Mr. Magera testified that he never gave Mr. Archibald any instructions during
2008 (after the Peterson Agreement terminated without closing), and that ifMr. Archibald had
called him and asked if he could still show the house after the Peterson Agreement had
terminated, that Mr. Magera directed him to call the Petersons. (Magera Depo., p. 37, In. 411 ).
Finally, Plaintiffnever benefitted monetarily or otherwise from the Peterson Property.
As mentioned above, Defendant Peterson's property was farmed by Peterson's son Steve
during the 2008 farm season. Plaintiff received no rent payments or any other form of
payment from the lease of the Peterson property to Defendant Peterson's son. Defendant
14 -
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Peterson acknowledged he could have rented out the home but did not want to because of
damage from renters. Plaintiff did not receive any financial benefit from the residence located
on the Peterson property. (Peterson Depo., p. 58-59, In. 22-5). Further, no offers were
received during the time Mr. Archibald marketed the Property. (Archibald Aff. ~ 20). If an
offer had been received and accepted, any proceeds would have gone to the Petersons. Buku
did not exercise dominion or control over the Peterson Property.
None of the above-described interactions between the parties in anyway indicated that
there was a "new agreement" reached with regard to Plaintiff purchasing either Property, nor
did any of those interactions indicate that Defendants were somehow entitled to retain the
earnest money deposits which should have been returned pursuant to the terms of the Clark
and Peterson Agreements. Plaintiff did not exercise "dominion and control" over either the
Clark or Peterson properties. Even ifPlaintiffhad exercised "dominion and control" over the
property, the Clark and Peterson Agreements expired without closing and pursuant to the
terms of the Agreements, Plaintiffwas entitled to a refund of its earnest monies when the sales
did not close.
Any modifications or amendments to the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreements
had to be in writing to be valid. Such an amendment was never executed. Further, any
agreement for the sale of real property not in writing violates the statute of frauds and is
invalid. Thus, any alleged oral agreement to continue with the transaction after the Clark
Agreement and Peterson Agreements expired has no bearing or effect on the terms of the
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Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement and could not have materially altered the terms of
those contracts. Buku is entitled to the return of its earnest monies, plus interest.

IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff complied with all terms and conditions ofthe Clark and Peterson Agreements.
Because the earnest monies deposited by Plaintiff for the purchase of the Clark and Peterson
Properties was fully refundable until closing, and because such closing did not occur because
a condition found during the due diligence period was not cured, Plaintiff is entitled to the
return of the earnest monies. Defendants have no viable causes of action against Plaintiff
because the written Agreements control the dispute, and, as such, they should be dismissed.

I,

DATED this

~"'-./

tlo

\

day of November, 2010.

rfeXiine CasperFc;!;, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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relevant portions of the deposition ofRaoel Clark, taken April 13, 2010.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the cover page and
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MR. DUNN: Objection to the fonn of the
question, and misstating as this document has no
mention of the Clarks on it.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: You can go ahead
and answer.
A. I don't know on this one. I mean, I
knew that Buku was -- I've gone to Mr. Magera on a
number of occasions and asked him ifhe would give
me some money, and he said that there was none.
When we first signed the one with Jab, he said I'd
get -- after closing I would get a third payment on
it. But I never received any money.
I had - I had gone to Texas. My wife
had a health problem. We had gone to Texas for
her. And maybe I speculated, but I arranged to buy
us a home based on the fact that we were going to
receive some money. And I borrowed -- it's in
records, I borrowed $150,000 to make down payment
on a home. And then I -- subsequently when I
couldn't get any funds from whomever, I borrowed
another to pay for the house.
And then in doing so I had to
surrender some different funds I had. And then
they -- the people that gave me the money from that
considered it as cash or -- anyway, I had to borrow
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more money to payoff the additional amount of
money that increased my earnings for the year,
doubled it. I had to borrow money to pay that off.
And, anyway, the whole thing has
caused me quite a bit of embarrassment and grief
I approached Mr. Magera on a number of
occasions asking him what we could do, but I never
did receive anything. We'll leave it at that.
Q. Did you expect Buku to go through with
an agreement if the value of the property was not
the same as when they entered into the contract?
A. I don't know that I did. I knew that
Buku wasn't going to pay me, so I left it at that.
Q. And you heard Mr. Magera's testimony
where he indicated that he was at a meeting with at
least the Petersons and counsel in which they were
advised of the risk of using the earnest money
prior to having the agreement closed?
A. Yes. But I went to Mr. Magera, and I
said when can we do this. Can you advance me the
25,000. I'll put it down on this home, and it will
save you that much money to pay interest. And he
wrote me a check.
Q. And that was the 25,000 earnest money?
A. I guess it was earnest money. It was

';

$25,000.

Q. Did you understand based on the
purchase and sale agreement that if the agreement
for some reason did not close that you would have
to give back that 25,000?
A. I think that's what this case is over.
Q. Did you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Clark, in paragraph 16 of your
affidavit you state: The plaintiff exercised
dominion and control over the real properties
contained in the written contract of the
defendantslcounter-p lain tiffs.
Can you explain to me how Buku
exercised dominion and control over your property?
A. I considered this case to be in kind
of a limbo thing. I frankly didn't know what to do
with the thing. And Brad Foster called me and said
what are we going to do with it. And whether -whoever ran the thing has to pay the water system
on the taxes on the property.
Q. Let me go back. You said that Brad
Foster called you?
A. And said that Jaramie had asked him to
ask me.

Page 23
2

April 13, 2010

Page 25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
~O

21
l22
23
24
25

Q. To ask you what?
A. What to do with it. I said, this
property is in the process of being sold, and
therefore I don't feel that that's my decision. I
mean, he's offered to buy the thing. It's in
limbo, and I'm going to leave it to him to make
that decision.
Q. When did you say that Brad Foster
contacted you?
A. About the time that -- about the time
that he called Mr. Magera.
Q. SO the spring of2008?
A. I'm not sure when it was. But he came
and asked me if it was all right for him to run the
property.
Q. Was it shortly before the fanning
season would have begun?
A. I'm not sure of it. I'm not sure when
it was. It would have to be somewhere around
there.
Q. Do you know whether it was past when
the contract was supposed to close?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Did you have any kind of written
agreement with Mr. Foster to fann the land?
7 (Pages 22 to 25)
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A. No.
Did you receive any payment from
Mr. Foster?
A. In the amount of the -- he paid. I
think he paid for the water assessment. I think
that's correct. And my son was involved in this
too. And also the taxes on that property.
Q. And had you negotiated an agreement
with Mr. Foster as to what he would pay for that?
A. It was the going rate, whatever it
was.
Q. SO in addition to the water assessment
and the taxes he also paid you whatever the value
of the lease was?
A. No. I think he paid the -- he just
paid the taxes and the water, and it came to about
the same.
Q. Oh, and it came to about the same as
if he had paid you for just farming the property?
A. Yes.
Q. SO you're not asserting that you
didn't get paid for the use of your land that year?
A. I didn't, but someone did.
Q. You didn't get paid?
A. Well, he paid Brad Foster or Brad
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works for Buku?
A. He indicated that he had -- I don't
I:'
know whether Mr. Magera approached him for use of !j
that property or whether it was the other w a y )
around. But Brad indicated to me that it was okay
with Mr. Magera ifhe rented that property.
Q. What specifically did Brad Foster tell
you in that conversation that you had with him?
A. It wasn't very much. He talked to me
on the phone.
Q. Isn't it true he simply told you that
Jaramie had directed him to contact you with regard
to whether or not he could rent that farmland?
MR. DUNN: Object to the form of the
question.
THE WITNESS: Let me say this. Brad did
call me and he said -- I don't know which one of
the other approached the other. But when Brad
spoke to me, he said that Mr. Magera -- it was all
';
right with him if I let Brad farm the thing, that
i
Mr. Magera had no care either way.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And with regard to
the remainder of the property, which as I
understand consists of the house and a little bit
of acreage, are you asserting that Buku had some
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Foster paid it. But -- all right. We received
some kind of remittance, yes. All right.
Q. Because on your behalf he paid your
water assessment, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And he paid the taxes on your behalf?
A. Yes.
Q. And as far as you're aware, Brad
Foster didn't make any kind of payment to Buku?
A. I don't know that he did.
Q. And if! understand your testimony
correctly is that the value of the water assessment
and the taxes equaled essentially what the going
rate would have been to farm the property?
A. Yes. It's not very much.
Q. SO you're not asserting that there are
damages that you incurred as a result of Brad
Foster leasing that property?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, in paragraph 17 it states that
Brad Foster, agent of Magera, and one of the
plaintiffs farmed the real property in the 2008
year. Did I read that correctly?
A. I think so.
Q. Are you asserting that Brad Foster
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kind of control or dominion over the house?
A. No.
Q. And who did have control and dominion
over the house?
A. Me.
Q. And isn't it true that it was your son
who was living in that property?
A. That's right.
Q. Are you aware of any way then in which
Buku controlled that property, your property -A. The house itself or the whole thing?
Q. The whole thing.
A. I don't know what to make of it. When
I read the name on that after I got studying it a
while, it was some kind of a shame. That's the way
I felt about it.
Q. The name on what?
A. Buku. It sounded phony to me. That's
all rm going to say.
Q. Okay. I understand that. But with
regard to your allegation that Buku somehow
exercised dominion and control over your property,
what are you asserting that they did?
A. The whole property?
Q. The whole plvpvlly.
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A. Well, maybe I assumed this, but I felt
that where he'd made an offer to buy my property,
that that was so. I was going to sell it to him to
become his.
Q. But you received the benefit of the
tax assessment that was paid by Mr. Foster,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you received the benefit of the
water assessment payment?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you received the benefit of
whatever leasing arrangement you had with your son.
I don't know whether you required him to pay you or
not, correct?
A. That's okay. I understand that.
Q. SO how did Buku control that property
after the agreement did not close in December?
A. Well, I was hoping that it would
continue on. But as to whether -- I don't know who
owned what. The property never left my ownership,
and it wouldn't until it was paid for.
Q. Okay. And you agreed to allow
Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct?
A. Sure. You know, if you let it go, it
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Q. Well, you understand that we had cross
motions for summary judgment?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you understand that the court
ruled that the contract was not ambiguous?
A. Legal terms are ambiguous in any way
you look at it.
Q. But you do understand that there has
been a ruling from the court on this case?
A. Some ruling. I don't know what it
was, but yes.
Q. Let me go to these miscellaneous costs
and billings that you claim to have lost. What
lost revenues on farming practices are you
claiming?
A. None.
Q. What lost interest are you claiming?
A. On the farm itself? Not the agreement
to buy?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't know that I've lost anything.
Q. SO the lost interest that you're
referring to in this paragraph is only associated
with the contract, correct?
A. With the farm.
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turns to weeds. Somebody had to make a call on it.
Q. And you agreed you were the person
that did that?
A. I did. I mean, I was told by Brad
that Mr. Magera asked him to call me and see if it
was all right.
Q. SO you're not alleging that Buku
actually received any profits off of your property,
correct?
A. I don't know that they did. I don't
see how they could.
Q. If you look at paragraph 21 of your
affidavit, it indicates that -- well, let me read
it to you. It says your affiant has been damaged
monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract and
other miscellaneous costs and billings, including
but not limited to lost revenues on farming
practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and
utilities, tax assessments, attorney fees and
costs.
Now, you understand that the court has
already ruled on a portion of this litigation,
correct?
A. Would you explain that to me, please.
What part?
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Q. Let me separate those out. Are you
claiming lost interest as a result ofBuku doing
something to control that farm after the contract
didn't close?
A. I'm not quite getting where you're
wanting me to go.
Q. Well, you've indicated in your
affidavit that you're claiming damages for lost
interest, and all I'm trying to do is fmd out what
lost interest is it you're claiming?
A. This is the farm or the whole
contract?
Q. Well, you're going to have to tell me.
I don't know. It's your affidavit.
A. Well, based on -- based on my talking
with Mr. Magera, I asked him upfront, I said I need
to get my wife out of this country. And we had a
daughter that lives in Texas, and that's where we
went. And we studied a lot of the homes back there
that we liked. It's a very modest little home, but
it cost a lot of money. And I borrowed some money
based on what I hoped Mr. Magera was going to do.
He talked like he would to me. And after I had
made the loan, I asked him for money, and he said
Buku's broke. I paid some interest on a lot of
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instruct the deponent how to answer.
THE WITNESS: No. Say that again.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Are you aware of
any writing that has been signed by both you,
meaning you and your wife, and Buku Properties that
altered or changed this purchase and sale
agreement?
A. No.
Q. You will agree with me that this
purchase and sale agreement did not close on
December 21st and has never closed; correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And you have stiII retained all of the
earnest money, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. Now, if we take a look at your notes,
which was previously marked as Exhibit *-1, you
state on January 3rd of2008 that Kipp Archibald
called to ask what you wanted to -- what we wanted
to do with the house; is that correct?
A. That's right.
Q. Is that a correct statement of what
Mr. Archibald said?
A. That's right.
Q. And your response to him was to direct
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him to your attorney; is that correct?
A. He asked me if! wanted to sell it and
put part of the payment on -- put the payment on -on part payment. I told him I sold the house and
farm together, so to call our attorney, Rob Dunn.
I said -- and I also said that Mr. Magera was in
charge of it. He was the one that still was
holding the thing on the property.
Q. Mr. Peterson, why wouldn't you have
reflected that in your note that you prepared?
A. I don't know. But that's what I told
him.
Q. Now, tell me again what you claim you
said about Mr. Magera?
A. I told him, I says, you have to see
Mr. Magera. He's the one that wants to sell the
house, because I've already sold it to him.
Q. Had you closed on that property?
A. No, I hadn't. But I had a thing that
they were going to close on it.
Q. In January 3rd of2008 you had
something that said they were going to close on it?
A. On January 3rd Kipp Archibald called
and asked what we wanted to do with the house.
Q. Let me stop you, Mr. Peterson. What
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I'm asking you is you said that you had a deal
indicating that they were going to close on it, I
think is what you said. What are you talking
about?
A. Mr. Magera told me that -- I had it
down here somewhere. He called me and asked me on
early December if we would take a payoff early. He
said he had a buyer for the house and it would be
soon. We said yes. I checked with the title
company. And he told me to go check with the title
company. And I went and checked with the title
company. They said they had it set up, but then
when the date come to do it, they said no. They
wasn't - it had been canceled.
Q. Okay. Well, let's skip now forward to
January 3rd of2008. At this point in time you
understand that Buku has not closed the property on
December 21st, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And you understand based on the letter
that your attorney sent that you were insisting
that the property be closed, otherwise you would
institute legal action, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And on January 3rd, your testimony is

Page 49
that Mr. Archibald called you and asked you what
you wanted to do with the house, correct?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And at that time you were still the
owner of that property, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And as the owner of the property, you
would be the only one who would have authority to
decide whether or not to sell that property,
correct?
MR. DUNN: Objection. Legal conclusion.
And leading again.
THE WITNESS: I was the owner of the
property. But we were still figuring on selling
it, because he said if it would -- the zoning was
changed. And the zoning wasn't changed. And so I
told him to get ahold of Mr. Magera and Mr. Dunn,
because it wasn't up to me, because I had already
had a thing that was supposed to be in place, and
it was -- still hadn't -- completely hadn't gone,
because he had wanted to go to the 31 st of March.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But this was past
the 31 st of March even -- I'm sorry. You refused
to sign that document, correct, extending the
closing date?

13 (Pages 46 to 49)
TandTReport@ida.net

T&T Reporting

208.529.5291

"!

,.l"
'!

il

,j"

",
~
~j

~

'iJ
~j

J

?1
~1

~

~

~

W

J

j

"
~

'1

;1
,j

1
j
~

J
;1

!
Ii
;]
,
1
i

11
'I
)J

1

1

,'I

Deposition of:

Angus Peterson
Page 50

1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2l
22
23
24
25

A. I didn't sign it, no.
SO as it existed that date, there was
no document extending the closing, correct?
A. Only that he still wanted the
property.
Q. What document can you show me that he
still wanted the property on that date?
A. I haven't got a document.
Q. And you haven't indicated any kind of
conversation during that time frame that indicated
that Mr. Magera still wanted the property, correct?
A. Yes, I did. Because Brad Foster
called me, and he said that Jaramie wanted him to
operate the farm this year.
Q. Let's back up. That happens in March,
correct?
A. You're talking about March here too,
aren't you?
Q. I'm talking about January.
A. January.
Q. Of2008.
A. I don't recall anything about that
other than the thing was still in limbo, because I
knew -- I knew that he still wanted it if the
zoning didn't get changed, and it didn't get

Q.
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A. It probably would. That's why I made
these notes.
Q. Prior to Mr. Archibald calling you on
January 3rd, asking what you wanted to do with the
house, had you had prior discussions with
Mr. Archibald?
A. None. He come out -- him and
Mr. Magera come out before we moved, and they went
through the house. He took him through the house,
and they put it up for sale.
Q. Were you there?
A. I was there when they went through the
house. I wasn't in any of their negotiations. I
didn't know how much they were going to get or
anything like that.
Q. You're saying that you never signed
the listing agreement with Mr. Archibald?
A. Never. Never talked to him about it.
Never signed nothing.
Q. Did you approve the listing of the
house with Mr. Archibald?
A. No.
Q. But you were there?
A. I was there when he brought it out.
And then there was no signing done there. He

I
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changed.
Q. How did you know he still wanted it?
A. He told me that.
Q. When?
A. Well, he told me here, and he told me
on that meeting, that meeting we went to.
Q. Now, we've specifically been over your
statement that you prepared for December 12th, and
during that meeting you had already testified that
he specifically said that they wouldn't pay if the
zoning went to five-acre lots, correct?
A. That's right. But it didn't go to
five-acre lots. Is that correct?
Q. And you didn't know that in December,
did you?
A. What?
Q. You didn't know whether it had or had
not in December of2008, correct?
A. I didn't know that it had.
Q. You didn't know that it hadn't either?
A. No. So that's why we were waiting on
this -- it wouldn't make any difference.
Q. Mr. Peterson, you would agree with me
that at the time you made these notes your memory
would have been more accurate than it is today?
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brought Mr. Archibald out, and they went through
the house and looked it over.
Q. How could Buku list a property that
they didn't own?
A. I don't know. But when he called me
up, Jaramie said that he had the house up for sale,
and he says would you sign it over, because he said
I need to -- I need you to sign it. I said, yeah,
sure, I would.
Q. That you would essentially give Buku
Properties the authority to market the house?
A. No. I never give authority to do
anything until he asked me on early in December.
But this was before December that they come out the
first time and put a sign out.
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Archibald to
take that sign down?
A. Never told him to take the sign down.
Q. Did you ever tell him to remove the
lock box?
A. I never told him to remove the lock
box. But he called me and in -- he called me -- he
called me August 6th. He called me on his cell
phone, asked about selling the house. I told him
to talk with Jaramie and said we don't know what's

I
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going on right now. We've turned everything over
to our attorney, Rob Dunn. Kipp said Jaramie still
wanted the farms, ours and Clarks, and the bank had
cut down on the loaning percentages.
Q. Mr. Peterson, let me take you back to
your January 3rd conversation that you had with
Mr. Archibald. When he asked you what you wanted
to do with the house and you told him to go talk to
your attorney, Mr. Dunn, do you have any knowledge
of whether Mr. Archibald had a conversation with
your attorney?
A. I have no idea.
Q. SO you have no idea what Mr. Archibald
did after that?
A. No.
Q. But you do know that he continued to
have a sign in front of the house?
A. He had a sign in front of the house,
yes.
Q. And he had a lock box on it?
A. He had a lock box on it.
Q. And was he giving you notification of
any showings that took place?
A. No. He wasn't giving me any showings.
But I went out there and -- on June 27th, 2008, I
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evidence of that, correct?
A. No. No, I don't.
Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Archibald who he
was taking his directions from for purposes of
selling the house?
A. No.
Q. And you never asked him to remove the
lock box, correct?
A. No.
MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And you never asked
him to remove the sale sign?
MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Correct?
A. No. I never asked him to remove it.
Q. And if Mr. Archibald had sold that
property, who would you have expected to get the
proceeds?
A. Well, if the property was -- if the
farm and that would have sold, I would have
expected him to get the proceeds. But the farm
wasn't sold, so the house wouldn't have been sold.
To me, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't have got any
proceeds because I wouldn't -- I didn't have it up
for sale. Jaramie is the one that put it up for
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went out there, found a cell phone in the master
bedroom of the house. And according to a neighbor,
Earl Coles, the house was stilI being shown. The
blinds in the front rooms were open, which I have
kept closed. The for-sale sign was stilI up.
Q. SO you have no idea when that cell
phone was left, correct?
A. No.
Q. You have no idea when the blinds were
allegedly moved?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Peterson, ifMr. Archibald had an
agreement with Buku Properties to sell the house,
why would he call you on January 3rd of2008 and
ask you what you wanted to do with the house -MR. DUNN: Objection, speculation.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: -- to the extent
that you can testify.
MR. DUNN: Objection, speCUlation. How is
he supposed to know -THE WITNESS: I don't know but I'll tell
you what I thought. I thought Mr. Magera was
standing right there beside him wanting him to
call.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But you have no
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sale.
Q. Who would have had to sign the
documents in order to transfer title to that
property?
A. I would have. But ifhe wasn't going
to buy the farm, it wouldn't have been sold. I
didn't have anything to do with seIling the
property -- selling the house. I had nothing to do
with that. Never talked to Mr. Archibald. He
called me twice. That's the only times that I
talked to him.
Q. SO without any understanding as to why
Mr. Archibald was trying to sell it, you just
continued to let the sign stay there and the lock
box stay on it?
A. I thought that he was trying to sell
it for Mr. Magera.
Q. But you never had a conversation with
him about that?
A. No. No.
Q. Now, during this time frame that the
property, you say, had the sign out front, you were
taking care of the property, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And, in fact, you leased the fannland
',,'
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to your son for pasture, correct? Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. You indicate that in March, you don't
have a date, that Brad Foster called you; is that
correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And specifically tell me what you can
recall Mr. Foster told you.
A. Mr. Foster said that laramie called
him and wanted him to rent the farm. He asked me
if it was in pasture. I said yes, but laramie
hasn't bought the place yet. He said oh, he
hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I
said, well, when he buys it, he can do what he
wants, but ifhe don't buy it, why, I'm going to
let Steve run it.
Q. And that's what you did, correct?
A. That's what I did.
Q. SO any profits that were made with
regard to that farmland came to you, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. Why didn't you take actions to lease
the house out if you were no longer living there?
A. Because I didn't want to lease it out.
It was in good shape, and I didn't want people to
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with regard to the sale ofthe property?
MR. DUNN: Objection. Form of the
question.
THE WITNESS: There was a letter written to
us, I guess, yes.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And isn't it true
that that contained different terms than the
original terms in the purchase and sale agreement?
MR. DUNN: Objection. Leading.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: What did you
understand was the difference between the terms
that were proposed in the letters as opposed to the
terms in the original purchase and sale agreement?
A. They wanted to make payments on it.
Q. And was there ever any contract signed
as a result of those negotiations?
I
A. Not with me.
I
(Exhibit *-J marked.)
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: I'll hand you what
was previously marked as Exhibit *-l. Do you
recognize that document?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you identify it for me?
A. Well, it's a letter for the
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move in. If he didn't take it and we got it back,
why, then I would sell it.
Q. SO you were concerned that any renters
would damage the property?
A. Yes.
Q. You indicated in your prior testimony
on August 6 of2008 that Kipp Archibald again
called you and asked you about selling the house,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And, again, you referred him to
laramie and Mr. Dunn, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And, again, did you have an
understanding as to why Mr. Archibald would be
calling you as to what you wanted done with the
house?
A. He called me, and I told him
everything was turned over to our attorney, Robin
Dunn. And he said laramie still wanted the farm,
along with the Clarks', but the bank had cut down
on the loaning percentage.
Q. Isn't it true that later in 2008 that
there were proposals going back and forth between
you and Buku Properties to come to a new agreement
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defendants.
Q. If you look to the right-hand side of
this document, it says affidavit of Jerry and Betty
Peterson in support of defendants' position re:
summary judgment; is that correct?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. And if you'll look to the back page of
this document -- or the second to last page, is
that your signature?
A. That's my signature.
Q. And is that also your wife's
signature?
A. That's right.
Q. And you understand that this document
was your sworn testimony that was submitted to the I'
court in this matter?
A. Yes.
Q. And you testified, you asserted that
this was true and correct?
A. Yes.
Q. If you'll go to paragraph 12 of your
affidavit. The first portion of the first sentence
of paragraph 12 states: The purpose ofthe
I
purchase by the buyers was never communicated to
the undersigned affiants.
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Page 68

1
agent ofBuku was on your property after this
2
purchase and sale agreement failed to close?
3
A. Well, only Archibald.
4
Q. And you never had any discussion with
5
Archibald as to who he understood he was
6
representing?
7
A. Well, I just assumed he was
8
representing him because he brought him out to our
9
place and went through the house. And they was
10
taking notes down and size of the rooms and what
was done down in the basement and everything else. 11
12
Q. And isn't it true that that all
13
happened prior to the contract being closed,
14
correct?
15
A. That's right.
16
Q. And after that happened on January
17
3rd, Mr. Archibald specifically called you and said
18
what do you want me to do with the property?
19
A. Yes. He said -- and I told him he had
to talk to Magera and to Rob Dunn.
" 20
21
Q. And you don't have any knowledge as to
22
whether he did any of those things?
23
A. No. I talked to him twice is all I
24
ever talked to him.
25
Q. Isn't it true that you specifically

phone that you found in there, the blinds being in
a different position, and then this statement that
you have from your neighbor that it was shown; is
that correct?
A. I've never seen anybody in there
myself, no.
Q. And it was true during this time that
you and your wife were still maintaining and caring
for the property, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. You specifically testified that you
told Brad Foster that until Buku actually paid you
the money they weren't going to get to use that
pastureland, correct?
A. Yeah. And Brad said he didn't want to
get in -- I said Magera hadn't bought it yet. When
he bought it, he could do whatever he wanted with
it, but until then Steve would run it. And he
says, well, I don't want to get involved in it
then.
Q. Why didn't you tell Mr. Archibald the
same sort of thing?
A. Well, I didn't know Mr. Archibald was
selling the ground.
Q. But you knew he was trying to sell the
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gave your son the right to use the pastureland?
A. That's right.
Q. SO you're not asserting that Buku -A. No.
Q. -- had any kind of dominion or
control-A. No.
Q. -- over the pasture land -- let me
finish. You're not asserting that Buku had any
kind of control over the pastureland, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And your only evidence that Buku was
controlling the house was your assumption that
Mr. Archibald was acting on behalf of Buku,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And any profits that were made with
regard to the pasture land came to you, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And you're not aware of any payments
that Buku received as a result of having any kind
of control or dominion over that property?
A. No.
Q. And you never observed anyone actually
going through the property other than the cell
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house?
A. That's a different property. It was
different.
Q. What do you mean it was different?
A. Selling the house, but he wasn't
selling the property.
Q. But the house was still to be sold in
the original purchase -A. That's right.
Q. -- contract, correct?
A. And he asked me, he says is it all
right if we sell this. They thought they had a
buyer. And if they sold it, the house would get
out of -- the house would be part payment on the
properties.
Q. And that was all prior to the closing
date of the purchase and sale agreement?
A. That's right.
Q. If you would look to page 27 -- or
paragraph 27 of your affidavit, this paragraph
specifically states: Your affiants have been
damaged monetarily in the remaining sum of the
contract and other miscellaneous costs and
billings, comma, including but not limited to,
comma, lost revenues on farming practices, comma,

I:
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A. No.
Q. Did you ever have a contract with a
Realtor on the Clark property?
A. No.
Q. What happened to the property of
Petersons during the 2008 year?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did you ever have the property listed
with a Realtor?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever have a contract with a
Realtor to sell the Peterson property?
A. No.
Q. Has ERA via Kipp Archibald or any
other Realtor ever represented you in this
particular transaction?
A. I don't know if they represented me,
but when we put the property under contract, I
asked Kipp to try to sell the house.
Q. And what house are we referring to?
A. The Petersons' house. During the due
diligence period I asked him to sell the house. So
maybe we could sell it and do a one-time close when
we close with the Petersons.
Q. Did you ever ask Kipp Archibald to try
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money for the Peterson property?
A. No.
Q. Did you indicate to Mr. Foster that
the Peterson property may be available for farming?
A. No.
Q. Did you or your attorney ever meet
with the Petersons in March of2008 concerning the
contract?
A. No.
Q. Did you or your attorneys ever meet
with the Clarks concerning your contract in March
of2008?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever make any inquiries of
anyone whether the contract was to be -- contracts
that were to be closed in December of2007 were
still viable after December of2007?
A. Repeat that question again.
Q. Did you believe the contracts were
viable after the closing date of2007?
A. Did I believe our contracts that were
supposed to close in December were viable after
that?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
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to sell any of the Clark property?
A. No.
Q. Did any farmers ever approach you
about farming the Clark property?
A. Yes.
Q. And who was that?
A. Brad Foster.
Q. And what information, if any, did you
give to Mr. Foster?
A. Brad Foster took me to lunch, asked me
ifhe could farm another piece of ground we have in
Hailey Creek. And he said -- he asked me too if -I heard you bought Raoel Clark's piece, could we
farm that. And I said no, we didn't buy it. The
deal fell through, I said, but here's Raoel Clark's
number, if you want to call him you can ask him to
farm it.
Q. Did you receive any -- you meaning
Buku Properties or any entity that you have an
interest therein, receive any money from Brad
Foster?
A. For the Clark property?
Q. Correct.
A. No.
Q. Did you receive from Brad Foster any
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Q. Did you believe the contracts had
completely been terminated as of the closing date
in December of2007?
A. Those particular contracts, yes.
Q. Are there any other contracts
outstanding with the Clarks or Peterson properties?
A. No.
Q. Were there any attempts to revive the
contracts of2007 in 2008 with the Clarks or
Petersons?
MS. CASPERSON: rm sorry. Did you say
revive or revise?
MR. DUNN: Revive. Come back to life.
TIlE WITNESS: I don't know if we ever tried
to revive the existing contracts. I can't remember
for sure. I think we made them another offer,
another contract.
Q. BY MR. DUNN: And are there any
documents that reference that offer?
A. If there are, they're in the -- all
your paperwork. I think we sent a letter and you
denied it, demanded us to close. I can't remember
for sure.
Q. And if you had any offers to revive or
revise the vVUU<1vl:>, where would we fmd those
9 (Pages 30 to 33)
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documents?
MS. CASPERSON: Objection. It misstates
his prior testimony.
Q. BY MR. DUNN: You can answer.
A. In your paperwork.
Q. Do you have any copies of documents
that would indicate your attempts to revive or
revise the contracts of2007 with the Clarks and
Petersons?
MS. CASPERSON: I'm going to object to the
extent that misstates his prior testimony again.
THE WITNESS: I'm sure you guys have
everything.
Q. BY MR. DUNN: The question is do you
have any documents left in your files on the
Petersons or the Clarks?
A. No.
Q. What, ifany, documents exist
concerning this transaction?
MS. CASPERSON: I'm going to object to the
extent it's vague and ambiguous.
Q. BY MR. DUNN: We'll make it more
specific.
There were two contracts presented by
Jab, Inc., that did not culminate, correct?
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Q. Through where? A title company? To
them directly? To what location, if you know?
A. I don't know for sure. IfI remember
right, I just wrote it to Raoel Clark, the name, I
think.
Q. And that was drawn on the Buku banking
account?
A. I'm pretty sure.
Q. The $327,000, how did that money come
into the possession of the Petersons, if you know?
A. In the form of a check.
Q. And was that from the Buku bank
account that you wrote to them?
A. If I remember right, yes.
Q. Was it made -- well, I guess the
better question I'm trying to ask is did the
327,000 ever get deposited with a title company, or
was it made directly to my clients?
A. It was made directly to them.
Q. And whatever they did with the money,
you knew that it was going to a house, but you
didn't have any further context; is that a fair
statement?
A. Correct.
Q. What, if any, instructions did you
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A. Yes.
Q. There were two contracts for Clarks
and Petersons with Buku Properties that were
actually signed, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Were there any documents or letters
subsequent to those two contracts?
A. After?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And how many, if you know?
A. I don't know.
Q. I'm just trying to find out what's out
there. You don't know?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did you ever see a copy of the closing
of Petersons' home in Idaho Falls?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever made aware of any
documents on their closing of property in Idaho
Falls?
A. No.
Q. The earnest money that was provided to
the Clarks, how was it paid to them?
A. In a check.
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give to Kipp Archibald in the year 2008?
MS. CASPERSON: Objection. That misstates
his prior testimony. Lacks foundation.
Q. BY MR. DUNN: Go ahead.
A. None. He might have called me and
asked me can I still show the house. I said call
Jerry. I don't know. I think he had somebody that
..
wanted to look at the house. I said call Jerry. I
..
don't know. Our deal was done. I can't remember
.
what date it was, if it was 2007 or 2008. It had
to be 2008 because our deal was over.
I
Q. In your affidavit for summary judgment
you relied upon various newspaper clippings. Where
did you obtain those newspaper articles?
A. From the newspaper. From the
Jefferson Star. I don't know what you're asking.
Q. That's pretty much it, where you got
them. You also relied on various statements from
your banker that you indicated. Were those
statements that he or she made to you? I assume it
was a he, but I don't know that you didn't speak to
more than one person.
A. Yes.
Q. In your affidavit you referred to
various county employees. Were those statements

i:
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that you heard from them?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you know, who was the county
planning and zoning coordinator during 2007/2008?
A. I don't know if DaNiel Jose was still
here or if it was Naysha Foster. I can't remember
when DaNiel left.
Q. Did you ever deal with Naysha Foster
at any point in time on these two particular
contracts?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Now, you've dealt with planning and
zoning on a number of occasions with many of your
other businesses; is that a fair statement?
A. Correct.
Q. Are you familiar with their policies
and procedures in a general sense?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've made applications for plats
and subdivisions through other entities, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's with the county? I should
be more specific.
A. Yes.
Q. You've obtained building permits from

I

1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8

9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

A. It's a purchase and sale agreement for
Jerry Peterson.
Q. What date is it signed?
A. August 30th, 2007.
Q. And you signed on behalf ofBuku
Properties; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And likewise with Deposition
Exhibit *-A you signed on behalf of Buku
Properties?
A. Yes.
Q. And who prepared Deposition Exhibit
*-A and Deposition Exhibit *-B?
A. My attorney.
Q. And who was that?
A. Jim Archibald.
(Exhibit *-C marked.)
Q. BY MR. DUNN: Handing you what's been
marked as Deposition Exhibit *-c. What is that?
A. The letter we sent to Jerry Peterson
and Raoel Clark.
Q. When you say we, who is that?
A. Buku.
Q. And who drafted that letter?
A. Jim Archibald.
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the county on occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. And who do you work with on building
permits currently with the county?
A. The girls in the office and Jim Lynch,
building official.
Q. I don't have a real good copy of the
Clark -- you probably have a better copy of the
Clark purchase and sale agreement. But I'll hand
you, and we'll mark it in a second here, Deposition
Exhibit *-A. Does this appear to be the purchase
and sale agreement that was signed by the Clarks?
A. Yes.
(Exhibit *-A marked.)
Q. BY MR. DUNN: When was the agreement
with the Clarks which has been marked Deposition
Exhibit *-A signed? Date?
A. It looks like August 30th, 2007.
(Exhibit *-B marked.)
Q. BY MR. DUNN: Handing you what's been
marked as Deposition Exhibit *-B. Do you recognize
that particular document? It's not a very good
copy. Yours is probably better.
A. Yes.
Q. And what is it?
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Q. And you signed that letter; is that
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And what was the intent of that
letter?
MS. CASPERSON: I'm going to object to the
extent it calls for a legal conclusion.
Q. BY MR. DUNN: You may answer.
A. What was the intent of this letter.
The intent was -- after the contracts were void in
December, it looks like we're asking them to
continue -- to do another deal, to try to make it
work with the banker and try to get the financing.
Q. Were these ever signed by anyone other
than yourself?
A. I don't know.
Q. Deposition Exhibit *-C, is it signed
by anyone other than yourself?
A. No.
Q. When you spoke with the Clarks and the
Petersons, did you always refer to yourself as the
manager for Buku Properties?
A. I don't understand the question.
Q. When you had conversations with
Clarks, did you refer to yourself as the manager of
.....

..
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Q. Do you recall that they were
specifically advised that they would have to pay
back the earnest money if the deal did not go
through?
A. Yes.
Q. Who advised them of that?
A. Robin Dunn.
Q. You were asked some questions about
the zoning that took place in Jefferson County and
your understanding of the zone changes that
eventually took place. Were the Petersons or
Clarks involved in any of the meetings that the
county had to discuss the zone changes?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me what meetings they were
specifically involved in.
A. The county announced however they did
it that they were thinking about that proposed
countywide zone change. So I called Raoel Clark
and Jerry both and said, hey, this is what the
county is thinking about. If this happens, the
deal is off. We can't buy R-5 ground for R-l
prices. We better go to the meeting. So we went
to a meeting. They came with me or I met them
there at the county building. I don't know if it
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ground and subdivide it into five-acre lots.
Q. You were asked some questions about a
real estate agent by the name of Kipp Archibald.
What is your understanding as to who can enter into
an agreement to have a real estate agent sell their
property?
MR. DUNN: Objection. Legal conclusion.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: You can go ahead
and answer.
A. My understanding of who can enter into
I
-- the landowner, the property owner, the
homeowner.
I.
Q. And at any time was Buku ever the
owner of the Peterson or the Clark property?
I
A. No.
Q. And as far as you were aware did Buku
ever enter into any kind of listing agreement with
Mr. Archibald?
A. No.
Q. Did you have discussions with
Mr. Peterson about possibly trying to sell their
home?
A. Yes.
Q. What were those discussions?
A. The discussions were if we could
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was in October or November of 2007.
Q. When you say they, who are you
referring to?
A. Raoel Clark and Jerry Peterson carne to
the meeting.
Q. Do you recall what was specifically
discussed at that meeting?
A. Yeah. It was basically a public
hearing. And every farmer, every landowner, every
developer -- not every. Many in the county stood
up and told the county what a dumb idea they
thought it was, how bad it would affect the
property values.
Q. You indicated in your testimony that
R-l property is not worth the same as R-5 property.
Can you explain that?
A. At the time in the summer of2007, R-l
property was worth about anywhere between 9- and
10,000 an acre. R-5 ground is not worth anything.
It's farm ground. It's worth 1,500, 2 grand an
acre, maybe 2,500. We have an R-5 5-acre lot
subdivision and they're worthless. Nobody wants
them. If they do want them, they have horses and
they aren't willing to pay what it's worth. You
can't make it pencil paying $10,000 an acre for R-5
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sell-- if Buku could sell -- Buku or Jerry could
sell -- if we could sell his house during the due
diligence period, that there was -- if there was
some way we could do a one-time close when we
closed on his property.
Q. You previously testified that you had
informed both Clarks and the Petersons that Buku's
intention was to develop their land into one-acre
lots. Can you tell us what those discussions were
or how you put them on notice that that's what
Buku's plan was?
A. I don't remember the specific
discussion. We talked about it a lot of times.
Raoel and Jerry, they knew exactly what we were
going to do with the property. I think in Raoel's
contract we even -- we went to the extent of -- I
think we were going to name a park after his
brother.
I have the utmost respect for Raoel
Clark, and so it was very important to him and to
me that we develop his ground in a respectful
manner. So I put Raoel and Jerry in my truck, and
we drove around and looked at some other
developments that we'd done so that I could assure
them we'd do a good job. They full well knew that
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISBNo. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
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1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
Case No. CV-08-941

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband. and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.
1 - PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, by and through its counsel of record, Charles A.
Homer and DeAnne Casperson, of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., move the
Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for Summary Judgment.
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson, Affidavit of Brad Foster,
Affidavit of Kipp Archibald and affidavits previously submitted and of record and the
Motion is also supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion for
Summary JUdgment, filed simultaneous with this Motion.
DATED this

\Lt~ of November, 2010 .
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HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1~
I hereby certify that on this ! ~ day of November, 2010, I served a copy of the

following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering,
by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

G:IWPDATAICAHlI49181PIdgsICopy of Summary Judgment, MOT.wpd:bel

3 - PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

( 0First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( j1iacsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

Charles A. Homer. Esq. (1SB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANUUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RADEL H. CLARK and JANET C.

CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES. LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.

Case No. CV-08-94I

AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD FOSTER IN
S'VPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

BRAD FOSTER, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am over 18 years of age, have personal knowledge of the following, except to the
extent a statement is made on information or belief, and make this Affidavit based on
my own personal knowledge.

2.

I am a general partner of Foster Land & Cattle Co. ("Foster Land & Cattle"), an Idaho
general partnership.

3.

In late 2007 or early 2008, Jaramie Magera and I discussed the possibility of Foster
Land & Cattle renting a piece of property known as Hailey Creek for the 2008
farming season. I understand the property is owned by a business associated with Mr.
Magera and located near what is now South Fork Elementary School in Rigby, Idaho.

4.

During this meeting, Mr. Magera and I also discussed two other properties that Mr.
Magera believed Foster Land & Cattle might be interested in farming. One property
was Raoel Clark's farm. The other property was Jerry Peterson's farm. Mr. Magera
told me to contact the Clarks and the Petersons if Foster Land & Cattle was interested
in running either of those properties. I did not know the status of who actually owned
the properties.

5.

In early 2008, I contacted Jerry Peterson by telephone and inquired as to whether he
would be interested in allowing Foster Land & Cattle to run the property. He
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informed me that Jaramie Magera was supposed to purchase it, but his son was going
to run the farm that year.
6.

About the same time, I also contacted Raoel Clark and asked whether he would be
interested in allowing Foster Land & Cattle to run the Clark property. Mr. Clark told
me Jaramie Magera was supposed to purchase it, but there were some problems. He
agreed that Foster Land & Cattle could run the farm to maintain it.

7.

As a result of this agreement, Foster Land & Cattle ran the Clark property that year.

8.

When it came time for payment, I was unsure who to pay. I talked to J aramie Magera
and he said to pay Raoel Clark. When I talked to Raoel Clark, he said Jaramie
Magera owned the land.

9.

After a few months of trying to figure out who to pay, I eventually paid Raoel Clark
on behalf of Foster Land & Cattle. It is my understanding that Mike Clark has the
receipts of Foster Land & Cattle's payments for taxes and water assessments.

10.

Foster Land & Cattle never had a written lease with the Clarks for the 2008 lease of
the property. Rather, the entire agreement was an oral agreement to run the farm. We
have continued with this arrangement for 2009 and 2010.

11.

At no point did Foster Land & Cattle make payments to anyone other than Raoel
Clark for or related to Foster Land & Cattle's farming of the Clark Property.

12.

Foster Land & Cattle is not connected with or associated with Jaramie Magera or any
entity for whom he might work in any way.
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13.

At no point have I or Foster Land & Cattle acted as an agent for Jaramie Magera or
any entity for whom he might work.

Dated this - ' - day of October, 2010.

~
Brad Foster

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

0 day of October, 2010.

~ ~"fLL

Nota PublIc for Idaho
Residing at: gtl>1I\l--v,lt1
My commission expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~-

I hereby certify that on this

h.t

day of November, 2010, I served a copy of the

following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering,
by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD FOSTER IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ATTORNEYS SERVED:

~irst

(
Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
/
( v) Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

-

-v

DeAnne Casperson, E q.

G:IWPDAT AICAH\14918\PldgsISummary ludgment2d.Foster.AFF.wpd:bel
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISE No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 RivelWalk Drive 5 Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsim.ile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF· THE
STATE OF IDAlIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho

Case No. CV-08-941

limited liability company,

Plaintiff,
v.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF KIPP ARCHIBALD
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss
)

County of Jefferson

Kipp Archibald, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am over 18 years of age and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal
knowledge.

I understand that in making this Affidavit, I am providing sworn

testimony under oath, which may be provided to the Court in this case and under
penalty of perjury.
2.

I reside in Jefferson County, Idaho.

3.

I am a real estate agent for ERA Archibald Real Estate located in Rigby, Idaho.

4.

In the fall of2007, I was approached by Jaramie Magera to help procure a buyer for
Jerry and Betty Peterson's home.

5.

In approximately late September/early October of2007, Mr. Magera, Mr. Peterson,
and I met at Jerry Peterson's home located in Jefferson County to discuss the logistics
of marketing the home. Mr. Magera explained that Mr. Peterson and BukuProperties,
LLC ("Buku") had entered into a purchase and sale agreement in which Buku was
going to purchase the Peterson's property for the purpose of creating a new
development. Both Mr. Magera and Mr. Peterson explained that the plan was for the
Peterson home to be sold simultaneous with the remainder of the property, but that
B uku was going to purchase the acreage (the "Development Property") and home, and
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hopefully a third-party buyer could be found to purchase the home and a small amount
of property surrounding the home (the "Home Site Property").
6.

At the meeting Mr. Peterson insisted that the sale of the Home Site Property could
only occur if the sale of the remainder of the property to Buku occurred simultaneous
with the sale of the Home Site Property because he did not want to incur additional
taxes or fees.

7.

Additionally, at the meeting, Mr. Peterson gave me authorization to put a lock box on
the house, to find a buyer, and provided me a key to the house. As a real estate agent,
I could not list a house for sale without the approval ofthe actual owner. I understood
that Mr. Peterson gave me authorization to place the house on the market. I would not
have listed it without his approval since he owned the house.

8.

I listed the Home Site Property on the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") website on
October 9, 2007. A true and correct copy of the MLS records for the Home Site
Property are attached hereto as Exhibit A. I placed a "for sale" sign on the Home Site
Property in order to market it as we had agreed.

9.

In early December 2007, Mr. Magera informed me that there were problems with the
zoning of the Development Property, that the sale of the Development Property was
not going to close, and that the contract between the parties was going to expire.

10.

After receiving this information, and knowing the direction I had been given that the
Home Site Property had to be sold simultaneous with the Development Property, I
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took the Home Site Property off of the market and removed the Home Site Property's
listing from the MLS service on December 7, 2007. This is reflected in the MLS
records attached hereto as Exhibit A.
11.

I telephoned Mr. Peterson shortly after Christmas 2007 to discuss with him what he
wished to do with the Home Site Property. I specifically asked ifhe wanted me to
continue marketing the property.

12.

Mr. Peterson responded that as far as he was concerned Buku had to purchase the
Property. Mr. Peterson told me to either speak with his attorney, Robin Dunn, about
the matter, or discuss it with Mr. Margera.

13.

I never contacted Robin Dunn about this matter because I did not think it was
appropriate for me to do so. I did not contact Mr. Margera because he already told me
that the purchase agreement has expired. I simply left the Home Site Property off the
market because Mr. Peterson had not given me any authority to market the Home Site
Property any further.

14.

Even though I took the Home Site Property off the market, I did not remove the "for
sale" sign and the realtor's key box because I anticipated the zoning issues may get
resolved and the parties may enter into a new purchase and sale agreement. The
Petersons never asked me to remove the "for sale" sign or the realtor's key box.

15.

According to my records, I put the Home Site Property back on the market in April
2008. I put the Home Site Property back on the market because I understood Buku
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and the Peterson's were possibly working on a new purchase and sale agreement for
the Home Site Property and Development Property.
16.

After it became apparent that the parties did not intend to enter into a new purchase
and sale agreement, I spoke with Mr. Peterson in early August 2008 to ask him if he
wanted me to continue marketing the home. Mr. Peterson informed me that he
believed Buku was obligated to purchase the Property and that I should speak with his
attorney, Robin Dunn, or Mr. Margera.

17.

I did not speak with Robin Dunn after this conversation with Mr. Peterson. Again,
I did not think it was appropriate for me to contact Mr. Dunn. Rather, I took the
Home Site Property off the market.

18.

I took the "for sale" sign down some time later in August of 2008.

19.

I inadvertently forgot to remove the realtor's key box from the front door of the home
and did not remove the realtor's key box until December 16, 2009. The Peterson's
never informed me the lock box was still there or asked that I remove it.

20.

During the entire time I marketed the Home Site Property for sale, there were no
offers to purchase the Property. To the best of my knowledge, the Petersons had full
access and control of the Home Site Property. I and my agency did nothing to restrict
their use, possession, or control over the house.

21.

During the entire time the Home Site Property was listed for sale, I am not aware of
any action taken by Mr. Magera or Buku to control or possess the Property. I never
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observed Mr. Magera or anyone from Buku at the Home Site Property other than our
original meeting with Mr. Peterson in September/October 2007.
22.

The Petersons never contacted me to complain or assert they wanted me to do
something different with the Home Site Property or to request that the sign or lock
box be removed.

Dated this.3- day of November, 2010. .

.1

(b

,/1

1/ / / / "

KI:i1t~ibaJ p/.'(>/ (

/;1'-SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this --2.- day of November, 2010.

~.,~L(;,J )i/tA. ~ 1!vVi1 (~t1/',(6--;0-~

Wary Ryblic for Id~ho
.
Residing at: irfahD h'1/1 \
My commission expires:
/{)/;r;;:yJ/L/
I
,/
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.

~'--/---.

I hereby certify that on this \ Lt' day of November, 2010, I served a copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering,

by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDA VIT OF KIPP ARCHIBALD IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

( v)First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

( v1

DeAnne Casperson, Es!q.

G:I WPDATAICAHll49 I 8IPldgslSummary Judgment.2d.Archibald.AFF.2. wpd:bel

NavicaMLS

146259
I

Page 1 of 1

(241 N 4200 E)

Date/Eastern Time

II

Changed By

II

Change

110/9/20076:54:00 PM

IIMelissa Archibald (Office Staff)IINew Listing ($259,000)

110/9/20077:01:00 PM

II NavicaMLS

110/11/20075:42:00 PM
110/17/20071:40:00 PM

I
I

IIPhoto for Main View Processed

Melissa Archibald (Office Staff) IMiSC.

Change.~

Sherilyn Nielsen (Office Staff) IMisc. Change.

110/31/200712:15:00 PMI Melissa Archibald (Office Staff) IMiSC. Change

e

110/31/200712:16:00 PMllMelissa Archibald (Office Staff)IIMain view Deleted
110/31/200712:26:00 PMIINavicaMLS

IIPhoto for Main View Processed

111/30/200712:47:00 PMIIKi Pp Archibald (Agent}

IIMiSC. Change.

I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I

I
I

11217/20072:44:00 PM

IIMelissa Archibald (Office Staff)IIWithdrawn

13/7120082:04:00 AM

II NavicaMLS

IIWithdrawn marked as Deleted by systeml

13/16/2008 2:04,00 AM

IINavicaMLS

IIpurged from system

I

EXHIBIT

i
http://www.navicamls.net/3 59/searchlhistory.asp?mlsnumbet= 146259&is""pop_ win=true

p\
7/21/2010

NavicaMLS

150761

Page 1 of 1

(241 N 4200 E)

1 Date/Eastern Time II

Changed By

II

Change

14/21/20082:38:00 PMIIMelissa Archibald (Office Staff)IINew Listing ($239,000)
14/24/2008 3:35:00 PMIINavicaMlS
18/22/2008 5:08:00 PMIIKipp Archibald (Agent)

I
I

I!Photo for Main View Processed 1

IIWithdrawn

I

http://www.navicamls.netl359/searchlhistory.asp?mlsnumber=150761 &is'yop_win=true

7/2112010

Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
De4Jme Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
,HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO,P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAijO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC. an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON. husband and wife,
Defendants .
. RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.
I - NOTICE OF HEARING

Case No. CV-08-941

NOTICE OF HEARING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 13 th day of December, 2010, at 2:00 p.m., or
as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, at the Jefferson County Courthouse in Rigby,
Idaho, before the Honorable Richard St. Clair, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, in the aboveentitled action will call up for hearing its Second Motion for Summary Judgment.

-

"" -

=

II

DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

2 - NOTICE OF HEARING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

\U,~

of November, 2010, I served a copy of the

following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering,
by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

NOTICE OF HEARING

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

( 4rst Class Mail
( ) jfand Delivery
( -1 Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

DeAnne Casperson,

G:IWPDAT AICAHlI49181PIdgslHearing,NOT. wpd

3 - NOTICE OF HEARING
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)

;<...'

;

'!

c.

l:

.J

"

(;1';

I
I j:
i
,

1

i

Attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-941

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDOUM
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION

)

-------------------------)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company; and
JARAMIE MAGERA, an individual,
Counter-Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------------------)

COMES NOW, these answering co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through
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the undersigned attorney, and submit this memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. The first Motion for Summary Judgment by the
plaintiffs occurred almost one (1) year ago with briefing filed in November of 2009. Mter the
court's decision, nothing was done by the plaintiffs and the matter has sat dormant until this
Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
The newest request for summary judgment does not raise any new material other
than to attempt to detach Magera (manager of the plaintiff) from the proceedings; and to
second guess the court on matters subsequent to the closing date on the contracts discussed
hereafter. The co-defendants / counter-claimants attaches a major portion of their earlier
briefing to this matter for assistance and ease of the court. The earlier information may
assist the court. (The major arguments of these co-defendants/counterclaimants begins on
page 11 of this brief.) The briefing is as follows:
LEGAL STANDARD
This Court is required to review a motion for summary judgment by applying the
following standard:
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits,
and discovery documents on file with the court, read in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no
material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proving the
absence of material facts is upon the moving party. The
adverse party, however, "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." In
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
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Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000) (citations omitted). The Court
should "liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in
favor of that party.

Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172, 175, 968 P.2d 661, 664 (1998).

Notwithstanding, the following also applies to the case herein:
[W]hen a motion for summary judgment which has been
properly supported with evidence indicating the absence of
material factual issues, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine material
fact which would preclude summary judgment. This standard
of review is not affected by the fact that both parties have filed
motions for summary judgment. Rather, each motion must be
separately considered on its own merits, with the court drawing
all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is
under consideration.

Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 488-489 20 P.3d
21, 24-25 (2001).
Idaho law is very clear on the standard used in summary judgment proceedings
that has been cited in numerous cases. That initial standard is as follows:
Summary judgment should be granted if no genuine issue as to any material
fact is found to exist after the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits
have been construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
summary judgment motion. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975).
Thereafter, the court follows often cited points, as follows:
If the court determines, after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment,

that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the court may enter judgment for
the parties it deems entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Barlows, Inc. v.
Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310, 647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982).
In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be liberally construed in
favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of
all favorable inferences which might be reasonable drawn from the evidence.
Smith v. Idaho State Federal Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 1016 (Ct.
App.1982).
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When a party moves for summary judgment, the initial burden of establishing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that party. Thompson
v. City ofIdaho Falls, 126 Idaho 527,887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1994).
If a genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved, or if the record contains
conflicting inferences and if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions
from the facts and inferences presented, summary judgment should not be
granted. Sewell v. Neilsen, Monroe, Inc. 109 Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App.
1985).
If an action will be tried by a court without a jury, a judge is not required to
draw inferences in favor of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment.
Kaufman v. Fairchild, 119 Idaho 859, 810 P.2d 1145 (Ct. App. 1991).

Thus, the court has at least two tasks concerning a summary judgment motion.
First, the court must determine that no material facts are in dispute. Second, the court must
draw reasonable inferences from those facts to determine which party should be granted
summary judgment/partial summary judgment.
Summary judgment is defined and explained in Rule 56, IRCP as follows:
Rule 56. Summary judgment:
(a) Summary Judgment--For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time
after the expiration of twenty (20) days from the service of process upon the adverse party or
that party's appearance in the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by
the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
that party's favor upon all or any part thereof. Provided, a motion for summary judgment
must be filed at least 60 days before the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the
order setting the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(b) Summary Judgment--For Defending Party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at
any time; move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in that party's
favor as to all or any part thereof. Provided, a motion for summary judgment must be filed
at least 60 days before the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order setting
the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(c) Motion for Summary Judgment and Proceedings Thereon. The motion,
affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least twenty-eight (28) days before the time
fixed for the hearing. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party must
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do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an
answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The moving party may
thereafter serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the hearing. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue ofHabiHty
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount ofdamages. Such judgment, when
appropriate, may be rendered for or against anyparty to the action. The court may alter or
shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good cause shown, may continue
the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against a party or the party's
attorney, or both.

(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion for Summary Judgment. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the
facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Mfidavits--Further Testimony--Defense Required. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.

(f) When Mfidavits Are Unavailable in Summary Judgment Proceedings.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
(g) Mfidavits in Summary Judgment Proceedings Made in Bad Faith. Should
it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
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shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused that party to incur, including
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.
IRCP Rule 56, Summary judgment
------------ Excerpt from pages 172-173.

UNDISPUTED /UNREBUTTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

The plaintiff entered into a contract for the sale of real estate with Raoel
and Janet Clark, co-defendants/ counterclaimants. [Complaint, Exhibit A;
Magera Affidavit, Exhibit A; See both Peterson and Clark affidavits].

2.

The earnest money paid to the Clarks was the sum of $25,000. [Complaint,
Exhibit A; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit A; Clark Affidavit, par. 7]

3.

The plaintiff entered into an almost identical contract for the sale of real
estate with Jerry and Betty Peterson, co-defendants / counterclaimants.
[Complaint, Exhibit B; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit B; See also Peterson
Affidavit par. 4].

4.

The earnest money paid to the Petersons was the sum of $327,000.
[Complaint, Exhibit B; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit B; Peterson affidavit,
par. 7 and 8].

5.

The plaintiff knew that the Petersons needed the money to purchase a
retirement home in Idaho Falls. Plaintiff reassured the Petersons that the
sale would close. [Peterson Affidavit par. 8 and 15].

6.

The closing date for the sale on the two (2) contracts was December 21,
2007. [Complaint, Exhibit A and B; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit A and B;]

7.

The plaintiff had a period of inspection before the closing. The only
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defense tendered by the plaintiff, in the facts tendered to the court, for the
non-closing on the two (2) contracts, was that it believed the real estate was
being re-zoned from R1 to R5 by Jefferson County. (One acre lots to five
acre lots.)
8.

The real property was zoned R1 as of the signing of both contracts with the
Clark party and the Peterson Party; and also zoned R1 as of the closing date
of the contracts. [N aysha Foster Mfidavit, par. 4, Peterson Mfidavit, par.
11; Clark Mfidavit, par. 10]. Plaintiff was well aware the property was zoned
R1 and continued to be zoned R1 well after the closing date. [See, Naysha
Foster Mfidavit, par. 6 with attachments of Exhibits 1 and 2; See also,
Exhibit 3 to Naysha Foster Mfidavit].

9.

Jefferson County reassured the plaintiff that the real property would be
zoned R1 and was "grandfathered". [See entire Mfidavit of Naysha Foster
with Exhibits 1,2, and 3.]

10.

The plaintiff failed to close the two (2) sales on the real estate pursuant to
the two contracts at the time designated in the contracts. [Complaint,
Exhibit A and B; Magera Mfidavit, Exhibit A and B;]

CONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiff exercised dominion and control over both sets of real property
belonging to Clark and to Peterson. [Peterson Mfidavit, par. 18; Clark
Mfidavit, par. 16].

2.

Plaintiff hired the realtor to sell the house located on the Peterson real
property and the realtor, at a later date, indicated plaintiff still wanted the
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property. [Peterson Mfidavit, par. 23].
3.

Brad Foster, a renter on the Clark property, has no bearing on the decision
before the court. Brad Foster indicated in his affidavit he did not even
know who owned the land. [See affidavit of Brad Foster submitted by
plaintiff, par. 4; see also, par. 8].

4.

Plaintiff continued to seek desire to purchase the real property from Clark
and Peterson and to seek advice from Jefferson County after the closing
date of the transactions for the contracts. [See, Naysha Foster Mfidavit,
par. 6, 7 with Exhibits 1,2 and 3].

5.

Plaintiff continued to promise payment of the remaining balance to the
defendants/ counter plaintiffs. [Peterson Mfidavit, par. 22; Clark Mfidavit,
par. 18; Attorney Letters, Dunn Mfidavit].

INTRODUCTION
In this second motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs have not alleged any new
facts for the court to reconsider. In fact, quite the opposite exists. The plaintiff have merely
stated what was set forth by both parties in the original briefing and sworn statements of the
parties. The plaintiff is trying to hang its hat on the following language from the court's
ruling on the first summary judgment motions:
The written contracts between the parties are unambiguous and definite;
however, issues of fact remain as to Buku's entitlement to the earnest money under the
contracts. The behavior of the parties after the December 2007 closing date persuades the
Court that the "agreement" between the parties may not have ended after the closing date.
Mter the failed closing, the parties' behavior suggests that an arrangement possibly still
existed between the parties for the sale and purchase of the property. It is unclear what that
arrangement was or what it means. Nevertheless, it seems clear to the Court that the
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parties' behavior subsequent to closing could be due to a later agreement that might affect
Buku's entitlement to earnest money under the earlier Agreements.

A simplistic version of the facts is set forth hereafter which was stated in the first
Motion for Summary Judgment:
The parties hereto entered into real estate transactions for the sale of real property by
each of the two party defendants (husband and wife) to the plaintiff. Those exhibits are
attached to the original affidavit on the first request for summary judgment of Magera as
Exhibit A-Clark; and as Exhibit B-Peterson. (Exhibits also attached to the complaint). Both
properties were "tied" to the sale and the defendants had been neighbors and friends for
numerous years.
The Petersons received a substantial down payment on the real estate transaction as
everyone knew that they were purchasing a retirement home in Idaho Falls. The money was
needed to complete the purchase on their retirement town house and to allow them to begin
the retirement process. The Petersons relied upon the representations of plaintiff in
accepting the down payment.
The Clarks received a modest down payment to sell their real property to the
defendant and moved to Texas

to

begin their retirement plans. Neither set of defendants

believed any contingencies existed, except for environmental issues or defects in the land,
and that the contract was to be completed by a date certain (December 21, 2007) for them to
begin retirement activities.
The real estate purchase agreements state the terms and conditions. No oral
modifications were made by either set of defendants but multiple promises of payment were
made by the plaintiffs to the defendants-even subsequent to the closing date of the
transactions. The defendants did not participate with the plaintiff's bank process nor were
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the defendants involved in any actions of the plaintiff on financing.
No conditions were placed upon the sale of the real property as it related in any way,
shape or form as to the County of Jefferson and any zoning or building requirements. The
intent of usage by plaintiff for the subject real properties was irrelevant to the defendants.
No mutual agreement or understanding was made by the defendants as to the ultimate
usage of the real property being purchased by the plaintiff. In fact, the onl,v understanding

was that the down payment to Petersons was critical to their purchase of a retirement home
in Idaho Falls.
It is true that the sale of both sets of defendants' property was contemplated by the

plaintiff and a condition for both parties defendant. The defendants were aware that the
plaintiff was in the business of development. Both set of defendants continued to be ready,
able and willing to perform on the sale and were ready, willing and able to close subsequent
to the closing date.
Neither set of defendants signed any extensions or written documents referred to as
Ex. E and F. to the Magera Mfidavit in his original affidavit which is already before the
court.
Plaintiff instituted a lawsuit for refund. Defendants answered and counter-claimed
for damages and/or specific performance along with other defenses and claims as set forth
in the pleadings.

1. The plaintiff breached the contract between the parties which was Exhibit A and B to the
Complaint and Magera Mfidavit and, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment on its
cause of action in the complaint.
The breach is very straight forward. Plaintiff failed to pay the contract price to the
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defendants/ counter-plaintiffs on or before the date of closing. No factual dispute exists
concerning the failure of the plaintiff to pay the defendants on or before the closing date as
contained in the written contracts labeled as Exhibits A and B to the Magera affidavit.
Plaintiff relies upon the following language from paragraph 3 of the written contracts
to excuse its breach:
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements,
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs
to make for its due diligence purposes.
No factual dispute exists that any claim has or will be made that the condition of the real
property was not satisfactory. No factual dispute exists that any claim has or will be made that
the real property in question had any environmental concerns. Thus, the plaintiff (buyer) must
be relying on the language "and all requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due
diligence purposes."
This non-artfully drafted language is so vague that it would be impossible for any court
to know what "buyer needs for its due diligence." Paragraph 24 of the contracts is very clear that
the buyer drafted this agreement. As the court is well aware, the court must construe the
language against the drafter.

(See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 (agreement interpreted in accordance with
the meaning assigned by the more "innocent" of the parties); > Luzar v. Western Surety Co.,
107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) (where trier of fact is unable to determine the intent of the
parties, preference is given to the meaning which operates against the party drafting the
agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an interpretation favoring the public
interest).
815 P.2d 469,120 Idaho 271, USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, (Idaho App.
1991)
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201
(agreement interpreted in accordance with the meaning assigned by the more" innocent" of the
parties); > Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) (where trier offact is
unable to determine the intent of the parties, preference is given to the meaning which operates
against the party drafting the agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an
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interpretation favoring the public interest).

USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 815 P.2d 469,120 Idaho 271, (Idaho App.
1991).

------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474.
The plaintiff has attempted to rely upon the County of Jefferson's zoning as its only
defense. It believes that the subject property could not be zoned R-1. The affidavit of Naysha
Foster in the first summary judgment motion clearly rebuts this position and the issue. The
subject land was to be treated as R-1 purposes for this case. Thus. the only argument of the
plaintiff fails. No other defenses or arguments are presented on the direct action of the plaintiff
in its summary judgment motion.
The plaintiff breached the contract and did not timely pay for the balance of the contract
either at closing or subsequent thereto. The plaintiffs failed to fulfill the contract and simply did
not pay the balance. The County of]efferson made it very clear that the land in question had not
been re-zoned; and, as such, the plaintiffs have no legitimate reason to argue that the contract
should be voided and the earnest money returned. In fact, quite the opposite exists.
The court, in its earlier summary judgment ruling, was merely stating the obvious that
more factual questions exist as to the true intent of Buku; and the reasons or lack of reasons why
it demanded a refund of earnest money.
The newest affidavits on this second motion do not shed any new light on the court's
earlier decision. Buku continued to exert control and domination over the real properties of both
Clark and Peterson. Those facts, even if controverted or contested by Buku, are in the original
affidavits before the court.
The newest motion focuses on the lack of control by Buku and tries to place the burden
on the defendants. Those are the very facts that a fact-finder would have to determine in
rendering a decision. Obviously, the language of the contracts can be placed before the fact-
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finder. However, the factual assertions on the failure to close by the plaintiff focus on both the
zoning designation and the subsequent actions by the parties.
Defendants, on the other hand, are not trying to remove or change the clear language of
the original contracts; but rather are trying to show to the ultimate fact-finder that they
(defendants) were lead down a path to believe the original contract would be enforced and/ or
should be enforced as to the damages sustained by the defendants.

2. The defendants/counter-plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the issue ofliability
on their counterclaims.
Since the plaintiff breached the contract, the defendants are clearly entitled to liability on
their counterclaim for breach of contract. The only issue remains is damages and/or specific
performance. The court previously ruled that this matter contains facts that would have to be
determined at trial. The defendants still believe that Buku breached the agreement without any
kind of justification. The court agreed by stating that "issues of fact remain as to Buh..'1l's
entitlement to the earnest money." The court did not dismiss the counter-claims except as to
Consumer Protection. Thus, facts exist and the newest and second motion of the plaintiffs does
not alter the court's original ruling.
The defendants/counter-plaintiffs has been damaged monetarily in a sum to be
established. Specific performance is an alternative for enforcement of the contract against the
plaintiff and in favor of the defendants.

3. Other claims in the counter-claims of the counter-plaintiffs also establish liability with the
issues of damages to be determined at a later point.
The court left in place the following without removing the counter-claims from
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consideration. The plaintiffdoes not re-address these issues (on the counter-claims) and tries
to indicate that the contract entitles Buku to refund of the earnest money. The counter-claim
matters will not be re-hashed but are still in place and remain unaffected by the latest attempt
by plaintiffs to avoid trial. Those counter-claim issues are as follows:
A. Specific Performance
B. Breach of Contract
Breach of contract has been established wherein the plaintiff failed to pay the
defendants/ counter-plaintiffs. No material facts are in dispute and the court should grant the
counter-plaintiffs liability on this issue.

c.

Unjust Enrichment

As the court is aware, unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, plead in the alternative,
to a breach of contract claim.
D. Estoppel
The plaintiff should be estopped from asserting rights contrary to the representations
made to the counter-plaintiffs. Estoppel ties into the detrimental reliance theory. Estoppel is
defined as follows:
Equitable estoppel requires
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth;
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth;
(3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and
(4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to
his or her prejudice.

Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344
(1982).
E. Detrimental Reliance
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Allowing promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration is permitted in
those situations where injustice would otherwise result. The reason for the doctrine also defines
its limits. In order to allege the defense of promissory estoppel, it must be shown: (1) the
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) the substantial loss to
the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3)
the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made.
Simpson, Contracts § 42 (1954).

See also, Restatement of Contracts, § 90.

Mohr v. Shultz~ 388 P.2d 1002, 86 Idaho 531, (Idaho 1964)
------------ Excerpt from pages 388 P.2d 1008-388 P.2d 1009.
4. The defendant/counterclaimants do not indicate to the court that a "new written agreement"
exists.
The defendants / counterclaimants have never alleged that a new written agreement
exists. Nor do these parties dispute the clear written language of the original contracts and, in
particular, paragraph 21. Nor do these answering parties dispute the statute of frauds language
as contained in Idaho Code 9-503. The law is clear on those points and it is believed that the
plaintiffs have "missed the point" of the court's earlier ruling. The court was stating that
various facts exist to determine whether there is justification for return of earnest money. If
there are not sufficient facts to enable Buh"U for the return of earnest money, then the fact-finder
needs to make such a determination. Both pre- and post- contracts, Buku has lead the
defendant/ counterclaimants to believe the sale would occur and the balance of money would be
paid to these answering sellers.
It is very clear that part-performance creates various remedies under the Statute of
Frauds. The plaintiffs began to perform on the promise to purchase. This case was not about
zoning but in reality is about the plaintiffs lender and the willingness to provide additional
funding to the plaintiffs. The case has never been about the inability of zoning, despite the
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assertions of the plaintiff, or any deficiency on the real properties; or, for that matter, the good
faith and fair dealings of the defendants/ counterclaimants.
Quite clearly, part performance is explained in more technical terms concerning the
Statute of Frauds as follows:
We turn to "part" performance. When we use this term, we mean performance by either or both
parties of less than all their respective obligations under the contract. There is no literal
foundation in I.e. § 9-505 for the oft-made assertion that part performance takes a contract
outside the statute. Plainly it does not. The contract is still within the statute. At least a
portion of the contract remains "to be performed" on both sides. Compare I.C. § 9-504
(explicitly referring to part performance ofland sale contracts under I.e. § 9-503). Rather. it is
more accurate to say that in some circumstances. partperformance may establish an equitable
ground to avoid the strictures of the statute offrauds.
In Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 367 P.2d 579 (1961), discussing contracts for personal
services, our Supreme Court implicitly recognized this point:
[T]he equitable doctrine of part performance is not applicable to a contract ... within the statute
of frauds .... The mere part performance of such a contract does not take it out of the operation
of the statute or permit a recovery under the contract for any part of the contract remaining
executory.... [T]o hold that part performance is performance would be a nullification of the
statute.
Id. at 23,367 P.2d at 582 (quoting 49 AM.JUR. § 497, at 798). Similarly, in International
Business Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,198,677 P.2d 507,511 (Ct.App.1984), we
referred to part performance as a doctrine "grounded in equity."
The doctrine of part
performance is best understood as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable
estoppel. Accordingly, we will return to it in the next section of this opinion.
Hovering uneasily between full performance by both parties and part performance by
either or both parties is a troublesome hybrid known as "full" performance by one party.
American courts and commentators have long disagreed--with varying degrees of awareness
and perception--as to whether such performance is akin to full performance by both sides
(taking a contract outside the statute of frauds) or more closely resembles part performance
(possibly allowing equitable relief from the statute). A majority of courts appear to hold the
former view. CALAMARI & PERILLO § 19-23; CORBIN § 457; L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 89 (2d ed. 1965) (hereinafter SIMPSON); 73 AM.JUR.2D
Statute of Frauds § 533 (1974) (hereinafter Statute of Frauds). However, "no ... general
principle can be derived from the decisions on this point." WILLISTON § 528. Thus. some
courts have held that the statute of frauds does not apply to a contract fully executed on one
side. where nothing-remains to be done on the other side except to pay money. See SIMPSON
§ 89. Courts adopting this view may order the contract to be enforced in damages. Other
courts, taking an approach analogous to part performance, may consider an equitable or quasicontractual remedy, such as quantum merit. Id.
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Although the Idaho courts have not explicitly addressed this issue, our cases strongly
point to the equity approach. The Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that when one
party has fully performed an oral contract within the statute of frauds, he is not entitled to
collect damages for a breach. Rather, he is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific
performance. E.g., Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971); Quayle v. Mackert,
92 Idaho 563, 447 P.2d 679 (1968).
These cases put Idaho among a minority of states, but we think the equity approach is
sound. It offers greater consistency with the literal language of Idaho's
[111 Idaho 1010] statute of frauds. For even if one side has fully performed a contract, the
contract as a whole remains "to be performed." Moreover, it is the nonperforming party who
seeks protection under the statute. [In the instant case, the plaintiff, Buku]. Conceptually, it
makes little sense to allow the extent of the opposing party's performance to determine whether
the contract is within or without the statute. It makes greater sense. in our view, to examine the
conduct ofbothparties. and the circumstances surrounding the alleged contract. to determine
whether the party invoking the statute offrauds is equitably entitled to do so. Accordingly, we
hold that the doctrine of full performance by one party, like the doctrine of part performance,
does not take the contract out of the statute of frauds. Rather, it should be treated as a form of
equitable estoppel.

Frantz v. Parke, 729 P.2d 1068, 111 Idaho 1005, (Idaho App. 1986)
------------ Excerpt from pages 729 P.2d 1072-729 P.2d 1073.

The doctrine of part performance works in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
"Under Idaho law, part performance per se does not remove a contract from the operation of
the statute of frauds. Rather, the doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific
form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367, 109 P.3d
at 1109. (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004». Equitable estoppel
generaUy. and the doctrine ofpartperformance specificaUy. assume the existence ofa complete
agreement. See Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367,109 P.3d at 1109.
The language quoted above from cases in Idaho is precisely what the district court was
referring to when it stated: "the behavior of the parties" and similar language as stated therein.
This language is identical to the issues propounded by the court cases as highlighted above.
The plaintiffs cannot rely upon mere allegations of zoning issues to defeat the contract.
It has already been proven, through the Planning and Zoning Department, via Nasha Foster,
that the real property would not be re-zoned. The contractual enforcement rights exist for the
benefit of the defendants. The equitable remedies exist due to the aforementioned part
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performance theory.

Those theories are contained in the counter-claims of the

defendants / counter-claimants.

5. The dominion and control theories of the defendant/counterclaimants establish facts
consistent with the partial performance of the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs miss the point of these facts when arguing for their second summary judgment
motion. These controverted facts show the surrounding nature of the circumstances of how the
plaintiffs dealt; and, that such dealings were not in good faith. The controverted facts still do
not solve the unresolved question of whether the plaintiffs could unilaterally terminate a
contract, partially performed, by the assumption of zoning issues. The clear testimony is that
the zoning issue was a non-issue. Such fact has not been rebutted by the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS
The defendants/counter-claimants still believe and allege that they should bee
granted summary judgment on the issue of liability as there are no material facts to defeat
the breach of contract by the plaintiffs.
The newest and second motion for summary judgment does not raise any new
factual issues not already answered in the court's earlier decision. This second motion does
not remove controverted facts; and, the equitable remedies also available to the
defendants / counter-claimants along with the legal remedy of breach of contract.
The second motion for summary judgment by the plaintiffs should be denied.
DATED this

2q

day of November, 2010.

GZc~
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J'~ day of November, 2010 a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the.lZLl-

copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by:
~

Hand Delivery to plaintiff

~

Postage-prepaid mail to judge
Facsimile Transmission

a~lli
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
P.O. Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83440
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Attorneys for Defendants / Counter-plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
RADEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV-08-941
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY AND
BETTY PETERSON IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Second Mfidavit on Plaintiff's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment

-------------------------)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company; and
JARAMIE MAGERA, an individual,
Counter-Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------------------)

AFFIDAVIT OF PETERSONS RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-l-

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

)
ss.
)

Jerry and Betty Peterson, being duly sworn upon oath, state as follows:
1. They are husband and wife and co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs in the above
captioned matter.
2. This affidavit is prepared in opposition to the second summary judgment request of
the plaintiff and in support of the summary judgment request of the
defendants / counter-plaintiffs.
3. This affidavit is prepared with the assistance of their legal counsel and made upon
personal knowledge and belief of the undersigned affiants.
4. These affiants entered into a written contract with the plaintiff which is attached to
the affidavit of Magera and labeled Exhibit B.
5. This written contract was for the sale of real property in Jefferson County, Idaho as
described in the complaint on file and in the contract. The written contract was
performed in conjunction with the sale of real property of co-defendants/ counterplaintiffs, Raoel and Janet Clark. The Clarks have been neighbors and friends of the
undersigned affiants for numerous years. The plaintiff desired to purchase both the
real properties of the undersigned and of the Clarks. The Clarks written contract is
attached to the affidavit of Magera and labeled Exhibit A. The contracts mirror one
another in most material respects.
6. The written contract of the Clarks was signed on August 30,2007; the written
contract of the undersigned (Petersons) was also signed on August 30, 2007.
7. Both parties received earnest money with the Clarks being $25,000; and the earnest
money of the undersigned being $327,000.00.
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8. Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by nonperformance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of
dominion and control over the subject real property until as late as November, 2008.
9. The Brad Foster affidavit states that Mr. Foster contacted Jerry Peterson concerning
farming of the Peterson property for the 2008 year. Mr. Foster indicated J aramie
Magera had sent him to me to inquire as to the status. As such, I believed Mr. Foster
was acting on directions from Magera as his implied agent. I explained to Mr. Foster
that Magera could do whatever he wanted with the real property if the final payments
were made on the contract. Ifpayments were not made, then I instructed Mr. Foster
that my son was going to rent the ground for 2008. Mr. Foster and myself were both
unsure who "owned the ground" as stated in his affidavit. Your affiant believed that
Magera was still in control of the real property. I had no further dealings with Brad
Foster.
10. Kip Archibald, realtor, was not hired by the undersigned but was hired to sell real
estate by Jaramie Magera. Mr. Archibald, Mr. Magera and Magera's wife came to
the real property, inspected the house, and listed the property (house) for sale. When
Magera, via Buku, LLC paid us the $327,000 the listing came about and all parties
knew we relied upon the earnest money for the purchase of our retirement home in
Idaho Falls. I did not give permission to Mr. Archibald to sell the house; but,
believed that Archibald was listed through Magera. I had no objection to Magera
listing the property. I signed no agreements with Archibald and never had any
conversations with Archibald concerning the sale of the house. I had no input
whatsoever with any MLD listing and never viewed any such listing. These matters
were all handled through Magera and Archibald.
AFFIDAVIT OF PETERSONS RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-3-

11. Your affiants have seen the real property listed as of August 21, 2008 by Kipp
Archibald. Attached as Exhibit AA is a copy of such listing which is contrary to the
assertions of Mr. Archibald in his affidavit.
12. Your affiants believe they had no obligation to contact Mr. Archibald, realtor, as we
did not hire him and the agreements, if any, were between Kipp Archibald and
Magera. We did not tell Mr. Archibald to do anything with the real property. All
matters were between Magera and his agent, Kipp Archibald.
13. In early December of 2007, I was contacted about an early sale of the home. Your
affiants had no objection to the sale found by Archibald. I only spoke with Kipp
Archibald on the early sale of the home except for the request for a key to the house
in 2007 which I surrendered to Kipp Archibald. I did tell him to call Robin Dunn on
January 3,2008 as the sale had nothing to do with your affiants. The property, to the
best knowledge of the undersigned, was listed as long as August 21, 2008 because of
the notice.
14. Your affiants believed that the plaintiff breached the contract by not closing on
December 21, 2007. However, we did continue to try and salvage the sale and had
our attorney correspond with the attorney for plaintiff. Attached as Exhibit BB is
copies of correspondence showing we continued to work with the plaintiff and were
still ready, willing and able to sell the real property. The plaintiff would never meet
with us and actually failed to appear at a scheduled meeting at Mr. Dunn's office to
resolve the contract issues.
15. Your affiants continued to work with the plaintiff because we had totally relied upon
the sale and had already committed to the sale and needed the balance to complete
our retirement process.
AFFIDAVIT OF PETERSONS RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-4-

16. Your affiants have been damaged monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract
and other miscellaneous costs and billings, including but not limited to, lost
revenues on farming practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and utilities, tax
assessments, attorney fees and costs.
17. Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance).

DATED this

t11

day of November, 2010.

Je~ryP~iersoql

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisrf.<1 day of November, 2010.

a~
Notary Public
Residing at: fl, ( b "' Y , :;:'-0
Commission: ; C
b

l' /1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theZi day of November, 2010, a true and correct
AFFIDAVIT OF PETERSONS RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-5-

copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by:
~
~

Hand Delivery to plaintiff counsel

Postage-prepaid mail to judge
Facsimile Transmission

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller
Madison County Courthouse
P.O. Box 389
Rexburg, ID 83440
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Snake River
Main Menu

- This box will guide you through your searching. Look for helpful tips to
maximize your searching capability.

~9-'';lS. tg_,~!Qi rr;;?s9 r.;;h
Sc;r~~l1

$~Jiqck

I Currently Viewing - MLS Number: 150761
Kipp Archibald
ERA Archibald-Reece RealEstate
Phone: 208-200-0605/208-745-5911
Email: ~iR bC.stCC;J.l : Q.9-'Q@ ~r5U;:9Q)

Listing Details
List Price: $239,000
Total Bedrooms: 3
Total Baths: 2
Total Half Baths: 1
Style: 1 Story
County: Jefferson
Elementary School: Jefferson 251EL
Middle School: MIDWAY 251JH
High School: RIGBY 251HS
MLS Number: 150761
City: RIGBY
State: ID
Taxes: 807.10

Lot Size (Apx SqFt):
Apx Acreage: 2
Apx Total SqFt: 2580
Abv Grade SqFt: 1500
Blw Grade SqFt: 1080
Public Info: Beautiful home on two acres with
two big shops. Sunroom, large Jiving room and
family room on the main level. Mature landscapin
and large garden spot. 30x30 shop and 24x30
shop, both with power and insulation. All
surrounded by white vinyl fenCing .
Heat Source/Type: Gas, Forced Air
Air Conditioning: None
Garage # Stalls/Type: 6+ Stalls, Attached,
Detached, Other Type-See Remarks
Apx Year Built: 1964
Zip Code: 83442

All information is deemed reliable, but is not guaranteed. Consult with your real estate profeSSional to verify the
provided information.
The information found on this website is provided as a courtesy to those using www.SnakeRiverMLS.com . Please verify
any information found herein.

,· tfa.~Miii:
" _ " ___ '_"""_. __ •___ •..
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[QUAL HOUSI"G
OPPORTUHIT'I
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http://www.rigbyidahohomes.com/search.php
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SWAFFORD LAvV OFFICE, CH.4.RTERED
525 NINTH STREET
lDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83404
TELEPHOl'i"E: (208) 524-4002

FAx: (208) 524·4131

RONALD

1. SWAFFORD - ATTOR:-IEY-AT-LAW

TWINKIC SWAFfORD - LEG."!. ASSIST/\NT

R. JAMES ARCHIBALD· ATTORNEy·AT-L.. w
DARREN

S.

Rorm~s-ATTORNEY-AT-Lt\w

LARREN K. COVERT· AT,ORNEY-AT-LAW

December 28, 2007
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
Fax: (208) 745-8160

RE:

Jerry Peterson and Raoel Clark

Dear Rob:
Jaramie Magera received your letter this morning dared December 19, 2007. Why did it take
nine days to receive your letter? And why didn't you send it to me'? I talked to you about this and
don't understand why you didn't send me a copy. On December 18, 2007, Magera and Peterson and _
Clark were talKing about this il1fi1endl;'-te-m1's-:ldon't why your clients would think BUh'U is going to
simply walk away from this money.
Once rhe county passed their zone change. rhe appraiser pulled the appraisal of the property.
The hank would not close and Buku does not have the money without borrowing. This is nothing that
Buku or Peterson or Clark anticipated. No one could foresee Jefferson County devaluing the property
of Peterson and Clark at the time of signing the contract.
Buku intended to subdivide the property and install central water and sewer. If we could get a
letter fr0111 the county thar the Peterson and Clark properties will be accepted for one aCre or smaller
lots with a central water and sewer system. then we could take thac letter to the bank and to the
appraiser so that the loan would close.
Since you know the county attorney. can you get that ietter for us? With that letter. everyone
will win. Peterson and Clark will get their money. The county will get a subdivision with central
water and sewer. Buku will sdllots. Then we will proceed to closing. It sounds like a better option
than you and 1 tlghting over if the contract is enforceable or voidable. Without the assurance of
subdividing, we will sue for the return of the earnest money, as your clients have already agreed that
the earnest money is refundable.

Sincerel~

~

R'~Chibald'
J /j

?'::j 0

'3

Esq.

NN LAW OFFICES,
ROBI~

D. Dl':'::':

PE~:':Y ~ORTH

S!-l-\CL
_nfELL".. _-1.. SHEETS

Telephone: (208)745-9202

PO. Box 2"7'7
Pleasant Count::? Lane
Rigby, Idaho 83442-0Tem:lil: rdunn@,dunnbwoffices.com

Facsimile: (208! -4)-8l6('

4""~

December 31, 2007

R. James .Archibald, Esq.
525 Ninth Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Sent viafacsimile: 524-4131
Re: Jerry Peterson/Raoel ClarkiBuku Properties, LLC
Dear Jim:
I received your facsimile dated December 28,2007. It is my opinion that your
contentions contained therein are misplaced. I \vill explain as follows:
1. You indicated I had not VvTitten directly to you concerning .Taramie Magera and
his attempts to alter the contract. As you will note, I only represented [vIr. & t\;frs.
Peterson at the time. Subsequently, Mr. & Mrs. Clark joined in the
representation. I believe you need to have a conversation 'vvith your client and the
manager/member of Buku Properties, LLC (Buku) since there were discussions
between Mr. Magera, !vlr. Peterson and Mr. Clark. Mr. Magera approached them
and tried to have them sign a document which added additional conditions to the
contract. The document was on Buku letterhead and there was direct
conversations between Bukultvlagera and my clients. I merely responded to the
request on the letterhead. At no time, did Mr. Ivlagera indicate that conversations
should be had 'with you or with any other attorney. I merely assumed he \vas
representing himself since he used his own letterhead and had direct
conversations \-vith my clients. Thus, please discuss this matter 'with your client
and ifhe desires direct correspondence 'vvith you, it would cenainly be my intent
to do so. However, your assault upon me, in a friendly fashion, was inappropriate
given the circumstances.

2. The four comers of the contract are very clear. The contingencies contained
therein have been met by my clients. Thus, we fail to understand why a closing
did not occur on the date indicated. The letter sent from my office alTived in
Texas to the Clarks in three (3) days and to the Petersons in approximately two

R. J2.mes Archibald, E
December 31, 2007
Page 2

(2) days. I can only suggest that your client's receipt of mail and/or mailing
practices are someV\ihat different than other individuals. I do not kno'vv why he
did not receive the lener until nine (9) days from the mailing date since both of
my clients received such lener. r can only suggest that either there 'vvas a mail
problem or your client needs to check his box more regularly.
3. You indicated there are contingencies \vith the County. Obviously, both you and
I have clients other than those we currently represent. However, my
representation of other clients has nothing to do with this contract nor with the
language in the four comers of the contract. Both sets of my clients have been
ready, willing and able to sell the property and close upon the date indicated.
Thus, reference to my other clients in other cases has no bearing upon this
transaction.
4. My clients have never indicated they were willing to refund the Earnest Money
Agreement. They have never said it is refundable and have always maintained
they are ready, willing and able to sell the property and continue to do so.
With the spirit of cooperation in mind, both sets of my clients indicated they would
extend the closing date contained in the contract without altering any other tern1S
contained therein upon the condition an additional down payment, in a sum to be
negotiated, and 7.5% interest of their outstanding monies from the date of closing until
the new closing is established.
They also desire the additional money be construed as a down payment and not as earnest
money.
Your clients mayor may not be speculating on the propeny it is purchasing. However,
my clients express no opinion as to the speculative value of the land in question
contained in the contract.
If you desire to litigate, please be infol1ned \ve feel we are on solid ground as the
language in the four comers of the contract seem very clear and definite. Additionally,
this would be construed as a commercial transaction and would entitle the prevailing
party to attorney fees. Obviously, neither the Petersons or the Clarks desire to enter into
litigation as they have always remained loyal to the contract and an attempt to sell to
Buku and/or its manager, tvfagera.
My clients remain on peaceable terms and would like to work out arrangements that are
beneficial to all concerned. However, they are very willing to litigate this issue for the
substantial sums of money that have been involved. They would not foreclose any
remedy including specific performance and/or forfeiture of Earnest Money Agreement
with the return of the real property.

R. James Archibaid, Esq.
December 31, 2007
Page 3

Thus, we have left the matter in your hands.
Sincerely,
".

RDD/jn
cc: Mr. & Mrs. Peterson
lvrr. & Mrs. Clark

I fill

11V,

LVU

JL'1
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S'WAFFORD LA \" OFFICE, CHARTERED
525 NIi'iTH STREET
IDAHO FAl..LS, IDAHO 83404
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-4002

FA.X: (208) 524-4131

TWINKlE SWAfFORD - LEGAl.. ASSISTAr>T

RONA!..D L. SWAFFORD" AnORNEY-AT-LAW

R. JAMES ARCHIBM.. D - ATTORNEy-Ai-LAW
DARReN S. ROSINS-ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
LI\RREN K. COVERT - ATTORi'!EY-Al'-LAW

December 31, 2007
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
fax.: (208) 745-8160

RE:

Jerry Peterson and Raoel Clark

Dear Rob:
Thank you for your letter dated December 31, 2007, No personal assault upon you was
intended.
Your clients have a perfect understanding as to why the contract did not close. Magera,
Peterson, Clark, me and you all attended the planning and zoning meetings. We all knew that if the
zone change was passed, the million dollar property would be reduced in value to a third of the value.
They are now selling something valued substantially less than what was represented [0 Buku back in
August when it was signed. Buku had an obligation under the contract [0 perform due diligence prior
to closing. The due diligence reveals that there is a problem. Buku simply wanted to extend the time
to figure it out. Buku prepared a contract extension on December 18 and your letter was prepared on
December 19.
Your clients are ready willing and able to sell property which was not bargained for by my
client. We all know it. J don't know why your clients are pretending that everything is the same. It
has obviously changed. There waS a meeting of the minds as to the sale of property zoned one acre.
There was not a meeting of the minds as [0 five acre zoned property. This makes the contract
voidable, not enforceable.
The contracts indicate the earnest money is refundable. Please return the money to my office
immediately, or continue to work with us in getting the letter from the county which we need to obtain
financing.
Sincerely,

1,

VL

l\iN LAW OFFICES,
ROBI:\: D Dl':\::\:
SH.:\L'L
..l,\IELL-\ .-\. SHEETS

PE~:\,Y ~ORTH

Teie~hone:

P.O. Box'::-4:"7 Pleasant COUnt!"'.' Lane
rugby, Idaho 83442·02"7"7

C08} -45·9202

email: rdunn@:dunnlawofiices.com

\1arch 17,2008
R. James Archibald, Esq.
525 Ninth Street
Idaho Falls, m 83404
Re: .Teny Peterson/Raoel Clark/Jaramie lVIagera
Dear Jim:
I recognize that Jaramie Magera is the owner/operator of a LLC that is attempting to
purchase real purchase real property from Raoel Clark and J eny Peterson. This letter
wiIi serve notice that my clients both need to dose on the transaction, which is no\-v
delinquent approximately three (3) months, because of financial obligations.

Upon the good faith and belief they had a contract that \-vould be closed in December,
they have both made other arrangements for housing and have financial obligations
\vhich are coming due.
Also, the individuals have to plan for the upcoming months as to famling practices and or
care of the various homes since utilities are a necessity to maintain the imegrity of the
structures.
Therefore, notice is hereby given if the sum of money due my clients is not paid on or
before rv1arch 31, 2008, then they \"'ill pursue other avenues and consider the eamest
money forfeited which \vas paid on the various contracts.
As indicated previously, my clients have ahvays intended to work with your client and do
desire to close this transaction. However, as mentioned abo':,ce and because of other
commitments, they can no longer continue to commit to a contract which is delinquent.
Please let me knov,' your client's thought process in this pmiicular action.
in
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Robin,,-.,--.
D. DUlID,
Esq.',~".-..---,/ "-.J
DUN~ LAW OFFICES, PLLC

RDD/jn
cc: Mr. & Mrs. Peterson
Mr. & Mrs. Clark
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SwAFFORD LAW OFFICE, CHARTERED
525 NIKTH STREET
IDAHO F.ULS, IDAHO 83404

(208) 524-4002
FA.X: (208) 524.4131

TELEPHONE:

RONALD L. SWAFFORD - ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
R. JAMES ARCHIBALD - ATTORNEY-Ai-LAW
TR~VOR L. CA~TLETON . ATIORNEY-AT-LA W
L ..RREK K. COVERT· ATTORNEY·AT·L.~W

T"lI'lNK1E SWAFFORD - LEGAL ASSISTANT

March 31, 2008
Robin D. Dunn. Esq.
Fax: (208) 745-8160

RE:

Jerry Peterson and Raoel Clark

Dear Rob:
Since the date of your letter of March 17, 2008, I understand that yet another new zoning map
has been approved by Jefferson Coumy. I haven't seen the map. but 1 am told that the Peterson/Clark.
property is zonee!. R·5. We have talked [0 our banker, appraiser, and the Jeffeison County Plafu'1ing
and Zoning Administrator. The appraiser needs a Jetter from a county official so that we can finance
the purchase. The administrator has responded that she believes we will be grandfarnered in under the
old zoning map bur she wanted the county attorney [0 sign off on it. I have placed several calls to the
county attorney and have not heard back regarding this issue.
We still wane to purchase the property. May we have an extension to close? Once we get the
grandfarher letter from the county or the county attorney, we can close within 30 days from the date of
the letter. Please advise.

Sincerely,

•

(l~J)JJ-gjJ

\j

es Archibald. Esq.
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SWAFFORD LA \V OFFICE, CHARTERED
525 NINTH STREE.T
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83404
TEl..EPHONE: (208) 524-4002
FAX: (208) 524-4131
L. SWAFFORD - ArrORNEY-AT-LAW
R. J.'MES ARCHIBALD - ATrORNEy-AT·LAW

TWINKlE SWAPFORD - LEGAL ASstSTANT

RONALD
TREVOR

LARREN

L. CASTLETON. AITORNSy·AT-L,\W
K. COVERT·ATIORNEY-AT-LAw

May 28,2008
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.

fax: (208) 745-8160

Dear Rob:

As we discussed last week, the bank has approved financing for the purchase of the Peterson
and Clark properties. However, since the time that the contract was signed, banking regulations have
changed and we cannot borrow as much as was hoped.
We therefore propose a modification and signing a promissory note with the following terms:
Clark property:
Closing:
Money paid down:
Payment on June 6, 2008:
Balance remaining:
Interest rate:
Term:
Prepayment:

June 6,2008
$ 25,000.00
$125,000.00
S904,075.18
Seven Percent (7 %)
To be negotiated
Permitted

Peterson property:
Closing:
Money paid down:
Payment on June 6, 2008:
Balance remaining:
Interest rate:
Term:
Prepayment:

June 6,2008
$327,000.00
$
0.00
$653,000.00
Seven Percent (7 %)
To be negotiated
Permitted

Please review and advise as to a time we can all meet

to

finalize the details.

Sincer~,~

~ArChibald'

Esq.

I

UI

DIJrJl"-J Li\'\Xl OFFICES, PLl.lC
ROBE< D. DV\':-~
NORTH Sf-L-I..CL
,-I..:\fELL'i. ."•. SHEETS

PE~~Y

PO. Box 27"
4"7"7 Pleasant (oumry Lane
PJgoy, Id,lho 83442-0::::-"
email: rdunn(;tdunnlawoffices ..:om

June 3, 2008

R. James Archibald, Esq.

525 Ninth Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Re: Buku Properties, LLC/Peterson/Clark
Dear Mr. Archibald:
I met with my clients Jerry and Betty Pete::son this date and conferenced Raoel Clark by
telephone into the discussion. Obviously, we have received the proposal from your client
and have discussed the same with each party expressing their individual preferences.
Both parties \-vould like to honor the original contract and be paid in full, plus interest and
utilities, for the intervening time. That is the best scenario for all concemed since it
relieves the contractual oblig2tion. }Io\~;ever, your client has apparently encountered
difficulties and desires to alter the original agreement.
If the original agreement were altered, then we could discuss the follo\ving for Mr. &
Mrs. Peterson:
1. They would accept the sum of $153,000 plus accmed interest and utilities to pay
off the balance of the home. If the home were paid off and listed, then my clients
would expect any sale of the home which \vould bring in revenue to be applied
directly to the balance outstanding.

2. My clients would calTY the $500,000 balance ($980,000 - $480,000) with interest
at eight and one-half(8.5%) percent for one (1) year. Upon the conclusion of one
(1) year, then the balance of principal and acemed interest would be due and
payable.
3. My clients would definitely request a personal guaranty in addition to the LLC
business entity.

R. Jame:; Archibald, Esq,

Page 2

As to l\11r. Clark, he has the follO\ving propos;}] if the contract \.\-ere not paid off in full as
original!) contemplated:

1.

S I 25,000 plus interest 0;1 a nOle that is outstanding for the purchase of his
home in Texas. I believe Mr. Magera has spoken w-ith fAr. Clark on that issue.
additional down ..payment
towards the
,-\lso., he \,volIld want $200.000
'"
concluding price.

2.

\Vith the various payments and payments previousIy received, the one million
fony-four thousand (SL044,000)dollars is reduced to $694,000. lIthe
foregoing is accepted. Mr. Clark \.volrld CalTY the $694,000 at eight and onehalf(8.5%) percent interest for one (1) year wherein principal and accrued
interest would be payable in a lump sum. Once again, he would also \vant a
personal guaranty in addition to the LLC contract.

Thus, both of my clients have indicated their preference to honor the original contrac1,
pay the balance due \vith accrued interest, any utility and expenses associated with
upkeep and be done with the entire matter. The second option is their final proposal in
this matter. This option remains opened until June 20, :2008. Thereafter, my clients
"vould consider the original contract in total default, the sums forfeited a:1d would pursue
other buyers. As to the Petersons, they have already tumed down offers of purchase on
an installment basis. An installment basis has never been their preference and that is \vhy
they have tumed downed previous offers. However, I am sure they can at least explore
those options.
As IO Mr. Clark, he purchased a home in Texas in reliance upon the original contract
being fulfilled. Thus, he had to take out a note for payment to complete his transaction.
In the event of any type of litigation, \.ve vvould seek specific performance, accrued
interest and principal along with any utility expenses. Like\vise, we would also seek
attomey fees and costs incurred herein. We would not waive any other remedies which
may exist in either lav,,' or in equity.
Hopefully, the foregoing proposals will lead to successful resolution for all concerned.

RDD/jn
cc: Mr. & Mrs. Peterson
Mr. Clark

,
J

L.I:.JU

Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.

JL.0 -- ..J-lJ.O

20100[C- to

P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV-08-941

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Counter-Defendants.

I-

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

COMES NOW Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of
record Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submits this Reply Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. This Memorandum is supported
by the Affidavits of Brad Foster, Kipp Archibald, and DeAnne Casperson, and the affidavits
previously submitted by Plaintiff to the Court simultaneous with Plaintiff's prior Motion for
Summary Judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants' Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Second Motion
("Defendants' Memo") fails to even remotely address the issues which Buku has brought before
the Court in its Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Buku has asked for summary judgment
to resolve as a matter of law the remaining issues in this case with regard to whether any alleged
agreements or arrangements between the parties after the closing date had any material effect on
Buku's entitlement to a return of the earnest monies under the terms of the Clark and Peterson
Agreements, plus interest.
Defendants have failed to address at all the fact that the Agreements require any
amendments or waivers to the Agreements to be in writing and signed by the parties.
Additionally, Defendants have failed to sufficiently identify any means by which any alleged oral
agreement between the parties modified the terms of the original written agreements or would
not be barred by the statue of frauds. In fact, Defendants continue to insist that they "are not
trying to remove or change the clear language of the original contracts; but rather are trying to
show to the ultimate fact-finder that they (defendants) were lead down a path to believe the
original contract would be enforced as to the damages sustained by the defendants."
(Defendants' Memo, p. 8). However, this is precisely the problem with Defendants' arguments2-
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once the closing date came and went, the Agreements between the parties were terminated and
Buku was entitled to the return of its earnest monies. The Agreements could not be revived
absent a later written amendment or waiver. In fact, Buku asked Defendants to extend the
closing and Defendants refused. Now, however, Defendants want to claim the contract somehow
continued past the closing date and look to inapplicable equatable remedies instead of the
language of the parties' Agreements. Defendants have provided no evidence which would entitle
them to retain the earnest monies, which are refundable pursuant to the terms of the Agreements,
nor have Defendants provided any evidence of separate agreements of any kind, whether oral or
written, which would entitle them to retain the earnest monies and/or require that Buku purchase
the Properties. Buku is entitled to summary judgment on all ofthe pending claims and a return
of its earnest monies.

II. ARGUMENT
A.

Defendants have Failed to Provide Any Evidence of Written Amendments or
Waivers to the Clark and Peterson Agreements.
The purchase and sale agreement between Buku and Clarks ("Clark Agreement") and tlle

plain language of the purchase and sale agreement between Buku and the Petersons ("Peterson
Agreement") requires that any amendments or waivers to the Agreements be in writing and
signed by the parties to be valid. Because no such written amendments or waivers exist as to the
Agreements, the Agreements must be enforced as written. Defendants' have provided no
evidence of any written amendment or waiver modifying the Agreements. Rather, Defendants
merely argue that Buku breached the Agreements and therefore "is not entitled to summary
judgment on its cause of action in the complaint." (Defendants' Memo, p. 10).
In SUppOlt of its argument that Buku breached the Agreements, Defendants argue that
Buku's reliance upon the language of paragraph 3 of the Agreements ("Prior to closing, it is
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Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully satisfied with the condition of the property,
also any requirements, environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer
needs to make for its due diligence purposes") does not excuse its alleged breach because the
language "and all requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due diligence purposes" is
"so vague it would be impossible for any court to know what 'buyer needs for its due diligence.'"
(Defendants' Memo, p. 11). However, in making this argument, Defendants ignore the previous
ruling by the Court in which the Court unequivocally stated that such wording "is unambiguous
and not so indefinite as to make the contract illusory." (January 27,2010, Memorandum
Decision, p. 8). Further, Defendants' Counterclaim alleges the "contracts were clear and
unambiguous .... " (Counterclaim ~~ K and S). Consequently, any arguments made by
Defendants with regard to this language being vague to the extent that it must be construed
against Buku, and that, therefore, Buku cmmot rely upon such language in opting not to close on
the transaction based on its due diligence efforts should be disregm'ded by the Court. The issue
has already been decided by the Court and Defendants judicially admitted the Agreements were
clear and unambiguous.
Additionally, the Court impliedly decided the issue of breach of contract for failure to
close the transaction, as now argued by Defendants, in its Memorandum Decision on Buku's first
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court specifically stated:
Buku was given four months to conduct due diligence concerning the properties.
Potential zoning changes and their impact on financing are precisely the type of
issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase of a real estate
transaction. In short, under the facts ofthis case, it is reasonable that Buku would
look into potential zoning problems, and that uncertainty regarding the properties'
zoning would affect its "interests and concerns."
(January 27,2010, Memorandum Decision, p. 8). Buku has always contended that its reason for
opting not to close on the Agreements was the potential zoning change to the Clark and Peterson
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Properties, and the associated impact on Buku's ability to obtain financing for the purchase of the
Properties. Defendants do not disagree with this fact. (See Defendants' Memo, p. 12). The
Court recognized in its Memorandum Decision that Buku's reason for opting not to close on the
Agreements fell under the umbrella of the language of paragraph 3 of the Agreements. (January

27,2010, Memorandum Decision, p. 8). Buku provided Defendants with notice of the zoning
defect, and gave Defendants the opportunity to cure the defect. (Magera Aff., '122, Ex. E and
F). Further, Buku even requested that Defendants consent to extending the closing dates for the
Agreements in writing. (Magera Aff.,
(Magera Aff.,

~

~

22, Ex. E and F). Defendants rejected that request.

23, Ex. G). Buku was entitled to opt not to close on the Agreements if it was

unable to "satisfY its interest and concerns regarding the purchase." (Magera Aff. Ex.
B,

~

'13 A and

3). This is precisely what Buku did when it discovered, during its due diligence

investigation, that the zoning of the Clark and Peterson Properties was in question and
additionally that Buku would be unable to obtain the necessary financing for the purchase of the
Properties due to this issue. (Magera Aff., ~ 24).' The Court fully recognized the legitimacy of
this action by Buku pursuant to the terms ofthe contracts. (January 27,2010, Memorandum
Decision, p. 8). Consequently, Buku did not breach the Agreements in any way, and Defendants'
argument should be disregarded. Furthermore, because Defendants have failed to produce any
written amendments or waivers which would modifY the Agreements in any manner to entitled
Defendants to retain the earnest money, Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of

Defendants repeatedly state that Buku's citing of the zoning problems as the
reason for not closing on the Agreements fails because, based on the Affidavit ofNaysha
Foster, "[t]he subject land was to be treated as R-1 purposes [sic] for this case."
(Defendants' Memo, p. 12). Defendants ignore the fact that the potential grandfathering
in of the Properties was not addressed by Jefferson County until March of2008, three
months after the closing failed to occur on the basis of the zoning issues. (See Affidavit
of Naysha Foster, Ex.3).
I
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specific performance of the contract and refund of its earnest monies and interest, pursuant to the
terms of the Agreements, should be granted.
B.

Defendants' Cannot Rely OIl Part Performance or any Other Equitable remedy to
Alter the Terms of tbe Clark and l>eterson Agreements.
Defendants continue to argue that the parties entered into negotiations after the

Agreements terminated and that those negotiations somehow bound Buku to purchase the
Properties or forfeit its earnest monies. Defendants provide that they are "not trying to remove or
change the clear language of the original contracts; but rather are trying to show to the ultimate
fact-finder that they (defendants) were lead down a path to believe the original contract would be
enforced and/or should be enforced as to the damages sustained by the Defendants."
(Defendants' Memo., p. 13). Defendants cmIDot use equitable remedies to avoid the written
agreements. See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776-77, 203 P.3d 702,706-07(2009). Even if
promises were made, which Plaintiff denies, Defendmlts knew revisions to the Agreements had
to be in writing. Defendants could not have relied on any statements under the circumstances.
Defendants assert that these unwritten alleged oral agreements are enforceable and not barred by
the statute of frauds through the doctrine of part performance. In support of this argument,
Defendants state that "Buku continued to exeli control and domination [sic] over the real
properties of both Clark and Peterson."
Defendant's arguments regarding part performance are nonsensical. Pmi performance is
an exception to the statue of frauds which would otherwise bar an oral agreement. See
International Bus. Machines v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 198-99,677 P.2d 507, 511-12 (Ct. App.
1984). Part performance has no application to a written contract. See Chapin v. Linden, 144
Idaho 393, 396, 162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007); Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542,
681 P.2d 10 10, 10 17 (1984) ("[S] uch performance must relate to the oral agreement and may not
6-
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be referable to another cause, such as the rights and duties provide by a separate written
contract.") Defendants have pled no cause of action for an oral agreement. To the extent
Defendants are alleging part performance somehow alters the plain language of the Agreements,
Defendants' arguments fail.
In spite of their failure to plead an oral agreement, Defendants appear to be arguing that
the later negotiations somehow created new oral agreements between the parties, that Defendants
partially performed on those new oral agreements, and that therefore, enforcement of the alleged
oral agreements is not barred by the statute of frauds based upon Defendants' part performance.
The reality is that, although the parties engaged in negotiations to potentially enter into a later
agreement to regarding the purchase and sale of the Propeliies, the parties never actually came to
an agreement. (Magera Aff.,

~

25). However, assuming arguendo that the parties had reached

some kind of agreement, Defendants' argument still fails.
Part performance is predicated on the existence of an oral agreement. BauchmanKingston Partnership, LP, v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87,233 P.3d 18,23 (2008) (citing Bear
Island Water Ass 'n v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 723, 874 P.2d 528, 534 (1994». The agreement,
however, must be complete, definite and certain in all its terms, or contain provisions which are
capable of being reduced to certainty. Bauchman-Kingston, 233 P.3d at 23. For a land sale
contract to be specifically enforced, the contract must typically contain the minimum provisions
of the parties involved, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the
property, and all the essential terms of the agreement. Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396,
162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007) (citing Hoffman v. SV Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190,628 P.2d 218, 221
(1981».
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Nowhere do Defendants provide the tenns of any alleged oral agreements. There are no
allegations as to how the earnest money would be treated under the alleged oral agreements. Nor
have Defendants provided any other tenns of the alleged oral agreements, such as a closing date,
terms of financing, or treatment ofthe home located on the Peterson Property. In fact, the
correspondence between the parties attached to the Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in
Support of Defendants' Position Re: Summary Judgment as Exhibit BB clearly indicates that the
tenns of any alleged later oral or written agreement were never finalized, and were significantly
different from the tenns of the original Agreements. In the absence of the alleged terms of the
alleged later oral agreements, it is impossible for the Court to even consider the application of
past perfonnance.
Even if it is assumed that there was a subsequent oral agreement regarding the purchase
of the Properties and that agreement had the same tenns as the original Agreements, Defendants
can point to no portion of the Agreements under which they have perfonned. Defendants claim
that some alleged exercise of dominion and control over the Property by Buku is sufficient for
part perfonnance on the part of Defendants. No where is this addressed as a tenn of the original
Agreements. Moreover, as Buku previously explained in its Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Buku did not exercise dominion and control
over either of the Properties. (See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 19-15). Buku will not repeat those arguments, but it clearly demonstrated
the Petersons and Clarks retained control over their properties based on their straightforward
admissions in their deposition testimony. Defendants have not partially perfonned on any
agreements which existed between the parties. Therefore, partial perfonnance, cannot save any
alleged subsequent oral agreement from being barred by the statute of frauds. Further,
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Defendants reliance on any other equitable remedy to avoid the written agreements is not
permissible. Buku is entitled to summary judgment.

C.

The Facts Before the Court Resolve the Question of Whether Buku Could
Terminate the Agreements and was Entitled to a Return of Earnest Monies.
Defendants argue that "[t]he controverted facts still do not solve the unresolved question

of whether the Plaintiffs could unilaterally terminate a contract, partially performed, by the
assumption of zoning issues." (Defendants' Memo., p 18). Again, partial performance has no
relevance to a written agreement. The Court has in front of it all of the facts necessary to resolve
this case as to the Agreements between the parties and the return of the earnest monies because
nothing more is needed other than the plain language of the Agreements. The Agreements
require any amendments or waivers modifying the Agreements to be in 'writing. The Agreements
provide that:
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully satisfied
with the condition of the property, also any requirements, environmental
requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due
diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to perform the due diligence
inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase.
(Magera Aff., Ex. A,

~

3; Ex. B,

~

3). Because of the zoning problems that arose, Buku was

unable to obtain the necessary financing for the purchase. Buku gave Defendants that opportunity
to cure the zoning defect, and offered to amend the Agreements, in writing, in order to allow
Defendants sufficient time to cure. However, Defendants refused, the closing date passed
without Defendants curing the zoning defect, and the contract terminated. As the Court has
already recognized, "[p]otential zoning changes and their impact on financing are precisely the
types of issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase of a real estate transaction."
Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the zoning defect remained at the time of closing. (See
Affidavit of Naysha Foster, Ex. 3, indicating that Jefferson County did not provide Buku with
9-
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correspondence regarding the potential grandfathering of the Properties in question as being
zoned R-l until late March 2008, three months after closing would have occurred). After the
closing date passed without Defendants curing the zoning defect, Buku was entitled to a return of
its earnest monies, pursuant to the terms of the Agreements. (Magera Aff., Ex. A, ~ ~ 2,3; Ex. B
~~

2,3). No written amendments or waivers were executed. The parties did not enter into any

later agreements. Consequently, specific performance of the Agreements requires the return of
the earnest monies to Buku and summary judgment in Buku's favor.

D.

Defendants' Claim and Summary Judgment in Buku's Favor for Summary
Judgment is Untimely and Improper, and Should Not Be Considered by the Court
In Defendants' Memorandum they state: "[t]he defendants/counter-plaintiffs are entitled

to summary judgment on the issue of liability on their counterclaims" and further provide,
"[s]ince plaintiff breached the contract, the defendants are clearly entitled to liability on their
counterclaim for breach of contract." (Defendants' Memo, p. 13). Defendants have not actually
filed any motion for summary judgment, nor have Defendants served Buku with a Notice of
Hearing indicating that its motion for summary judgment will be heard at the December 13,
2010, hearing on Buku's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Given Defendants' untimely
and improper argument, Defendants claim for Summary Judgment should not be considered by
the Court.
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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant its Second
Motion for Summary Judgment and order the return of Plaintiff s earnest monies.

Dated this 6TH day of December, 2010.

-

DeAnne Casperson

1/

V
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December 2010, I served a copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY Judgment

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

( v}First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( b!Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff.
v.

RAOEL H. CLARK. and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company.
Counter-Defendants.
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MOTION TO STRIKE

Case No. CV-08-941

MOTION TO STRIKE

COMES NOW Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of
record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, and move this Court to strike the portions of the
Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary
Judgement, filed November 29,2010; the Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in Support of
Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgement, filed November 13,2009; and the Affidavit of
Raoel Clark in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgement, filed November 13,
2009. This Motion is supported by Buku's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and the
Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Strike, filed simultaneous herewith.

Dated this 6TH day of December, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December 2010, I served a copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand
delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct
copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED: MOTION TO STRIKE

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

G:\WPDATAICAHlI49181PIdgslStrike.MOT.wpd
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( 1'iirst Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
(---fpacsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .... _

Charles A. Homer. Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson. Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls. ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV-08-941

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE

RAOEL B. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,

Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BEITY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,

COUl1ter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Counter-Defenda11ts.
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of
record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, and submits this Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Strike.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark ("Clarks") and Angus Jerry Peterson and
Betty Jean Peterson ("Petersons") (collectively "Defendants") submitted their Memorandum Re:
Summary Judgement Plaintiffs Second Motion in response to Buku's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment, on November 29,2010 ("Defendants' Memorandum"). Along with
Defendants' Memorandum, Defendants submitted the Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in
Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment ("Second Peterson Affidavit.").
Defendants have also previously submitted to the Court the Afffidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson
in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment ("Original Peterson Affidavit") and
the Affidavit ofRaoel Clark in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment
("Original Clark Affidavit"). Portions of the such affidavits contain legal conclusions, hearsay,
or lack foundation, and further, portions of such affidavits constitute a "sham" and are therefore
inadmissible. Consequently, Buku objects to those portions of the affidavits and requests that the
Court strike those portions of the affidavits from the record.

II. ARGUMENT
A.

Second Peterson Affidavit
Buku moves to strike the following portions of the Second Peterson Affidavit for the

reasons specified below:

1.

Paragraph 9:
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The Brad Foster affidavit states that Mr. Foster contacted Jerry Peterson
concerning the farming of the Peterson property for the 2008 year. Mr. Foster
indicated Jaramie Magera had sent him to me to inquire as to the status. As such,
I believed Mr. Foster was acting on directions from Magera as his implied agent.
I explained to Mr. Foster that Magera could do whatever he wanted with the real
property if the final payments were made on the contract. If payments were not
made, then I instructed Mr. Foster that my son was going to rent the ground for
2008. Mr. Foster and myself were both unsure who "owned the ground" as stated
in his affidavit. Your affiant believed that Magera was still in control of the real
property. I had no further dealings with Brad Foster.
(Second Peterson Aff.,

~

9). This testimony contradicts Mr. Peterson's testimony at his

deposition. Mr. Peterson stated the following at his deposition:
Q. (Ms. Casperson) You indicate that in March, you don't have a date, that Brad
Foster called you; is that correct?
A. (Mr. Peterson)
That's correct.
Q.
And specifically tell me what you can recall Mr. Foster told you.
A.
Mr. Foster said that Jaramie called him and wanted him to rent the farm.
He asked me if it was in pasture. I said yes, but Jaramie hadn't bought the
place yet. He said, oh, he hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I
said, well, when he buys it, he can do what he wants, but ifhe don't buy it,
why, I'm going to let Steve run it.
And that's what you did, correct?
Q.
That's what I did.
A.

[... J
Q.

A.

You specifically testified that you told Brad Foster that until Buku actually
paid you the money they weren't going to get to use that pastureland,
correct?
Yeah, and Brad said he didn't want to get in - I said Magera hadn't bought
it yet. When he bought it, he could do whatever he wanted with it, but
until then Steve would run it. And he says, well, I don't want to get
involved in it then.

(Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Strike ("Casperson Aff."), Ex. A
("Peterson Depo."), p. 58,1. 7-18; p. 68, In. 11-20). Mr. Peterson's deposition testimony clearly
indicates that he was well aware that he "owned the ground," and furthermore, that Mr. Magera
was not "in control of the real property." Mr. Peterson's affidavit contradicts this sworn
testimony.
3-
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Statements in an affidavit which directly contradict deposition testimony may be
disregarded on a summary judgment motion. (See Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J. R. Simplot Co., 124
Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302 (1993) and Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262 (9 th
Cir. 1991) (explaining the "sham affidavit" rule: "The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a
party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony."
"[I]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by
submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the
utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact." (Internal
citations omitted)). To the extent that the testimony in Mr. Peterson's affidavit contradicts his
sworn deposition testimony, such testimony in Mr. Peterson's affidavit should be stricken from
the record and should not be considered by the Court.

2.

Paragraph lO(excerpt):
Kip [sic] Archibald, realtor, was not hired by the undersigned but was hired to sell
real estate by laramie Magera ...

(Second Peterson AfL,

~

10). The above statement lacks foundation and, further, Mr. Peterson

has demonstrated no personal knowledge as to this matter. Therefore, such statement should be
stricken from the record and disregarded by the Court.

3.

Paragraph 8:
Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by nonperformance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of
dominion and control over the subject real property until as late as November,
2008.

Paragraph 14:
Your affiants believed that the plaintiff breached the contract by not closing on
December 21, 2007.

Paragraph 17:
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Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance).
(Second Peterson Aff., "8, 14, 17). The above statements are legal conclusions. Defendants
have brought causes of action against Buku for breach of contract and specific performance.
Because Mr. Peterson's statements regarding whether Buku breached the contract or whether
Defendants are entitled to specific performance are legal conclusions, and not statements of fact,
those portions of Mr. Peterson's affidavit should not be considered by the Court.

B.

Original Peterson Affidavit
Buku moves the Court to strike the following portions of the Original Peterson Affidavit:

1.

Paragraph 12:
The purpose of the purchase by the buyers was never communicated to the undersigned
affiants nor did the contract state any potential use of the real property being purchased by
buyers. Both properties were historically used as farm operations. Your affiant did
know, however, that plaintiffs were in the business of land speCUlation and development.
Moreover, the sale of the real property by written contract never contained any language
of speculative purposes or of development.

(Original Peterson Aff., , 12). This testimony contradicts the deposition testimony of Mr.
Peterson with regard to his knowledge of Buku's intention to develop the Peterson property:
Q. (Ms. Casperson)

So if! understand your testimony correctly is that you
understood that Buku was purchasing the property for
purposes of developing it. You just didn't have any
knowledge about how they intended to develop it?
A. (Mr. Peterson)
No. I didn't know whether they were going to try to have
half-acre lots or whatever. I didn't know.
Q.
But you did understand that they were purchasing it for purposes of
developing it?
A.
Yes.
(Peterson Depo., p. 18, In. 22 - p. 19, In. 7). Because Mr. Peterson's affidavit contradicts his
deposition testimony, paragraph 12 of Mr. Peterson's affidavit constitutes a "sham." Clearly, Mr.
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Peterson was well aware that the Peterson property was being purchased for the purpose of
development. (See argument above regarding the legal basis for striking "sham" affidavit
testimony). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Peterson's testimony in the Original Peterson
Affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, the Court should disregard the testimony in the
Original Peterson Affidavit and such testimony should be stricken from the record.

2.

Paragraph 18 (excerpt):
The plaintiff exercised dominion and control over the real properties contained in
the written contracts of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs ...

Paragraph 26:
Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by nonperformance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of
dominion and control over the subject real property.

Paragraph 28:
Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance).
(Original Peterson Aff.,

~~

18, 26, 28). The above statements are legal conclusions. Defendants

have brought causes of action against Buku for breach of contract and specific performance.
Because Mr. Peterson's statements regarding whether Buku breached the contract or whether
Defendants are entitled to specific performance are legal conclusions, and not statements of fact,
those portions of Mr. Peterson's affidavit should not be considered by the Court.

C.

Original Clark Affidavit
Buku moves to strike the following portions of the Original Clark Affidavit:

1.

Paragraph 11:
The purpose of the purchase by the buyers was never communicated to the undersigned
affiants nor did the contract state any potential use of the real property being purchased by

6-
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buyers. Both properties were historically used as fann operations. Your affiant did
know, however, that plaintiffs were in the business ofland speculation and development.
Moreover, the sale of the real property by written contract never contained any language
of speculative purposes or of development.

2.

Paragraph 16 (excerpt):
... The real property of the undersigned was used for farming by the buyer
throughout the 2008 fann year.

(Original Clark Aff.,

~

11, 16). This testimony contradicts the deposition testimony of Mr. Clark

with regard to his knowledge of Buku' s intention to develop the Peterson property and the fact
that Buku did not fann the Clark Property in 2008:
Q. (Ms. Casperson)

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

And in 2007 you began having negotiations with Mr.
Magera and either Jab Construction or Buku with regard to
the purchase of the property; is that correct?
(Mr. Clark)
Yes.
And isn't it true when Mr. Magera had those negotiations with you that he
drove you to other developments that he had done?
Yes.
And you understood at the time that the purpose of purchasing that property was
to develop it; correct?
Yes.

[... J
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

7-

So how did Buku control that property after the agreement did not close in
December?
Well, I was hoping that it would continue on. But as to whether - I don't
know who owned what. The property never left my ownership, and it
wouldn't until it was paid for.
Okay. And you agreed to allow Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct?
Sure. You know, if you let it go, it turns to weeds. Somebody had to
make a call on it.
And you agreed you were the person that did that?
I did. I mean, I was told by Brad that Mr. Magera asked him to call me
and see if it was all right.
SO you're not alleging that Buku actually received any profits off of you
property, correct?
I don't know that they did. I don't see how they could.
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(Casperson Aff., Ex. B ("Clark Depo."), p. 6, In. 22 - p.7, In. 9; p. 30, In. 17 - p. 31, In. 11).
Because Mr. Clark's affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, paragraphs 11 and 16 of his
affidavit constitute a "sham." Clearly, Mr. Clark was well aware that the Clark Property was
being purchased for the purpose of development. Additionally, it is clear that Mr. Clark's
testimony is that Brad Foster farmed the land, not Buku. (See argument above regarding the
legal basis for striking "sham" affidavit testimony). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Clark's
testimony in the Original Clark Affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, the Court should
disregard the testimony in the Original Clark Affidavit and such testimony should be stricken
from the record.

3.

Paragraph 16 (excerpt):
The plaintiff exercised dominion and control over the real properties contained in
the written contracts of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs ...

Paragraph 20:
Your affiant alleges that the plaintiff breached the written contract by nonperformance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of
dominion and control over the subject real property.

Paragraph 22:
Your affiant believes and alleges that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance).
(Original Clark Aff., "16, 20, 22). The above statements are legal conclusions. Defendants
have brought causes of action against Buku for breach of contract and specific performance.
Because Mr. Clark's statements regarding whether Buku breached the contract or whether
Defendants are entitled to specific performance are legal conclusions, and not statements of fact,
those portions of Mr. Clark's affidavit should not be considered by the Court.

8-
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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Buku respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion to Strike.

Dated this

~f. . . ~ of December, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December 2010, I served a copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
RobinD. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

10 -

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE

( vr:;rst Class Mail
(

) ]land Delivery
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV-08-941

AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO S'I'RIKE

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Defendants.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Counter-Defendants.
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)ss.
)

DeAnne Casperson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney with the firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and
an attorney of record on behalf of Buku Properites, LLC. I submit this Affidavit
based upon my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated, and in support of
the Motion to Strike.

2.

On April 13, 2010, I took the deposition of Defendant Angus Jerry Peterson.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A are relevant portions of the transcript of such
deposition.

3.

On April 13, 2010, I took the deposition of Defendant Raoel H. Clark. Attached
hereto as Exhibit B are relevant portions of the transcript of such deposition.

Dated this

£'h..."day of December, 2010.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

('~v'
9 day of December, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6TH day of December, 2010, I served a copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand
delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct
copy thereof.
DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDA VIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

~rst

(
Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( .;;Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail
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PAGE 17

1 selling, I have no idea how much it was.
Q. You indicated that you had received an
2
3 offer to sell your property several years earlier,
4 correct?
5
A. That's right
Q. And how much were they going to pay
6
7 you per acre?
A. They were gOing to pay me $5,000 an
8
9 acre for farming ground.
Q. And their purpose, was it to develop
10
11 it?
12
A. They were going to develop it.
Q. And you're not familiar with anyone
13
14 else who has sold property for farming purposes and
15 what the going rate was for that?
16
A. No.
17
Q. Did you have an understanding of what
18 the going rate was for acreage for purposes of
19 development?
20
A. I never paid any attention to that.
21 only just going by and saying they wanted 30,000,
22 40,000 by -- I think it was one of his properties
23 over there on the county line. It seemed to me.
24 It might be wrong. It seemed like they wanted
25 $40,000 an acre for it.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

they intended to develop it?
A. No. I didn't know whether they were
going to try to have half-acre lots or whatever. I
didn't know.
Q. But you did understand that they were
purchasing it for purposes of developing it?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in 2007 after you entered into
this agreement with Buku, tell me what your
understanding was as to the county's action with
regard to possibly changing the zoning?
A. Mr. Magera called me and said that
they was having a meeting on planning and zoning.
They wanted to change it. Wanted us to come to the
meeting.
Q. Had you heard from other people ••
A. No.
Q. Can I finish the question?
A. Okay.
Q. Had you heard from other people that
the county was interested in possibly changing the
zoning?
A. Not until he told me.
Q. And did you attend that zoning
meeting?

r== PAGE 18

r== PAGE 20

Q. And what was your understanding from
1
2 the contract that you entered into with Buku what
3 you were being paid per acre for your property?
4
A. Well, I was paid so much for the
5 acreage, and I was paid - and then I was paid so
6 much for the house.
7
' Q. Did you have an understanding as to
8 what you were being paid per acre for the land?
9
A. I was being paid -I can look it up.
10
Q. You'd have to look at the purchase
11 agreement; is that what you're saying?
12
A. Yeah.
13
Q. I think there's a copy of it right
14 here. I think that one is Mr. Clark's. You can go
15 ahead and take a look at Exhibit *-B. Do you have
16 a rough idea of what you were being paid per acre?
17
A. Okay. I was being paid $653,000.
18
Q. And this was roughly for 73 acres; is
19 that correct?
20
A. Approximately 73 acres. 72 acres it
21 says on the contract.
22
Q. So if I understand your testimony
23 correctly is that you understood that Buku was
24 purchasing the property for purposes of developing
25 it. You just didn't have any know/edge about how

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. I attended that meeting.
Q. Did Mr. Magera explain to you why he
wanted you to attend that meeting?
A. He said to come in and have anybody
else that was interested in coming.
Q. Did he explain to you what Buku's
concern was with regard to the county changing the
zoning?
A. Well, he didn't want it changed.
Q. Why didn't he want it changed?
A. Well, I'm sure he didn't want it
changed because he wanted either one-acre lots or
less.
Q. Did you go to that meeting for the
purposes of contesting the county changing that
zoning?
A. I went to the meeting, but I never
said a word.
Q. What was your purpose in attending the
meeting?
A. He asked me to come and go.
Q. That was the only reason you went?
A. That was the only reason I knew about
it.
Q. And did you ever attend any other
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1 that Mr. Archibald called you and asked you what
2 you wanted to do with the house, correct?
3
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And at that time you were still the
4
5 owner of that property, correct?
6
A. That's right.
Q. And as the owner of the property, you
7
8 would be the only one who would have authority to
9 decide whether or not to sell that property,
10 correct?
11
MR. DUNN: Objection. Legal conclusion.
12 And leading again.
13
THE WITNESS: I was the owner of the
14 property. But we were still figuring on selling
15 it, because he said if it would - the zoning was
16 changed. And the zoning wasn't changed. And so I
17 told him to get ahold of Mr. Magera and Mr. Dunn,
18 because it wasn~ up to me, because I had already
19 had a thing that was supposed to be in place, and
20 it was - still hadn't - completely hadn't gone,
21 because he had wanted to go to the 31st of March.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But this was past
22
23 the 31st of March even --I'm sorry. You refused
24 to sign that document, correct, extending the
25 clOSing date?

=
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1
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3
4
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changed.
Q. How did you know he still wanted it?
A. He told me that.
Q. When?
A. Well, he told me here, and he told me
on that meeting, that meeting we went to.
Q. Now, we've specifically been over your
statement that you prepared for December 12th, and
during that meeting you had already testified that
he specifically said that they wouldn't pay if the
zoning went to five-acre lots, correct?
A. That's right. But it didn~ go to
five-acre lots. Is that correct?
Q. And you didn't know that in December,
did you?
A. What?
Q. You didn't know whether it had or had
not in December of 2008, correct?
A. I didn't know that it had.
Q. You didn't know that it hadn't either?
A. No. So thafs why we were waiting on
this - it wouldn't make any difference.
Q. Mr. Peterson, you would agree with me
that at the time you made these notes your memory
would have been more accurate than it is today?

r=== PAGE 50
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1
A. I didn't sign it, no.
Q. So as it existed that date, there was
2
3 no document extending the clOSing, correct?
4
A. Only that he still wanted the
5 property.
Q. What document can you show me that he
6
7 still wanted the property on that date?
8
A. I haven't got a document.
9
Q. And you haven't indicated any kind of
10 conversation during that time frame that indicated
11 that Mr. Magera still wanted the property, correct?
12
A. Yes, I did. Because Brad Foster
13 called me, and he said that Jaramie wanted him to
14 operate the farm this year.
15
Q. Lers back up. That happens in March,
16 correct?
17
A. You're talking about March here too,
18 aren't you?
19
Q. I'm talking about January.
20
A. January.
21
Q. Of2008.
22
A. I don't recall anything about that
23 other than the thing was still in limbo, because I
24 knew -- I knew that he still wanted it if the
25 zoning didn't get changed, and it didn't get

A. It probably would. That's why I made
1
2 these notes.
3
Q. Prior to Mr. Archibald calling you on
4 January 3rd, asking what you wanted to do with the
5 house, had you had prior discussions with
6 Mr. Archibald?
7
A. None. He come out - him and
8 Mr. Magera come out before we moved, and they went
9 through the house. He took him through the house,
10 and they put it up for sale.
11
Q. Were you there?
12
A. I was there when they went through the
13 house. I wasn't in any of their negotiations. I
14 didn't know how much they were going to get or
15 anything like that.
16
Q. You're saying that you never signed
17 the listing agreement with Mr. Archibald?
18
A. Never. Never talked to him about it.
19 Never signed nothing.
20
Q. Did you approve the listing of the
21 house with Mr. Archibald?
22
A. No.
23
Q. But you were there?
24
A. I was there when he brought it out.
25 And then there was no Signing done there. He
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1 brought Mr. Archibald out, and they went through
2 the house and looked it over.
Q. How could Buku list a property that
3
4 they didn't own?
A. I don't know. But when he called me
5
6 up, Jaramie said that he had the house up for sale,
7 and he says would you sign it over, because he said
8 I need to --I need you to sign it. I said, yeah,
9 sure, I WOUld.
Q. That you would essentially give Buku
10
11 Properties the authority to market the house? .
A. No. I never give authority to do
12
13 anything until he asked me on early in December.
14 But this was before December that they come out the
15 first time and put a sign out.
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Archibald to
16
17 take that sign down?
A. Never told him to take the sign down.
18
Q. Did you ever tell him to remove the
19
20 lock box?
A. I never told him to remove the lock
21
22 box. But he called me and in -- he called me .- he
23 called me August 6th. He called me on his cell
24 phone, asked about selling the house. I told him
25 to talk with Jaramie and said we don't know what's
~
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went out there, found a cell phone in the master
bedroom of the house. And according to a neighbor,
Earl Coles, the house was still being shown. The
blinds in the front rooms were open, which I have
kept closed. The for-sale sign was still up.
Q. So you have no idea when that cell
phone was left, correct?
A. No.
Q. You have no idea when the blinds were
allegedly moved?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Peterson, if Mr. Archibald had an
agreement with Buku Properties to sell the house,
why would he call you on January 3rd of 2008 and
ask you what you wanted to do with the house -MR. DUNN: Objection, speculation.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: -- to the extent
that you can testify.
MR. DUNN: Objection, speculation. How is
he supposed to know-THE WITNESS: I don't know but I'll tell
you what I thought. I thought Mr. Magera was
standing right there beside him wanting him to
call.'
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But you have no

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = j ! r==

1 going on right now. We've turned everything over
2 to our attorney, Rob Dunn. Kipp said Jaramie still
3 wanted the farms, ours and Clarks, and the bank had
4 cut down on the loaning percentages.
Q. Mr. Peterson, let me take you back to
5
6 your January 3rd conversation that you had with
7 Mr. Archibald. When he asked you what you wanted
8 to do with the house and you told him to go talk to
9 your attorney, Mr. Dunn, do you have any know/edge
10 of whether Mr. Archibald had a conversation with
11 your attorney?
12
A. I have no idea.
13
Q. So you have no idea what Mr. Archibald
14 did after that?
15
A. No.
16
Q. But you do know that he continued to
17 have a Sign in front of the house?
18
A. He had a sign in front of the house,
19 yes.
20
Q. And he had a lock box on it?
21
A. He had a lock box on it.
22
Q. And was he giving you notification of
23 any showings that took place?
24
A. No. He wasn't giving me any showings.
25 But I went out there and - on June 27th, 2008, I

PAGE 56
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1 evidence of that, correct?
2
A. No. No, I don't.
3
Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Archibald who he
4 was taking his directions from for purposes of
5 selling the house?
6
A. No.
7
Q. And you never asked him to remove the
8 lock box, correct?
9
A. No.
10
MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered.
11
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And you never asked
12 him to remove the sale sign?
13
MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered.
14
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Correct?
15
A. No. I never asked him to remove it.
16
Q. And if Mr. Archibald had sold that
17 property, who would you have expected to get the
18 proceeds?
19
A. Well, if the property was - if the
20 farm and that would have sold, I would have
21 expected him to get the proceeds. But the farm
22 wasn't sold, so the house wouldn't have been sold.
23 To me, I wouldn't ·-1 wouldn't have got any
24 proceeds because I wouldn't --I didn't have it up
25 for sale. Jaramie is the one that put it up for
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sale.
Q. Who would have had to sign the

documents in order to transfer title to that
property?
A. I would have. But if he wasn't going
to buy the farm, it wouldn't have been sold. I
didn't have anything to do with selling the
property - selling the house. I had nothing to do
with that. Never talked to Mr. Archibald. He
called me twice. That's the only times that I
talked to him.
Q. So without any understanding as to why
Mr. Archibald was trying to sell it, you just
continued to let the sign stay there and the lock
box stay on it?
A.. I thought that he was trying to sell
it for Mr. Magera.
Q. But you never had a conversation with
him about that?
A. No. No.
Q. Now, during this time frame that the
property, you say, had the sign out front, you were
taking care of the property, correct?
A. Thafs right.
Q. And, in fact, you leased the farmland
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move in. If he didn't take it and we got it back,
why, then I would sell it.
Q. So you were concerned that any renters
would damage the property?
A. Yes.
Q. You indicated in your prior testimony
on August 6 of 2008 that Kipp Archibald again
called you and asked you about selling the house,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And, again, you referred him to
Jaramie and Mr. Dunn, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And, again, did you have an
understanding as to why Mr. Archibald would be
calling you as to what you wanted done with the
house?
A. He called me, and I told him
everything was turned over to our attorney, Robin
Dunn. And he said Jaramie still wanted the farm,
along with the Clarks', but the bank had cut down
on the loaning percentage.
Q. Isn't it true that later in 2008 that
there were proposals gOing back and forth between
you and Buku Properties to come to a new agreement

r=== PAGE 60
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1 to your son for pasture, correct? Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
2
Q. You indicate that in March, you don't
3
4 have a date, that Brad Foster called you; is that
5 correct?
6
A. That's correct.
Q. And speCifically tell me what you can
7
8 recall Mr. Foster told you.
9
A. Mr. Foster said that Jaramie called
10 him and wanted him to rent the farm. He asked me
11 if it was in pasture. I said yes, but Jaramie
12 hasnt bought the place yet. He said oh, he
13 hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I
14 said, well, when he buys it, he can do what he
15 wants, but if he don't buy it, why, I'm going to
16 let Steve run it.
Q. And that's what you did, correct?
17
18
A. That's what I did.
19
Q. So any profits that were made with
20 regard to that farmland came to you, correct?
21
A. That's right.
Q. Why didn't you take actions to lease
22
23 the house out if you were no longer Jiving there?
A. Because I didn't want to lease it out.
24
25 It was in good shape, and I didn~ want people to

1 with regard to the sale of the property?
2
MR. DUNN: Objection. Form of the
3 question.
4
THE WITNESS: There was a letter written to
5 us, I guess, yes.
6
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And isn't it true
that
that
contained different terms than the
7
·8 original terms in the purchase and sale agreement?
9
MR. DUNN: Objection. Leading.
10
THE WITNESS: Yes.
11
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: What did you
12 understand was the difference between the terms
13 that were proposed in the letters as opposed to the
14 terms in the original purchase and sale agreement?
15
A. They wanted to make payments on it.
16
Q. And was there ever any contract signed
17 as a result of those negotiations?
18
A. Not with me.
(Exhibit *-J marked.)
19
20
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: "II hand you what
21 was previously marked as Exhibit *.J. Do you
22 recognize that document?
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. Can you identify it for me?
"
25
A. Well, it's a letter for the
i r\ i ~i

T&T REPORTING - (208) 529-5491

Ii
Ii

II
II
Ii

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t

SITION OF ANGUS JERRY PETERSON - 04/13/2010
r== SHEET 17

PAGE 65

r== PAGE 67

1 never changed.
Q. What does that have to do with Buku
2
3 exercising dominion or control over the property'?
4
A. You mean I just go sell it and default
5 the thing?
6
Q. No. I'm trying to ask you
7 specifically how Buku was in control over your
8 property'?
9
A. Well, they were in control over the
10 house.
Q. How were they in control over the
11
12 house?
13
A. Had the house locked up.
Q. Did you have keys to the house?
14
15
A. I had a key to the house.
16
Q. Did Buku or Mr. Magera have keys to
17 the house?
18
A. I gave him the keys.
Q. Do you know if he still had those keys
19
20 at that time?
A. No. He might have gave them to
21
22 Archibald, but he had keys. He had keys and he had
23 the door openers. And he's never returned the door
24 openers.
25
Q. Are you aware of any time when any
r== PAGE 66
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gave your son the right to use the pastureland?
A. That's right.
Q. So you're not asserting that Buku ••
A. No.
Q. •• had any kind of dominion or
control··
A. No.
Q. •• over the pasture land ··Iet me
finish. You're not asserting that Buku had any
kind of control over the pastureland, correct?
A. Thafs right.
Q. And your only evidence that Buku was
controlling the house was your assumption that
Mr. Archibald was acting on behalf of Buku,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And any profits that were made with
regard to the pastureland came to you, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And you're not aware of any payments
that Buku received as a result of having any kind
of control or dominion over that property'?
A. No.
Q. And you never observed anyone actually
going through the property other than the cell

r== PAGE 68

1 agent of Buku was on your property after this
2 purchase and sale agreement failed to close?
3
A. Well, only Archibald.
Q. And you never had any discussion with
4
5 Archibald as to who he understood he was

1
2
3
4
5

6 representing?
A Well, I just assumed he was
7
8 representing him because he brought him out to our
9 place and went through the house. And they was
10 taking notes down and size of the rooms and what
11 was done down in the basement and everything else.
Q. And isn't it true that that all
12
13 happened prior to the contract being closed,
14 correct?
15
A That's right.
16
Q. And after that happened on January
17 3rd, Mr. Archibald specifically called you and said
18 what do you want me to do with the property'?
19
A. Yes. He said - and I told him he had
20 to talk to Magera and to Rob Dunn.
21
Q. And you don't have any knowledge as to
22 whether he did any of those things?
23
A No. 'talked to him twice is all I
24 ever talked to him.
25
Q. Isn't it true that you specifically

6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

phone that you found in there, the blinds being in
a different position, and then this statement that
you have from your neighbor that it was shown; is
that correct?
A. "ve never seen anybody in there
myself, no.
Q. And it was true during this time that
you and your wife were still maintaining and caring
for the property, correct?
A That's right.
Q. You specifically testified that you
told Brad Foster that until Buku actually paid you
the money they weren't going to get to use that
pastureland, correct?
A Yeah. And Brad said he didn't want to
get in --I said Magera hadn't bought it yet. When
he bought it. he could do whatever he wanted with
it, but until then Steve would run it. And he
says, well, I don't want to get involved in it
then.
Q. Why didn't you tell Mr. Archibald the
same sort of thing?
A. Well, I didn't know Mr. Archibald was
selling the ground.
Q. But you knew he was trying to sell the
j
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1 afford, we bought it. And he knew that we were
2 buying it.
MS. CASPERSON: Why don't we take a break.
3
(A recess was taken from 12:33 p.m. to
4
5 12:53 p.m.)
. Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Mr. Peterson, you
6
7 had indicated that you had provided a key and a
8 garage door opener to the house. And you said that
g that was to Mr. Magera; is that correct?
10
A. Thars right.
Q. And isn't it true that when you
11
12 provided that was at the meeting that you and
13 Mr. Archibald and Mr. Magera had at your house?
14
A. No.
Q. When was it that you provided that?
15
A. It was before that, I took the key
16
17 over to his office.
Q. And the garage door opener at that
18
19 time too?
A. And two garage door openers at that
20
21 time.
Q. During the time that you negotiated
22
23 this purchase and sale agreement with Buku
24 Properties, was your wife ever present?
A. Yes - no. Not until we got the
25

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
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a few questions. They walked through the house.
That's all.
Q. When you looked at the document, I
think which was previously marked as Exhibit *.1,
which was your notes that you prepared from your
handwritten notes, do any of those conversations
reflect conversations that your wife had?
A. No.
Q. These are all your conversation; is
that correct?
A. That's right.
Q. Did you ever receive any
correspondence from your attorney regarding any
risks that you might face as a result of using the
earnest money prior to the closing of this purchase
and sale agreement?
A. No.
MS. CASPERSON: I have nothing further.

:

16
17
18
19
20
EXAMINATION
21 BY MR. DUNN:
Q. Can I have you look at Exhibit *.J,
22
23 paragraph No. 12. Counsel didn't have you read the
24 entire' paragraph, took only a portion of it. Could
25 you begin with that sentence where my finger is
;-== PAGE 76
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contracts, no.
Q. When you went to the meeting for the
county zoning issues, was your wife present?
A. No.
Q. And were you typically the one who was
dealing with any of the issues that have arose as a
result ofthe purchase and sale agreement?
A. We agreed on it. Yeah. We talked
back and forth, yes.
Q. What I'm asking you is as between you
and your wire, were you the one that was handling
the issues that arose as a result of the purchase
and sale agreement?
A. We talked it over. I talked it over
with her before I done any of it. Yeah, she was -I was the one that done it.
Q. But you were the one who having
discussions with Mr. Magera?
A. That's right.
Q. And you were the one who was having
discussions with Mr. Archibald?
A. I had - only when he called me those
two times, the only time I ever talked to
Mr. Archibald, other than the time that they come
out and walked -I said hello to him, and he asked

1 pointing?
A. Your affiants did know, however, that
2
3 the plaintiffs were in the business of land
4 speculation and development. Moreover the sale of
5 the real property written by the contract never
6 contained any language of speculative purposes or
7 of development.
8
Q. So you knew that the plaintiffs were
.9 in the business of land speculation and
10 development?
11
MS. CASPERSON: Objection. Leading and
12 suggestive.
13
THE WITNESS: Yes.
14
Q. BY MR. DUNN: And you also knew that
15 they were going to develop this, correct?
16
A. Yes.
17
MS. CASPERSON: Objection. Leading.
18
Q. BY MR. DUNN: But you did not know,
19 however, how they were going to develop it?
20
MS. CASPERSON: Same objection.
21
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't know how they
22 were going to.
23
Q. BY MR. DUNN: And you didn't know if
24 it would be any type - what type of lots, correct?
25
MS. CASPERSON: Same objection. Can I have
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taken before?
A. No.
Q. I just want to go over a few ground
rules, and they're really for me and for you, and
they help us prepare an adequate transcript. The
first of which is I can tell you at some point
throughout this deposition I'm going to ask a
poorly worded question. If you don't understand
what I'm asking, please just say will you repeat
that or have me rephrase, and I will do so.
A. Okay.
Q. Otherwise I'm going to assume that you
understand the question. The second is that I need
you to answer in a yes or a no or some kind of
explanation. We have a tendency to nod our head
and say uh·huh.
A. Okay.
Q. And those are very difficult for the
court reporter to take down. If you can remind me,
I'll remind you, because I'm sure we'll both do it.
The third thing is that at any time that you need
to take a break, although I don't think it's going
to be a very lengthy deposition, you're welcome to
do so, although I would ask that you answer the
question that's currently on the table.

PAGE 6

A. Yes.
1
2
Q. And isn't it true when Mr. Magera had
3 those negotiations with you that he drove you to
4 other developments that he had done?
5
A. Yes.
Q. And you understood at the time that
6
7 the purpose for purchasing that property was to
8 develop it; correct?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Isn't it true that you understood that
11 in order for Buku or Jab to pay you the amount of
12 money that they offered, that they would need to
13 develop that into one·acre lots?
14
A. I'm not sure initially I did but just
15 developed.
Q. And when was it that you came to that
16
17 understanding?
18
A. I tell you, it really wasn't on my
19 mind. I was dealing with Jab. And when this Buku
20 was - I don't know when this came about, but I
21 thought this thing was over. I didn't feel-- I
22 didn't -/ really don't know what on that. It
23 bothered me anyway. Didn't feel right about it.
24 But I trusted Jaramie. I had respect for him and I
25 did.
~

Is there any reason why you can't
1
2 testify truthfully today?
3
A. I don~ know of any.
Q. Thank you. Can you tell me what your
4
5 current address is?
6
A. I live in Frisco, Texas.
Q. And when did you move to Frisco,
7
8 Texas?
9
A. I moved two days after Thanksgiving in
10 '77, I think -- 2007. Criminy.
11
Q. And prior to living in Texas where did
12 you live?
13
A. We lived at 286 East 4100 North. Is
14 that right? Yes.
15
Q. And is that the property that is at
16 issue in this litigation?
17
A. Nearby, yes.
18
Q. And, in fact, you had a house and then
19 a substantial amount of farm property; is that
20 correct?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. And in 2007 you began having
23 negotiations with Mr. Magera and either Jab
24 Construction or Buku with regard to the purchase of
25 that property; is that correct?
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Q. And you had indicated at some point

that you came to an understanding that the
development was going to be in one·acre lots. When
did that occur?
A. I didn't know that he had - well, it
really came to bear in my mind - I'd really not
give it a whole lot of thought. I knew that he
wanted to develop the property, and I knew that he
wanted it to be -- to zone with the one, with the
R-1. I knew that, yes.
Q. And was that before you entered into
the contract that you knew that?
A. If I did, I mis - it really came to
bear in my mind when we went to the hearing. I
didn't know how significant that was gOing to be
for this.
Q. And you would agree with me that
Mr. Magera's assessment of the value difference
between R·5 property and R·1 is Significant?
MR. DUNN: Objection. Leading.
THE WITNESS: The only thing I wondered
about, about that time this thing was starting to
cool off, this whole sales thing. So - but I did
know that he wanted to make it R-1. I knew that.
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: You knew that he
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1 turns to weeds. Somebody had to make a call on it.
1 kind of control or dominion over the house?
Q. And you agreed you were the person
A. No.
2
2
Q. And who did have control and dominion
3 that did that?
3
A. I did. I mean, I was told by Brad
4
4 over the house?
5 that Mr. Magera asked him to call me and see if it
5
A. Me.
Q. And isn't it true that it was your son
6 was all right.
6
Q. So you're not alleging that Buku
7
7 who was living in that property?
8 actually received any profits off of your property,
8
A. That's right.
9 correct?
9
Q. Are you aware of any way then in which
A. I don~ know that they did. I don't
10
10 Buku controlled that property, your property ••
11 see how they could.
A. The house itself or the whole thing?
11
12
Q. If you look at paragraph 21 of your
Q. The whole thing.
12
affidavit,
it indicates that •• well, let me read
13
13
A. I don~ know what to make of it. When
14 it to you. It says your affiant has been damaged
14 I read the name on that after I got studying it a
15 monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract and
15 while, it was some kind of a shame. That's the way
16 other miscellaneous costs and billings, including
16 I felt about it.
Q. The name on what?
17 but not limited to lost revenues on farming
17
18 practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and
18
A. Buku. It sounded phony to me. That's
19 utilities, tax assessments, attorney fees and
19 all I'm going to say.
20 costs.
20
Q. Okay. I understand that But with
21
Now, you understand that the court has
21 regard to your allegation that Buku somehow
22 exercised dominion and control over your property,
22 already ruled on a portion of this litigation,
23 correct?
23 what are you asserting that they did?
A. Would you explain that to me, please.
24
A. The whole property?
24
Q. The whole property.
25 What part?
25

r=== SHEET 8
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A. Well, maybe I assumed this, but I felt
1
2 that where he'd made an offer to buy my property,
3 that that was so. I was going to sell it to him to
4 become his.
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. But you received the benefit of the
tax assessment that was paid by Mr. Foster,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you received the benefit of the
water assessment payment?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you received the benefit of
whatever leasing arrangement you had with your son.
I don't know whether you required him to pay you or
not, correct?
A. That's okay. I understand that.
Q. So how did Buku control that property
after the agreement did not close in December?
A. Well, I was hoping that it would
continue on. But as to whether -I don't know who
owned what. The property never left my ownership,
and it WOUldn't until it was paid for.
Q. Okay. And you agreed to allow
Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct?
A. Sure. You know, if you let it go, it

Q. Well, you understand that we had cross
1
2 motions for summary judgment?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. And do you understand that the court
5 ruled that the contract was not ambiguous?
6
A. Legal terms are ambiguous in any way
7 you look at it.
Q. But you do understand that there has
8
9 been a ruling from the court on this case?
10
A. Some ruling. I don't know what it
11 was, but yes.
12
Q. Let me go to these miscellaneous costs
13 and billings that you claim to have lost. What
14 lost revenues on farming practices are you
15 claiming?
16
A. None.
17
Q. What lost interest are you claiming?
18
A. On the farm itself? Not the agreement
19 to buy?
20
Q. Yes.
21
A. I don't know that I've lost anything.
22
Q. So the lost interest that you're
23 referring to in this paragraph is only associated
24 with the contract, correct?
25
A. With the farm.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.
RAOELH. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BErry JEAN
PETERSON. husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.
1 - NOTICE OF HEARlNG

Case No. CV-08-941

NOTICE OF HEARING

.
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 13 th day of December, 2010, at 2:00 p.m., or
as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, at the Jefferson County Courthouse in Rigby,
Idaho, before the Honorable Richard St. Clair, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, in the aboveentitled action will call up for hearing its Motion to Strike.

Dek'n'e Caspersok1~~q.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

2 - NOTICE OF HEARING

I'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December, 2010, I served a copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering,
by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

NOTICE OF HEARING

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ill 83442

G:IWPDATAICAHl149181P1dgsISJ Hearing.NOT.wpd

3 - NOTICE OF HEARING

( V{Pirst Class Mail
( ) Nand Delivery
( ; ;Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120
RIGBY, IDAHO 83442
)
)
)
)
)
)

Buku Properties L L C

vs.
Raoel H Clark, etal.

Case No: CV -2008-0000941

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motions (2 nd motion for summary judgment)
Monday, January 24, 2011
Dane Watkins, Jr.
Judge:
Large Courtroom #3
Courtroom:

02:30 PM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Thursday,
December 16, 2010.

Deanne Casperson
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

US Mail . / /

Hand Delivery _ __

RobinD. Dunn
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

US Mail._ _

Hand Delivery_ __

Dated: Thursday, December 16, 2010
Christine Boulter
Clerk Of The District Court

.-../\!\lJ

By:
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RAOELH. CLARKETAL,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2008-941
MINUTE ENTRY ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
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This matter came on for hearing on motion for summary judgment on January 24, 20tJ,at .:.-./0'
'
t?
3:05 P.M., before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Rig%
Idaho.
Court Reporter was not present. The parties waived the presence ofthe court reporter.
Ms. Nancy Andersen, Deputy Court Clerk, was present.
Ms. DeAnn Casperson appeared on behalf of the plaintiff
Mr. Robin Dunn appeared on behalf of the defendant.
Ms. Casperson presented argument in supporting the motion for summary judgment.
Mr. Dunn presented argument in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Ms. Casperson responded.
The Court will take the matter under advisement.
Court was thus adjourned.

c: DeAnn Casperson, Esq.
Robin Dunn, Esq.

District Judge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON.

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-941

--------------------------))
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------------------)
This cause having come before this Court pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Buku Propeliies, LLC (hereafter "Buku") on November 16, 2010, and a Motion to Strike
filed by Buku on December 6, 2010; this Court being fully advised in the premises, and good
cause appearing;
NOW, THEREFORE:
Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

JUDGMENT RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1

Buku's Motion to Strike is denied.

DATED this

?

day of February 2011.

JUDGMENT RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L3

day of February 2011, I did send a true and correct
I hereby celiify that on this
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Robin D. Dunn

P.L.L.c.
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
DUNN LAW OFFICES,

DeAnne Casperson
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.

P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

CRISTINE BOULTER
Clerk of the District Court
Jefferson County, Idaho

JUDGMENT RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON.

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Defendant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-941
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC (hereafter "Buku") entered into a
Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereafter "Clark Agreement") with Defendants Raoel H. Clark
and Janet C. Clark (hereafter collectively "Clarks") for the purchase of 80.17 acres of property
located in Jefferson County, Idaho (hereafter "Clark Property"). The Clark Agreement denoted a
purchase price of$I,044,075.18. The Clark Agreement specified that Buku would provide

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

Clarks with $25,000 in earnest money and that the entire amount was fully refundable until
closing. The money was tendered on October 15,2007.
On or about August 30, 2007, Buku entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement
(hereafter "Peterson Agreement") with Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (hereafter
collectively "Petersons") for the purchase of 73 acres (hereafter "Peterson Property") adjacent to
the Clark Property. The Peterson Agreement denoted a purchase price of $980,000. The
Peterson Agreement specified that Buku would provide Petersons with $327,000 in earnest
money and that all but $10,000 was fully refundable until closing. The money was tendered on
August 30, 2007.
At the time the parties entered into each respective Purchase and Sale Agreement, both
the Clark Property and the Peterson Property (hereafter collectively "Properties") were zoned
Residential-l ("R-l "), which would allow a minimum density of one acre lots.
Pursuant to both the Clark Agreement and the Peterson Agreement (hereafter collectively
"Agreements"), closing was to take place on or before December 21,2007.
Both Agreements provided Buku with a four month due diligence period to ensure Buku
was satisfied with the condition of the Properties prior to closing. During the four-month
diligence period, Buku learned of a proposed zoning change, which might have affected the
Properties.
Between August 30,2007 and December 18,2007, issues arose regarding the Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission's plans to possibly change the zoning categorization
of the Properties to R-5. The change which would allow a minimum density of five acre lots
could have potentially decreased the value of the Propeliies.

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

On December 18, 2007, Buku notified in writing the Clarks and Petersons of its objection
to the condition of the Properties being zoned R-S. While the parties dispute the relevance of the
zoning of the Properties, it was an issue that was discussed prior to the closing date. The
December 18, 2007 letter contained an offer to move the closing "date back from December 21,
2007, to March 1,2008."
On December 19,2007, in response to Buku's offer to extend the closing date, counsel
for Clarks and Petersons rejected the offer to extend the closing date by stating, "In the event you
choose not to close, my clients would declare the contract in default."
December 21, 2007, passed without closing on the Properties, and the Agreements were
never modified or amended.
On November 6, 2008, Buku filed suit against Clarks and Petersons seeking return of the
earnest monies under the terms of the Agreements.
On December 10,2008, Clarks and Petersons filed a Counterclaim seeking specific
performance, breach of contract, and other equitable claims; and asking the Court to grant
summary judgment in their favor.
On October 6, 2009, Buku filed for Summary Judgment.
On January 27,2010, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision (hereafter "First
Memorandum Decision,,).l Among other things, the Court found the Agreements were
unambiguous but that summary judgment was premature as to the issues surrounding
enforcement of the Agreements. 2
On November 16,2010, Buku filed Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment.

This case was previously assigned to Seventh Judicial District Judge Moller who issued the
January 27,2010 Memorandum Decision.
2 The Court granted summary judgment in Buku's favor as to Defendant's counterclaim
involving the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

On November 29,2010, Clarks and Petersons filed Defendant's Memorandum Re:
Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Second Motion (hereafter "Defendants' Brief in Opposition").
On December 6,2010, Buku filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 3
The Court heard oral argument on January 24,2010.

II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v.
Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21
P.3d 908 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct.
2548 (1986), stated:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the

On December 6,2010, Buku filed a Motion to strike portions of the following affidavits:
Original Peterson Affidavit, Second Peterson Affidavit, and the Original Clark Affidavit. Buku
argues that the objectionable portions of the affidavits contain legal conclusions, lack foundation,
and that they are conflicting. The Court can sort through the affiants' statements that are
conflicting, that lack foundation and contain legal conclusions and disregard them as appropriate.
Buku's Motion to Strike should be denied. Moreover, the remaining portions of the affidavits
provide the Court with the necessary evidence for its conclusions.
3
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affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement.
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that,
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary jUdgment
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way
that allows it to accomplish this purpose.
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original).

When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co.,
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v.
Lott, 133 Idaho 846,993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-

moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237,999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000).
If the action will be tried by the court without a jury, an exception to this rule applies. In
Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519-20, 650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982), our

Supreme Court held that summary judgment is appropriate despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences if the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the
trier of facts. Moreover, in such a situation, the judge is not required to draw inferences in favor
of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Id. "Conflicting evidentiary facts,
however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving pmiy." Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark
Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 124,206 P.3d 481,488 (2009).
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The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Celotex, which stated:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." ., . Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc.,
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488
(2002).
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cmmot merely rest on his pleadings
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth,
136 Idaho 800,41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle,
Inc., 136 Idaho 792,41 P.3d 220 (2001).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof
attrial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof
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concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Id

III.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Clark and Peterson Agreements are Unambiguous

When construing a contract, this Court must decide as a matter of law whether the
contract is ambiguous. Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Program Underwriters v. Northland Ins.
Cos., 7 Idaho 84, 86, 205 P.3d 1220, 1222 (2009). A contract is ambiguous if, when considered
in its entirety, it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101
Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135,136 (1980); Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 781, 747 P.2d
1302, 1310 (1987). If the contract does not appear ambiguous on its face, and if neither party
asserts that it contains an ambiguity, then the meaning ofthe contract and the intent of the parties
must be determined from the plain meaning ofthe words used. Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of
Idaho, 139 Idaho 37,46, 72 P.3d 877, 886 (2003). Further, "courts do not possess the roving
power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho
219,223,220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009).
Neither party asserts the Agreements are ambiguous. Clarks and Petersons assert Buku
breached the Agreements by refusing to close on or before December 21, 2007. Buku argues,
pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Agreements, it was not obligated to close, and that Clarks and
Petersons breached the Agreements by failing to refund the earnest money. Paragraph 3 of the
Agreements provides as follows:
Buyers Obligations:
Prior to closing, it is
with the condition
requirements, and all
diligence purposes.

Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully satisfied
of the property, also any requirements, environmental
of the requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due
Buyer will have four month to perform the due diligence
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inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase. Thus
closing will be on or before December 21,2007.
Clark and Peterson Agreements at 1-2 & 2 respectively.
In its First Memorandum Decision, the Court stated the following in reference to
paragraph 3: "The Court finds that the wording above is unambiguous and not so indefinite as to
make the contract illusory." First Memorandum Decision at 8.
Having reviewed Idaho authority and the Agreements, like the previous Court, this Court
concludes the language in paragraph 3 of the Agreements is unambiguous and enforceable.
B.

Buyer's Diligence

Clarks and Petersons assert that since the Agreements are unambiguous, the Agreements'
provisions are enforceable; specifically that Buku was required to close on December 21, 2007.
Buku argues that it performed the necessary diligence under paragraph 3 of the Agreements by
providing notice of the zoning issue to the Clarks and Petersons and asking them to extend the
closing date to cure the issue.
In its First Memorandum Decision, the Court previously stated:
Buku was given four months to conduct due diligence concerning the properties.
Potential zoning changes and their impact on financing are precisely the type of
issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase of a real estate
transaction. In short, under the facts of this case, it is reasonable that Buku would
look into potential zoning problems, and that uncertainty regarding the properties'
zoning would affect its "interests and concerns."
First Memorandum Decision at 8.
The language of the Agreements clearly allowed Buku to ensure it was "fully satisfied"
with the condition of the Property and "all the requirements" it needed to satisfy its "interests and
concerns. "
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While the provisions, "fully satisfied" and "buyer's interests and concerns" are
potentially broad, they are not ambiguous. During the four month due diligence period, Buku
was authorized to satisfy its interests and concerns regarding purchasing the Propeliies. Thus,
the Agreements permitted Buku to look into potential zoning changes that would affect its
"interests and concerns." Buku's efforts to fully satisfy its interests and concerns were expressly
permitted under the contract. 4
Reaffirming the Court's First Memorandum Decision, this Court concludes Buku's
reason for declining to close on December 21,2007, was permitted under paragraph 3 of the
Agreements. Therefore, Buku did not breach the Agreements by failing to close on December
21,2007.

C.

Post Closing Date Agreements

Clarks and Petersons argue they are entitled to "summary judgment on the issue of
liability as there are no material facts to defeat the breach of contract by Buku." Defendants'
Brief in Opposition at 18. They also assert that "Buku continued to seek to purchase the real
property from Clark and Peterson and to seek advice from Jefferson County after the closing date
of the transactions for the contracts." Defendants' Brief in Opposition at 8.
In its First Memorandum Decision, the COUli stated:
The Court finds that the wording above is unambiguous and not so indefinite as to
make the contract illusory. "Ifthe language of a contract is unambiguous, then its
meaning and legal effect must be determined from its words." However, despite the
Court's finding that the contract is unambiguous, the Court cannot grant summary

4 The issue sUlTounding the diligence provision involved the relationship between the properties'
existing R-ldesignation and a proposed R-5 designation and Buku's ability to obtain financing.
The record suggests that if the proposed change were approved, the properties in question would
be "grandfathered." See Afjidavit ofNaysha Foster and Exhibit 3. While the court
acknowledges the above facts, the record reflects that the "grand fathering" issue was not
addressed by Jefferson County until March 2008, three months after the December 21,2007
closing date.
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judgment in Buleu's favor at this time. As will be explained below, there are issues of
fact in the record, when construed in a light most favorable to Defendants, that suggest
Buku may not be entitled to recover under the unambiguous contracts.

All of these statements suggest that an agreement existed between Buku and the Clarks
subsequent to the December 2007 closing date. Before the Court decides Buku's
entitlement to earnest money under the Clark Agreement, the Court must understand the
entire arrangement between the parties.
Summary judgment is similarly premature on the Peterson Agreement. Buku and
the Petersons had an arrangement similar to the arrangement between Buke and the
Clarks.
First Memorandum Decision at 8-9.
Buku asserts the plain language of paragraph 21 of the Agreements requires that
subsequent agreements be in writing. Buku argues the Court did not consider paragraph 21 when
issuing its First Memorandum Decision. Paragraph 21 provides as follows:
Amendments and Waivers. No amendment of any provisions of this agreement will be
valid unless the same shall be in writing and signed by the parties. No waiver by any
party of any default, misrepresentation or breach of warranty or covenant hereunder,
whether intentional or not, shall be deemed to extend to any prior or subsequent default,
misrepresentation, or breach of warranty or covenant hereunder or effect in anyway any
rights arising by virtue of any prior or subsequent such occurrence.
Clark and Peterson Agreements at 4 & 5 respectively.
The above language specifically requires that no amendments to the Agreements would
be valid unless "in writing and signed by the parties." While Buku attempted to amend the
agreement by offering to extend the closing date, neither the Clarks nor the Petersons accepted
the written offer. Rather, through counsel, they expressly rejected Buku's offer.
Idaho Code § 9-503 states:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust power over or concerning it, or in any
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument
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in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
The record contains no evidence that any written agreement subsequent to the December
21, 2007 closing date was ever reached. 5 Furthermore, even if there were oral agreements or
modifications, they would be prohibited by Idaho Code § 9-503.
The terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements must be enforced, including the
requirement that subsequent amendments be in writing.
In opposition to Buku's first motion for summary judgment, Clarks and Petersons argued
that Buku exercised dominion and control over the Properties. They raise this issue again in
opposition to Buku's second motion for summary judgment by stating, "Defendants, on the other
hand, are not trying to remove or change the clear language of the original contracts; but rather
are trying to show to the ultimate fact-finder that they (defendants) were lead down a path to
believe the original contract would be enforced and/or should be enforced as to the damages
sustained by the defendants." Defendant's Brief in Opposition at 13.
In support of its claim that Buku exercised dominion and control over the Properties,
Clarks and Petersons allege that Buku may have leased the Clark Property to a third party, that a
Buku agent farmed the Clark Property, and that Buku controlled the home on the Peterson
Property. While the record contains various interactions between the parties surrounding the
above allegations, nothing indicates the parties ever reached a new agreement. 6 Even if Buku
had exercised dominion and control over either the Clark or the Peterson Property, the closing
date passed, and no written amendments were ever executed.

5 Moreover, counsel for Clarks and Petersons conceded at oral argument that there were no such
subsequent written agreements.
6 Based upon the affidavits and exhibits attached with Buku's submissions, the Court questions
whether the "dominion and control" arguments asserted by Clarks and Petersons would be
established.
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Based upon the above authority and discussion, Buku is entitled to summary judgment
under the terms of Agreements. Clarks' and Petersons' motions for summary judgment under
their breach of contract claims should therefore be denied.

D.

Equitable Claims
Clarks and Petersons assert that "the Court left in place the following without removing

the counter-claims from consideration. . .. The counter-claims will not be re-hashed but are still
in place and remain unaffected by the latest attempt by plaintiffs to avoid trial.,,7 Defendant's
Brief in Opposition at 13-14. Further, Clarks and Petersons argue they are entitled to summary
judgment on their counterclaims.
In its First Memorandum Decision, the Court stated, "Although Clarks' and Petersons'
pleadings and summary judgment brief are unclear as to how the legal and equitable principles
they cite apply to these facts, the Court still finds that Defendants' have raised sufficient issues
of fact to preclude summary judgment at this point." Id. at 10.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently stated,
The existence of an express agreement does not prevent the application of
the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Only when the express agreement is
enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment in contravention of the express contract. Id. (citing Chandler v.
Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 17 Wash.2d 591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943); Hixon,
supra). Once the jury determined that the contract was not enforceable because
Appellants had proved an affirmative defense, the jury properly considered
Respondents' claim of unjust enrichment.

Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776-77, 203 P.3d 702, 706-07 (2009).
"Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available.
When parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity is not allowed because the

7 The Clarks' and Petersons' Complaint alleges the following equitable causes of actions:
Specific PerfOlmance, Unjust Enrichment, Estoppel, and Detrimental Reliance
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express contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims." iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality

Design Systems, inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003) (citing Thomas v. Campbell,
107 Idaho 398, 404-05, 690 P.2d 333,339-40 (1984)).
In iron Eagle, Iron Eagle and Heartland entered into an express contract with Quality
Design Systems. Iron Eagle and Heartland sued Quality Design for breach of an express
contract, breach of an intended third party beneficiary contract, and equitable claims including
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, implied contract, quasi estoppel, and equitable estoppel.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were precluded from seeking an equitable
remedy against the Defendant because it had an adequate legal remedy under its express
agreement with Iron Eagle.
Because this Court has found the Agreements enforceable, Clarks and Petersons cannot
rely on their equitable claims. Therefore, Buku's motion for summary judgment as to Clarks'
and Petersons' equitable claims is granted.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above authority and discussion, Buku's motion for summary judgment
should be granted.

"

DATED this

--.5

day of February 2011.

\

\

\.

\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I hereby certify that on this
day of February 2011, I did send a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Robin D. Dunn

DUNN LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C.
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

DeAnne Casperson
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

CRlSTINE BOULTER
Clerk of the District Court
Jefferson County, Idaho

B~'1f;u/Y)1
tIJ
lerk

Depu
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

RAOELH. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants / Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-941

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)

-------------------------)
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants appeal against the above named Respondent to

the Idaho Supreme Court from the Summary Judgment, entered in the above entided action
on the 3rd day of February, 2011, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, presiding.
2.

The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment/order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
to Rule 11(a)(1) I.A.R.

3.

The issues on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following:
a.

Did the court error in interpretation of the real estate contract between
the parties?

b.

Did the court error in granting summary judgment which e:xcluded
equitable remedies of the defendants?

c.

Were there ambiguous terms in the contract which allowed parol
evidence?

d.

Did the court error in using information outside the "four comers" of
the contract when the decision indicated the contract was not
ambiguous?

e.

Were the defendants' equitable remedies precluded by the court's
ruIing in Summary Judgment which required a return of earnest
money?

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

6.

The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
-Any minute entries-All pleadings by both parties-All affidavits of both parties-First Summary Judgment Decision (Denial) of Honorable Gregory
Moeller
-Second Summary Judgment Decision (Approval) of Honorable Dane
Watkins
7.

The undersigned certifies:
a.

That a copy of the notice of appeal has NOT been served on the

reporter since a transcript is not requested;
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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b.

That the Appellants have made contact with the clerk of the district

court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's
record;
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

paid or will be paid;
d.

That appellate filing fee has been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this

I/

-,
.Ji~

~ L'

l

day of February 2011.

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

NOTICE OF APPEAL

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of February, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by:

Hand Delivery
xx

Postage-prepaid mail
Facsimile Transmission

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Jefferson County Clerk
Jefferson County Courthouse
210 Courthouse Way, Ste. 120
Rigby,ID 83442
DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Honorable Dane Watkins
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
~~
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C ,~.'!!
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
. JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.

Case No. CV-08-941

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS SUPPORTED BY
AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON

PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of record,
DeAnne Casperson of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. By submitting this Memorandum, Buku is claiming the right, pursuant to
.-

contract, Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, to recover the costs and fees set forth in the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in
Support of Memorandum of Costs and Fees from Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C.
Clark, and Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (collectively "Defendants").
Paragraph 23 of both the Peterson Agreement and the Clark Agreement provides
as follows:

23. Attorneys fees. The prevailing party in any action to enforce this agreement
shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
(See Complaint, Ex. A, ,-r 23; Ex. B, 123). Consequently, Buku is entitled to its
reasonable attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the Peterson Agreement and the Clark
Agreement. Additionally, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for the award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on "any commercial transaction."
I.C. § 12-120(3). Idaho courts have recognized the applicability of this provision to
commercial real estate transactions. See i.e. Dennettv. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,31-32,936
P.2d 219, 230 (Ct. App. 1997); Farm Credit Banko/Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho
270,274-75,869 P.2d 1365,1369-70 (1994); Herrickv. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,306,

900 P.2d 201, 214 (Ct. App. 1995). The current action is a civil action to recover on a
commercial transaction. Buku entered into the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement
with the intent that the properties be developed, as is denoted in paragraph 25 of each of
the agreements. Consequently, Buku is entitled to an award of attorneys fees against
Defendants pursuant to Idaho Cod § 12-120(3). Finally, Idaho Code § 12-121 and the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54, provide for the award of attorneys fees to the
prevailing party where provided for by statute. The Judgment entered in this action
clearly indicates that Buku prevailed on summary judgment and disposed of all other
issues in the case, making Buku the prevailing party and entitling Buku to an award of
attorney's fees and costs against Defendants.
To the best of the knowledge and belief of DeAnne Casperson, the amounts set
forth herein for costs and fees are correct and such costs and fees are claimed by Buku in
compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney's Fees is supported by the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support
of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees filed simultaneously with this
Memorandum and incorporated herein by reference.
Buku has incurred attorney's fees in the above-entitled action in the amount of
$27,093.61 and costs in the amount of$724.82, which fees and costs are specifically
described and itemized in the Affidavit filed simultaneously with this Memorandum and
incorporated herein by reference.
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Dated thisf"Jd day of February, 2011.
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d
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~
~. ~ eAnne Caspe;son, Esq.'"

~ - HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,
P.L.L.C.
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MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE
CASPERSON

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
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( ) Hand Delivery
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Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
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Casperson, Esq.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-08-941

AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON

IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

v.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.
)

County of Bonneville

DEANNE CASPERSON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a member of the law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c.,

counsel for Buku Properties,LLC ("Buku") in this matter.
2.

This Affidavit is made on my own personal knowledge, except to the extent of

allegations made on information and belief, and in support of Buku's Memorandum of
Attorney's Fees and Costs Supported by Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson.
3.

I have reviewed the time and cost records of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo,

P.L.L.C. maintained on the above matter, and represent that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, the following items of costs and expenses are claimed in compliance with the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(5) and Rule 54(e)(1), and were necessarily expended and incurred
in the above entitled action on behalf of Buku:
1.

Costs of Right (Rule 54(d)(1)(c));
Cost

Date

Item

10/15/08

Filing Fee (Jefferson County)

$88.00

04/26110

Copy of deposition - Jaramie Magera (T & T Reporting)

$108.07

04/26110

Depositions - Raoel Clark and Angus Peterson (T & T
Reporting)

$528.75

TOTAL

$724.82
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(

4.

The above-listed costs represent the entire costs incurred to date herein.

5.

The law firm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. has expended

approximately 176.0 hours in prosecuting the above-entitled action for Buku. An itemization of
the legal services provided by Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c. in connection with such
matters is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The law firm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo,
P .L.L.C. has invoiced Buku for the legal services itemized on Exhibit "A" attached hereto the
total amount of$27,093.61, which is allocated among the following attorneys at the following
effective billing rates:
Name

Hours

Effective Hourly Rate

Total Fees

Charles A. Homer

4.20

$227.03

$983.50

DeAnne Casperson

85.80

$183.81

$15,770.30

Amanda E. Ulrich

86.00

$112.84

$9,703.70
$26,427.50

TOTAL
6.

The following computer-aided legal research are claimed in compliance with the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e)(3), and were reasonably and necessarily expended and
incurred in the above entitled action on behalf of Buku:
Date

Item

09115/08

Computer research for August 2008

$42.46

01113/09

Computer research for December 2008

$0.69

07/14/09

Computer research for June 2009

$37.89

08111/09

Computer research for July 2009

$414.86

Computer research for December 2010

$170.21

01118111

Cost
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ITOTAL
TOTAL ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS COMPUTER RESEARCH:
7.

$666.11
$27,093.61

The sum of$27,093.61 represents a reasonable sum for the services provided by

the law firm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. in prosecuting the above-entitled action
on behalf of Buku. The sum of $724.82 represents a reasonable sum for the costs incurred in the
above-entitled action, allocated for the benefit ofBuku.
8.

I have practiced law in Idaho continuously since April 24, 2003. I graduated from

law school in 1999 and practiced law in both Missouri and Kansas before returning to Idaho. I am
familiar with the prevailing charges in this community for legal work similar to that performed by
the attorneys in this case. It is my opinion that the prevailing charges in this community for like
work are equal to or higher than those indicated above, and that the attorney's fees are reasonable
and necessary.
9.

Neither me nor anyone else at my firm was aware that the Court issued a Judgment

Re: Motion for Summary Judgment ("Judgment") and Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Memorandum") in Judge Watkins' chambers on February 3, 2011, until the
afternoon of February 18,2011. I learned that the Judgment and Memorandum had been filed
because I received Defendants' Notice of Appeal at that time, in which it was mentioned that the
Court had filed the Judgment on February 3, 2011.
10.

Upon learning that the Court had issued the Judgment on February 3,2011, I

immediately checked the Idaho Court Repository website to see if the Judgment had been
docketed. It still had not. Attached as "Exhibit B" is a copy of the docket from the Idaho Court
Repository website dated February 18, 2011. I had periodically checked the Idaho Court
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Repository since the oral argument and nothing ever appeared relating to the Judgment issued on
February 3, 2011.
11.

After having received the Notice of Appeal on February 18,2011, I immediately

telephoned Defendants' counsel's office to obtain a copy of the Judgment, and Defendants'
counsel's receptionst informed me that she would have "Judy" fax me a copy of the decision. I
never received a copy of the Memorandum or Judgment from Defendants' counsel's office.
12.

At approximately 1:00 p.m., I telephoned Judge Watkins' clerk, Lettie Messick, to

request a copy of the decision. Ms. Messick was not in her office at the time. I left her a
voicemail explaining that I had not received a copy of the Memorandum or Judgment and asked
her to return my call.
13.

At approximately 1:00 p.m., Sandi Mueller, a secretary in my office, called the

Jefferson County clerk's office to inquire as to whether I could obtain a copy of the Judgment
from Jefferson County. Ms. Mueller informed me that the Jefferson County clerk stated Jefferson
County did not have a copy of the Memorandum or Judgment either.
14.

Ms. Messick returned my call at approximately 2:00 p.m. I explained to her that I

did not receive a copy ofthe Memorandum or Judgment. Ms. Messick immediately faxed a copy
of the Judgment and Memorandum Decision to my office. The faxed copies of the Judgment and
Memorandum Decision were the first copies of the Judgment and Memorandum decision my
office received. Attached as "Exhibit C" are copies of the faxed Judgment and Memorandum I
received from Ms. Messick on the afternoon of February 18, 2011.
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Dated this~day of February, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
t

I hereby certifY that on this2!L~~y of February, 2011, I served a copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand
delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct
copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDA VIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

(
(

) First Class Mail
) Hand Delivery
Facsimile
) Overnight Mail

(XJ
(

"-

ldfutUuiA~
QA
O!ue/c
~ DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
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Date
Attorney
Jun 17/2008 CAH
Jun 26/2008 CAH
Jul 112008 CAH
Aug 7/2008
Sep 16/2008
Oct 10/2008
Oct 11/2008
Oct 14/2008
Oct 15/2008
Oct 15/2008
Dec 512008
Dec 12/2008
Dec 15/2008
Dec 16/2008
Dec 29/2008
Dec 29/2008
Jan 912009
Apr 13/2009
Apr 29/2009
Jun 16/2009
Jun 26/2009
Jun 29/2009
Jun 30/2009

AEU
DC
DC
CAH
DC
CAH
DC
DC
DC
AEU
AEU
AEU
DC
AEU
DC
DC
DC
AEU
AEU
AEU

Jul 1/2009
Jul 2/2009

AEU
AEU

Jul 6/2009
Jul 7/2009
Jul 8/2009
Jul30/2009
Sep 16/2009
Sep 17/2009
Sep 22/2009

AEU
AEU
AEU
DC
DC
DC
DC

Sep 23/2009
Sep 24/2009
Sep 25/2009
Oct 112009
Oct 2/2009

DC
DC
DC
DC
AEU

Oct 2/2009 DC
Oct 14/2009 DC
Nov 612009 DC
Nov 19/2009 AEU
Nov 20/2009
Nov 23/2009
Nov 23/2009
Nov 24/2009

AEU
AEU
DC
AEU

Explanation
Review purchase agreements and proposed correspondence to Robin Dunn prepared by Thel Casper; telephone conference with attorney
Thel Casper
Email to Thel Casper pertaining to follow-up on correspondence with attorney Robin Dunn
w,
Review email from Thel Casper pertaining to dispute with Peterson; review documentation and prepare for conference with Jaramie
Magera
Receive and review case file; begin drafting complaint
Review documents and correspondence in file; edit and revise complaint.
Edit and revise complaint for filing,
Review and revise complaint against Peterson and Clark for refund of earnest money
Edit and revise complaint; finalize complaint for review,
Office conference with Jaramie Magera to review and execute Complaint on dispute with Peterson and Clark
Finalize complaint; conference with Client regarding complaint and current status,
E-mail correspondence to Mr. Magera.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera.
Draft answer to counterclaim; research affirmative defenses
Complete draft of Answer to Counterclaim
Intraoffice conference regarding affirmative defenses
Edit and revise draft answer to counterclaim; draft letter to Mr. Dunn regarding filing suit against Mr. Magera.
Compose first set of discovery to Defendants Clarks and Defendants Petersons; Edit discovery
Edit and revise discovery requests.
Draft e-mail to Mr. Magera.
Review answers to discovery and documents produced; E-mail Mr. Magera regarding status.
Draft Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum
Prepare documents for Summary Judgment
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Research case law regarding legal issues for summary
judgment
Edit summary judgment documents; Research case law on termination on contracts
Edit Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Research case law regarding Defendants' causes of action and issues on
summary judgment
Research case law regarding termination of contracts
Finish research regarding termination of contracts for Summary Judgment Memorandum
Research implied termination of contracts
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera
Edit and revise summary judgment motion and supporting documentation.
Continue editing and revising summary judgment motion and supporting documentation.
Edit and revise summary judgment documentation; draft argument regarding frustration of purpose; research additional cases of defect
and cure.
Continue working on summary judgment motion and supporting documentation.
Continue drafting summary judgment motion and supporting documentation.
Finalize Mr. Magera's affidavitfor review; e-mail affidavit to Mr. Magera.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera.
Meet with Jaramie Magera to review affidavit for Motion for Summary Judgment; Make edits to affidavit; Make edits to Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment to reflect changes in affidavit
Finalize documents for filing; e-mail Mr. Magera regarding review of affidavit.
Telephone conference with Mr. Dunn regarding rescheduling of summary judgment motion due to conflicts; telephone conference with
court; review pleading regarding changed date of hearing.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding summary judgment hearing and motion.
Review Defendants' response to Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike;Begin drafting brief in reply to Defendants'
response to Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in reply toDefendants' Motion to Strike
Continue drafting Memorandum in Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
Finish drafting memorandum in reply to Defendants' response memorandum regarding motion for summary judgment
Conference regarding reply to summary judgment motion.
Review and edit Memorandum in Reply regarding summary judgment

Hours
0.80
0.10
0.40
2.60
2.40
0.60
0.50
0.50
0,70
0.60
0.10
0.20
2.60
0.80
0.20
4.40
2.10
0.60
0.10
2.10
0.30
0.30
3.30
1.80
4.20
0.90
1.70
1.30
0.10
3.60
2.90
4.20
1.80
3.40
0.40
0.10
0.80
0.30
0.30
0.20
2.80
2.60
4.50
0.20
0.50

~..........

..0

:.E~

u:l

'-'

Dec 6/2009 DC
Dec 7/2009 AEU
Dec 7/2009 DC
Dec 14/2009 DC
Dec 15/2009 AEU
Dec 15/2009
Dec 22/2009
Jan 612010
Feb 1/2010

DC
DC
DC
CAH

Feb
Feb
Feb
Feb
Feb
Feb
Mar
Mar

CAH
DC
DC
CAH
DC
DC
DC
AEU

2/2010
2/2010
2/2010
3/2010
3/2010
5/2010
1/2010
11/2010

Marll/2010 DC
Mar 12/2010 AEU

Mar 12/2010 DC
Mar 16/2010
Apr 12/2010
Apr 13/2010
Jun 4/2010
Jul 6/2010

AEU
DC
DC
DC
AEU

Jul 7/2010

AEU

Jul 7/2010
Jul S/2010

DC
AEU

Jul12/2010
Jul12/2010
Jul13/2010

DC
AEU
AEU

Jul14/2010

AEU

Jul21/2010
Aug 3/2010
Aug 4/2010
Aug 10/2010
Aug 15/2010
Aug 16/2010
Aug 17/2010

AEU
AEU
AEU
AEU
DC
AEU
AEU

Sep 7/2010 DC
Sep S/2010 AEU

Edit and revise summary judgment motion and supportinginformation.
Finalize Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; Conduct legal research regarding failure of a condition
precedent and effect on contract
Finalize pleadings and arrange for filing.
Prepare outline for summary judgment argument; review caselaw in support of summary judgment; attend summary judgment argument;
Review discovery responses from Petersons and affidavits from Petersons and Clarks; Draft Golden Rule letter to Robin Dunn regarding
Clarks failure to respond to discovery requests; Draft additional Requests for Admissions
E-mail correspondence regarding summary judgment hearing.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera.
Finalize letter to Mr. Dunn regarding discovery responses;finalize additional discovery request.
Telephone conference with Jaramie Magera to discuss pending receipt from court on summary judgment motion; review summary
judgment order issued by court
Telephone conference with Jaramie Magera to discuss summary judgment opinion
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding decision.
Analyze decision as compared topleadings; prepare a discovery plan for purposes of moving forward with litigation.
Telephone conference with Jaramie Magera to review summary judgment decision and prepare for on-going litigation
Prepare for and conference withMr. Magera regarding summary judgment ruling and other discovery.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding farming situation.
Review information regarding depositions; draft letter to Mr. Dunn regarding depositions.
Draft Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Objection to Notice of Deposition and Request for Permission to Take Testimony via
Telephone; Draft affidavit for DC
Intra-office conference regarding needed discovery from Mr. Archibald and Mr. Foster.
Phone call to Dave Chapple; leave Message; Phone call to Kipp Archibald; Draft Affidavit of Kipp Archibald Affidavit; Conversation with
Dave Chapple; Email to Dave Chapple regarding questions toask Brad Foster
Prepare for and attend hearing regarding request for telephone deposition; e-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera; telephone conference
regarding information from witnesses.
Edit and revise Affidavit of Kipp Archibald
Prepare outlines and exhibits for depositions; conference with Mr. Magera to prepare for depositions;
Prepare for and take depositions of Mr. Clark and Mr. Peterson; defend deposition of Mr. Magera.
Telephone conference with Mr. Magera regarding telephone number for Brad Foster.
Review Magera deposition, Peterson depOSition and Clark deposition in preparation for second summary judgment memorandum
regarding interactions with Kipp Archibald
Continue reviewing depositions for second motion for summary judment; Begin drafting Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for
Summary Judgment
Conference regarding summary judgment motion and arguments.
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Prepare correspondence to Dave Chapple and Brad
Foster
Intra-office conference regarding status of summary judgment; e-mail correspondence to Mr. Magera regarding status.
Continue drafting Memorandum inSupport of Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Finish drafting Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Research case law regarding dominion and control
over real property
Finish reviewing and editing Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Make changes to Kipp Archibald Affidavit
and prepare list of questions for Kipp Archibald; Email to Kipp Archibald
Phone call with Kipp Archibald; Intraoffice conference
Draft Kipp Archibald Affidavit
Finish drafting Kipp Archibald Affidavit
Phone call to Brad Foster; leave message
E-mail correspondence regarding status.
Draft Affidavit of Brad Foster
Revise and edit Brad Foster and Kipp Archibald affidavits; Revise and edit memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment
Begin editing and revising 2nd motion for summary judgment; conference regarding affidavits in support.
Intraoffice conference regarding status of case

1.60
3.50
1.40
6.40
1.60
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.70
0.20
0.10
0.90
O.SO
O.SO
0.10
0.20
3.00
0.30
1.30
0.50
0.10
5.40
6.20
0.10
1.00
3.60
0.20
3.90
0.20
1.50
4.S0
3.00
0.70
0.60
0.10
0.10
0.10
O.SO
3.90
2.S0
0.20

Sep 8/2010
Sep 9/2010
Sep 15/2010
Sep 16/2010
Sep 20/2010
Sep 20/2010

DC
DC
DC
DC
AEU
DC

Sep 21/2010
Sep 21/2010
Sep 27/2010
Oct 1/2010

AEU
DC
AEU
AEU

Oct 4/2010
Oct 6/2010
Oct 11/2010
Oct 13/2010
Oct 14/2010
Nov 1/2010
Nov 4/2010
Nov 8/2010
Nov 1212010
Nov 15/2010
Nov 29/2010
Nov 30/2010
Nov 30/2010
Dec 1/2010
Dec 3/2010

DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
AEU
AEU
DC
AEU
AEU

Dec 6/2010

AEU

Dec 6/2010 DC
Dec 13/2010 DC
Dec 20/2010 DC
Jan 21/2011 DC
Jan 24/2011 DC
Feb 15/2011 DC

Continue editing and revising brief; research issue of equitable remedies when adequate recovery at law.
Continue editing and revising second motion for summary judgment.
E-mail Mr. Casper regarding settlement proceeds agreement; e-mail Mr. Meikle regarding Brad Foster's schedule for conference.
Intra-office conference regarding proceeds control agreement; e-mail correspondence with Mr. Casper.
Email to Dave Chapple regarding Brad Foster affidavit
Review e-mail correspondence from Mr. Casper; e-mail correspondences with Mr. Magera and Mr. Ball regarding proceeds control
agreement and status of second summary judgment.
Intraoffice conference regarding affidavits for summary judgment
Edit and revise affidavits of Kipp Archibald and Brad Foster; draft e-mail to Mr. Magera; review deposition testimony for affidavits.
Send email to Dave Chapple regarding Brad Foster Affidavit

1.40
0.40
0.10
0.30
0.20

Draft follow-up email to Dave Chappel regarding Brad Foster Affidavit; Draft email correspondence to GLM regarding Brad Foster Affidavit
Conference with Mr. Foster to discuss events surrounding use of Clark property.
Conference with Mr. Foster to review affidavit; edit and revise affidavit; finalize affidavit for Mr. Foster's Signature.
Edit and revise brief, affidavits, etc. for second summary judgment.
Edit and revise briefing to indude Foster Affidavit.
Continue editing and revising memorandum in support of second summary judgment motion.
Edit and revise Mr. Archibald's affidavit for review.
Conference with Mr. Archibald to finalize affidavit; edit and revise affidavit; finalize affidavit for signing.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding second summary judgment motion.
Edit and revise Buku briefing and affidavits.
Edit and revise briefing and affidavit; file all briefing related to second motion for summary judgment.
Review Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
Begin drafting Reply Memorandumin Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Intra-office conference regarding reply brief and status of prior ruling.
Continue drafting Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment

0.20
0.30
1.70
2.80
0.30
0.20
0.20
1.10
0.10
2.10
1.30
0.60
4.00
0.40
4.80

Finish drafting Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Draft Moion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit

2.20

Finish drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike; Draft Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Strike; Draft
Motion to Strike; Make final revisions and edits to Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Review and
edit Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson, Motion toStrike and Notice of Hearing on Motion to Strike
Edit and revise reply brief; finalize reply brief in support of summary judgment.
Prepare for oral argument on motion for summary judgment; travel to and from Jefferson County for hearing; conference with Client
regarding outcome and new hearing schedule.
Telephone conference with Mr. Magera regarding summary judgment and assignment to Judge Watkins.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding hearing; conference with Mr. Decker regarding concern of being before Judge twice in
one day.
Prepare for and attend summary judgment hearing.
E-mail correspondence regarding SJ decision.

0.20
0.20
2.30
0.40

6.40
6.10
2.40
0.20
0.30
4.70
0.10

TOTAL HOURS

176.00

Totals for CAH
Totals for DC
Totals for AEU

4.20
85.80
86.00

Costs
Sep 15/2008
Oct 15/2008
Jan 13/2009
Ju114/2009

Computer Research for August 2008
Filing fee for Complaint - Jefferson County
Computer Research for December 2008
Computer Research for June 2009

42.46
88.00
0.69
37.89

Fees Billed
953.50
15770.30
9703.70

Aug 11/2009
Apr 26/2010
Apr 26/2010
Jan 18/2011

Computer Research for July 2009
Deposition of Jaramie Magera - T & T Reporting
Deposition of Raoel Clark and Angus Petersen - T & T Reporting
Computer Research for December 2010

414.86
108.07
528.75
170.21
1390.93
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Case History
Jefferson
1 Cases Found.
,
CV..2008..
Case:0000941

BukuPropertiesLI.. 'C vs.Raoel H dark, eta!. '
Dane H
District Filed: 11/07/2008Subtype: Other Claims
Judge: Watkins Jr

.
Status: Pending

Defendants:Clark, Janet C Clark, Raoel H Peterson, Angus Jerry Peterson, Betty Jean
Plaintiffs: Buku Properties L L C,
Register Date
of
actions:
11/06/2008 Complaint Filed
11106/2008 Summons Issued Raoel Clark
11/06/2008 Summons Issued Janet Clark
11/06/2008 Summons Issued Angus Peterson
11/06/2008 Summons Issued Betty Jean Peterson
11/07/2008 New Case Filed .. Other Claims
11/07/2008 Plaintiff: Buku Properties L L C, Attorney Retained Charles

Homer
11/07/2008 Notice Of Appearance
Filing: A .. Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 Paid by:
11/07/2008 Homer, Charles (attorney for Buku Properties L L C,)
Receipt number: 0007034 Dated: 11/7/2008 Amount:
$88.00 (Check) For: Buku Properties L L C, (plaintiff)
11/25/2008 Acknowledgment of acceptance of service
11/25/2008 Acknowledgment of acceptance of service
12/08/2008 Defendant: Clark, Janet C Attorney Retained Robin D. Dunn
12/10/2008 Answer and counterclaim
Filing: 17 .. All Other Cases Paid by: Dunn, Robin D.
12/11/2008 (attorney for Clark, Raoel H) Receipt number: 0007896
Dated: 12/11/2008 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Clark,
Raoel H (defendant)
12/30/2008 Answer to counterclaim by BUKU Properties, LLC
04/14/2009 Def~~da~tfThird Party Plaintiff Burtenshaw's 2nd Amended

Exhibit list
04/15/2009 Notice of Service, Plaintiffs 1st set of Discovery Requests to

Defendant
04/15/2009 Notice of Service, Plaintiffs 1st set of Discovery Requests
06/0212009 Change Assigned Judge (batch process)
06/03/2009 No!ic~ of Service of ~efendants Peterson answers to

plaintiffs first set of discovery requests
10105/2009 Hearing Sch~duled (Motions 11/09/200903:30 PM) motion

for summary judgment
10105/2009 Memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment
10105/2009 Affidavit o~ Jaramie Magera in support of plaintiffs motion for

summary judgment
10105/2009 Notice of hearing
10106/2009 Motion for summary judgment
10/14/2009 Continue~ (Motions 12/141200901:30 PM) motion for

summary judgment
10/15/2009 Noti.ce vacating hear~ng and resetting hearing on plaintiffs

motion for summary judgment
11 113/2009 D~nia~ of plaintiff~' req~est for summary judgment and
objection to conSideration of summary judgment
11113/2009 Motion to strike portions of magera affidavit
11/13/2009 Defendant's requst for summary judgment
11/13/2009 Affidavit of Jerry .and Betty Peterso.n in support of

Exhibit "B"

defendants positions re: summary judment

https:llwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=JEFF ...
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Page 1. 01
11113/2009 Affidavit .
Clark in support of defendants postions re:
summary Judgment
11/13/2009 Affidavit of N~ysha Foster, Planning and Zoning Coordinator
re: summary Judgment
11/13/2009 Defendants memorandum re: summary judgment
11/13/2009 Hear~ng notice of on defendants summary judgment; motion
to strike
12/07/2009 Reply mer:norandum in support of plaintiffs motion for
summary Judgment
12/07/2009 Me~orandum in oppositio~ to defendants motion to strike
portions of magera affidaVit
12/14/2009 He8: ring result fo: Motions held o~ 12/14/200901:30 PM:
Motion Held motion for summary Judgment
01/06/2010 Notice of Service of plaintiffs second set of discovery
requests to defendants Raoel Clark and Janet Clark
Notice of Service of plaintiffs second set of discovery
01/06/2010 requests to defendants Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty
Jean Peterson
01/13/2010 Notice of Servi~e of defendant Clarks' answers to plaintiffs
second set of discovery requests
01/13/2010 Notice of Servi~e defendants Petersons answers to plaintiffs
second set of discovery requests
01/27/2010 ~emoran~um d~cision (BUKU motion for summary
Judgment IS denied)
02/25/2010 Notice of taking depostion duces tecum
03/03/2010 Notice of deposition for Raoel H. Clark
03/03/2010 Notice of deposition of Angus Jerry Peterson
defendants objection to notice of de[psotopm pf raoel h.
03/09/2010 clark and requst for permission to take testimony via
telephone
03/09/2010 Notice of telephonic hearing
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 03/12/201010:00 AM)
03/10/2010 objection to notice of deposition (to be heard in Madison
county)
Hearing result for Motions held on 03/12/2010 10:00 AM:
03/12/2010 Motion Held objection to notice of deposition (to be heard in
Madison county)
03/12/2010 Notice of Vacating Deposition of Raoel H Clark
03/12/2010 Notice of Vacating Depostition of Angus Jerry Peterson
03/12/2010 Minute Entry
03/15/2010 Minute Entry on objection to notice of deposition
Memorandum in opposition to defendants objections to
03/18/2010 notice of depositin fo Raoel H. Clark and request from
permission to take testimony via telephonce
Affidavit of deanne casperson in support of memorandum in
03/18/2010 oppostion to defendants objection to notice of depostion fo
raoel h. clark and request from permission to take testimony
via telephone
03/29/2010 Change Assigned Judge (batch process)
04/01/2010 Amended Notice of Deposition of Angus Jerry Peterson
04/01/2010 Amended Notice of Deposition of Raoel H. Clark

04/01/2010 Amen~ed Notice to taking Deposition Duces Tecum of
Jaramle Magara
11/01/2010 Hearing Sch~duled (Motions 12/13/201002:00 PM) motion
for summary Judgment
11/16/2010 Notice of hearing
11/16/201 0 Affi~avit of Kipp Ar~hibald in support of plaintiffs second
motln for summary Judgment

11/16/2010 Affidavit of B~ad Foster in support of plaintiffs second motion
for summary Judgment
11/16/2010 Affidavit of deanne casperson in support of plaintiffs second

https:llwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=JEFF ...
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Ida1'lO Keposltory - Case
motion for

Page 3 of3
judgment

11/16/2010 Plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment
11/16/2010 Memoran~um in support of plaintiffs second motion for
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idah9
/

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~2:)

:,

-'+:J

ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 38561-2011
Jefferson County Docket No. 2008-941

On February 25, 2011 this Court received a Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant
November 17, 2011 in District Court which appealed the Memorandum Decision re: motion for
)ummary Judgment and the Judgment re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered by Honorable

lane H. Watkins, Jr. filed February 3, 2011. It appears that a Judgment set forth on a separate
ocument has yet to be entered as provided by LR.C.P. 58(a) as clarified by the Court's recent
~cisions

in Spokane Structures v. Equitable Investment, 148 Id 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) and

rr, Inc. v. Mori, 148 Id 825, 230 P.3d 435 (2010), and this appeal is premature. As provided by
\.oR. 17(e)(2), this appeal shall be suspended until entry of judgment or order that on its face states
.t the order is the final decision of the District Court and represents a final determination of the

ltS of the parties. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the matter of entry of a judgment as required by
C.P. 58(a) be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the District Court and proceedings

in this appeal

[ be SUSPENDED to allow for the entry of a judgment, at which time this appeal shall proceed.
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

---------------------------)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
vs.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company; and
JARAMIE MAGERA, an individual,
Counter-Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------------------)
OBJECTION-l-

Case No. CV-08-941
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION
TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
FOR FEES AND COSTS;
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF OBJECTION

COMES NOW, Robin D. Dunn, Esq., attorney for the
defendant/ counterc1aimants and object to the attorney fee and cost request of the
plaintiff for the reasoning set forth hereafter:
1.

Justice Jesse Walters has written a primer on the award of attorney fees

which was an update of the often quoted Lon Davis study. This Idaho Law Review

Article, VoL 38 (2001) Number 1, requires three criteria as follows:
A. A prevailing party;

B. A statutory or contractual basis; and
C. Reasonableness of award under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the reasons stated hereafter, no basis exists for the award and the fee
request is not reasonable.
2.

The plaintiff requested a rescission of the contracts (Clark and

Peterson) which were for the sale of the real property. The plaintiff alleged and the
court believed that the plaintiff could rescind the contract based upon a due
diligence period contained in the contract notwithstanding no evidence was
presented of any problems with the real property. In any event, the court granted
summary judgment and the contract became a nullity. As such, there was no
contract. Thus, no contractual basis exists for the award of fees since there was "no
contract" according to the grant of summary judgment.
having dismissed the contract claims, the action could not have been one "to
recover on a contract." We affirmed the action of the trial court in Day, stating that
"to recover attorney fees under the statute, the action must be one to recover on the
contract, not merely an action arising from a transaction relating to the purchase or
sale of goods." 115 Idaho at 1018, 772 P.2d at 225. Based upon the interpretation of
the statute in Day, the trial court's grant of attorney fees against appellants must be
reversed; there being no contract between appellants

OBJECTION-2-

Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 809 P.2d 487, 119 Idaho
626, (Idaho 1991)
------------ Excerpt from page 809 P.2d 491.
3.

The same logic holds true for the claim of a commercial transaction

under Idaho Code Section 12-120. If there is "no transaction" between the parties
because the parties are returned to the status quo, then there is no basis for the award
of fees. If the "Agreement" is rescinded, then no transaction occurred. Thus, no
basis exists statutorily for the award of fees.
"there is a clear distinction between litigation arising from a commercial
transaction and litigation on noncommercial issues that might have future
commercial ramifications." > 117 Idaho at 424, 788 P.2d at 239. For reasons different
from those given by the district judge, we conclude that an award of attorney fees in
this case was not authorized under> I.e. § 12-120(3).

Edwards v. Edwards, 842 P.2d 307,122 Idaho 971, (Idaho App. 1992)
------------ Excerpt from page 842 P.2d 309.

This action before the court involved the future purchase of the real property.
Although the defendants' disagree with the court's ruling on summary judgment, the
case as it stands rescinded the contract and made the future purchase of the real
property problematic. Future commercial ramifications do not come under the
definition of commercial transactions to be able to award fees and costs.
4.

The lack of a contract or a statutory basis prohibits the award of fees

and costs.
With respect to the provision allowing attorney fees in a commercial
transaction, the statute defines a commercial transaction as all transactions
except transactions for personal and household purposes. This Court has
held that the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the
gravamen of the lawsuit. > Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714
(1995); Brower v. [126 Idaho 900] E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117
Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990). The gravamen ofthe lawsuit refers to whether
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis
upon which the party is attempting to recover. > Brower, 117 Idaho at 784,

OBJECTION-3-

792 P.2d at 349.

Property Management West:, Inc. v. Hunt:, 894 P.2d 130, 126 Idaho 897, (Idaho
1995)
------------ Excerpt from pages 894 P.2d 132-894 P.2d 133.
The claim for reimbursement by the plaintiff was by rescinding the contract.
By rescinding the contract to recover the earnest money, no contract existed and
could not be, by the court's ruling, the gravamen of the lawsuit since a contract no
longer existed and a commercial transaction no longer existed. Thus, fees cannot be
awarded.
5.

No argument, of a reasonable nature, is made for fees pursuant to any

other statute including Idaho Code 12-121. If so, the court should be convinced that
nothing done by the defendants was unreasonable, frivolous or without foundation.
6.

The request for attorney fees is untimely. The certificate of mailing by

the clerk for Judge Watkins, Lettie Messick, indicates she mailed a copy of the
memorandum decision and the judgment to plaintiffs counsel, DeAnne Casperson,
on February 3, 2011. The memorandum was not filed within 14 days as required by
rule.
7.

The summary judgment decision did not award fees. Thus, a request

for fees should be made to the district court since plaintiff was the prevailing party.
No motion was made by plaintiff to request fees. No request was timely made to the
court for fees rather an affidavit of fees and memorandum was filed. This is a
technical matter the court should consider.
8.

Assuming arguendo that the court determines fees should be awarded,

reasonableness of fees is governed by Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff should not be entitled to fees leading up to the ruling on summary

OBJECTION-4-

judgment by this court.
The defendants successfully defended the first summary judgment motion
and all allegations until this "newest court" made its ruling. Thus, all fees prior to
the briefing on the latest summary judgment motion (second motion for summary
judgment) should be denied.
The defendants prevailed on the first motion and the events leading up to that
decision. Thus, the plaintiffs could not argue, in reasonable fashion, that it was
entitled to fees until the date of July 8, 2010. (The date commencing the preparation
for the second summary judgment motion.) Furthermore, the court did not accept
the motions to strike, etc. and those matters should not be awarded for the
unsuccessful attempt by plaintiff. The plaintiff is only entitled to 68.9 hours
according to the affidavit of its attorney commencing July 8, 2010 until February 15,
2011. (Deleting motions to strike, etc.)
CONCLUSION
Fees and costs are not awardable from defendants to the plaintiff for
the reasons cited above.
DATED this 8 th day of March, 2011.

r

",,~.;;.C~)C?~:. ~
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8 th day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of

OBJECTION-S;

the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by:
__ Hand Delivery
_

Postage-prepaid mail

~

Facsimile Transmission (208) 523-9518

Qc;,)0~
Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Courtesy Copy: Judge Dane Watkins (Chambers in Bonneville)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
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Limited Liability Company,
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Status Conference regarding Final Judgment
Monday, March 28, 2011
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

- - - - - - - - - - - ))
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Counter-Plaintiffs, )
)
vs.
)
)
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
)
Limited liability company; and
)
JARAMIE MAG ERA, an individual,
)
)

Counter-Defendant. )

------------------------)

Case No. CV-08-941
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT
RE: FINAL JUDGMENT

i
L}
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INTRODUCTION
The above-entitled court entered its Memorandum Decision, dated February
3, 2011, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs; and, dismissing the counterclaims ofthe defendants. On the same date, the court entered its "Judgment"
completing the process.
The defendants timely appealed the document entitled "Judgment" believing
it to be the final position of the court. After that time, the Supreme Court of Idaho
requested a final judgment of the court and offered no directions. It is assumed that
all parties believed this was a final judgment. The only possible portion of the
document that may have been in question was a "certification" pursuant to Rule 54
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants can only assume when a document states "Judgment", it is
the final opinion of the court. Since that time, the plaintiffs have submitted proposed
final judgment documents to which the plaintiffs have objected since the judgment
documents submitted to the court contain information never explained or elucidated
by the court in its memorandum decision.
If the court were now to "change" its judgment, it would be tantamount to a

motion to reconsider which neither party requested. The time lines for requesting a
new trial and/or reconsideration have expired. The judgment should contain its
original language and add the certification pursuant to Rule 54.
In the alternative and given the lack of direction by the Supreme Court, the
complaint of the plaintiff should be the starting point to review what was originally
requested by such party. The plaintiff requested that the "contract" between the
parties be rescinded and the parties returned to the status quo. If so, and taking the

Defendants' Statement Re: Final Judgment
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decision of this court into consideration, that is exactly what the court did. Not only
did it grant the plaintiff summary judgment; but, it dismissed the counterclaims of
the defendants-some of which were equitable in nature and did not depend upon
the existence of a contract. Needless-to-say, the defendants disagree with the
reasoning of the court and of the decision. However, that determination, at this
point, is for another court to review.
If the court now adds language to the "judgment" which was not discussed in

the memorandum decision, how can either party defend or argue its position to the
higher court. This court should remain consistent with its judgment as previously
written and add the conforming language of Rule 54. To add otherwise would
prejudice the defendants and have to argue positions never discussed by the district
court.
1. Sum certain on money judgment. The plaintiff requests a sum certain in the
judgment for refund of earnest money. This position certainly is
understandable but does not portray the offsets that the defendants used for
the purchase ofthe "retirement homes" and the expenses (damages) that the
court did not consider by virtue of the counterclaims denied by the court.
These sums claimed by the defendants, at a minimum, would have required a
finding of damages and any offsets. No fact finder has or had the opportunity
to determine the damages to the defendants. The refunds that the plaintiff
requests are as follows: Peterson $317,000; Clark $25,000.
2. Prejudgment interest. A review of court cases indicates that prejudgment
interest can be a discretionary decision by this court.

Defendants' Statement Re: Final Judgment

3

We apply an "abuse of discretion" standard of review in deciding whether
prejudgment interest should have been awarded in the present case; it is a question
of fairness that is to be answered by balancing the equities. > Wessel v. Buhler, 437
F.2d 279 (9th Cir.1971). The district court's reasoning in following Rodgers is sound.
838 P.2d 323, 122 Idaho 720, Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., (Idaho App. 1992)
------------ Excerpt from page 838 P.2d 326.

However, it should also be noted that prejudgment interest has other factors to
consider and the following case considers many different matters to-wit:
Idaho statutory law, > Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award of
prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise calls
for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. > Jones v.
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886,889,736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Ct.App.1987). Under either the
statute or the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, however, prejudgment interest
is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by
mathematical process. > Id.; > Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706, 727 P.2d 893, 897
(Ct.App.1986). This limitation is based upon" equitable considerations," > Farm
Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d 298, 300 (1970), which
presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the amount
owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to be due.
See 22 AM.JUR.2D Damages § 654 (1988). However, "where the amount of liability
is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical processes" interest
is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the interest in fully
compensating the injured [145 Idaho 277] party predominates over other equitable
considerations." > Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting>
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Catde Co., 92 Idaho 889, 900,
452 P.2d 993, 1004 (1969». See also> Doolitde v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2, 128
Idaho 805,814,919 P.2d 334, 343 (1996); > Davis v. Prof'l Bus. Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho
810,817,712 P.2d 511, 518 (1985); > Child, 111 Idaho at 706-07, 727 P.2d at 897-98.
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and prejudgment
interest would never be awarded. > Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751,
682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct.App.1984). See also> Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235,
506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather, damages are unascertainable where some factor
necessary to calculate the amount of damages must be determined by a trier of fact.
Conversely:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it
possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or
discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed sum, claims for
money had and received, claims for money paid out, and claims for goods or services
to be paid for at an agreed rate.
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I

> Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d
555, 561 n. 2 (Ct.App.1993), aff'd, > 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need be
no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award of prejudgment
interest. > Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920,478 P.2d at 300; > Stueve v. Northern
Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323,326 (Ct.App.1992).
The parties disagree about the standard of appellate review applicable to a
trial court's order regarding prejudgment interest. Idaho case law has been
inconsistent on this point. In the past, the Idaho Supreme Court has suggested that
the review is conducted de novo, saying that" [i]nterest should be allowed as a
matter of law from the date the sum became due in cases where the amount claimed,
even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical computation." > Taylor v.
Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 137, 483 P.2d 664, 668 (1971) (emphasis added). Many
appellate opinions do not squarely address the level of deference to be given to the
trial court in these matters, but seem to implicitly apply de novo review. See, e.g., >
Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 792, 10 P.3d 734,
741 (2000). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has articulated an abuse of
discretion standard. > Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93, 96
(2003); > Belkv. Martin, 136 Idaho 652,660,39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001). > (FN1) Our
inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the district court abused its discretion in
finding that Rick's damages were not liquidated or ascertainable by mathematical
process. A permissible exercise of discretion occurs if the trial court (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. > Sun Valley Potato
Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 768, 86 P.3d 475, 482 (2004).

178 P.3d 639, 145 Idaho 274, Ross v. Ross, (Idaho App. 2007)
------------ Excerpt from pages 178 P.3d 641-178 P.3d 642.
Even more important, the plaintiffs did not timely prosecute this action.
More than one year passed (1/27/2010 to 2/03/2011) between the successful
defense by the defendants herein of the first summary judgment motion filed
by the plaintiffs. In these economic times, who would not want to receive a
12% return on money when financial institutions are anywhere between 1%
and 3% return on money. The court would be compounding the prejudice to
the defendants by allowing such sum (prejudgment interest). The court is
supposed to do justice for the parties. The court is well aware that the
plaintiffs paid $317,000 earnest money to the defendants, Petersons. This sum
Defendants' Statement Re: FinalJudgment
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was not by accident and more than the typical sum for earnest money.
Certainly, the court is not blind to this fact which was included in the
numerous affidavits on summary judgment. To add prejudgment interest to
this summary would be inequitable and totally unfair to the defendants,
Peterson. Likewise, even though the refundable sum is lower for the Clarks,
prejudgment interest should not be allowed.
3. Attorney fees have been addressed by separate document. Costs of right are
not argued by these defendants. The reasoning for the objections to attorney
fees are adequately set forth.
CONCLUSIONS
The court should not alter its original "judgment" and certify the judgment as
final. If the court does add additionally language to the judgment, the plaintiffs do
not have the reasoning of the court which should have been included in the original
memorandum.
If the court adds additional language, the only matter would be the amount to

be returned to the plaintiff. Since a contract did not exist by virtue of the grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiff, other items of interest should be rendered moot.
DATED this

/2.,

day of April, 2011.

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

+1=- day of April, 2011, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by:
__ Hand Delivery
_

Postage-prepaid mail

--L Facsimile Transmission (208) 523-9518

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Courtesy Copy:
Judge Dane Watkins
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120
RIGBY, IDAHO 83442
Buku Properties L L C

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

Raoel H Clark, etal.

Case No: CV-2008-0000941
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Oral Argument- Final Judgment
Judge:
Courtroom:

Monday, April 25, 2011
Dane H Watkins Jr
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I. ARGUMENT
Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of record,
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Reply Memorandum in
Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. By submitting this Memorandum, Buku is claiming the right, pursuant to
contract, statutory authority, i.e., Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to recover the costs and fees set forth in the Affidavit of
DeAnne Casperson in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Fees from Defendants
Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark, and Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson
(collectively "Defendants").

A.

Buku is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Parties'
Agreements
Defendants argue in their Objection to Plaintiffs Request for Fees and Costs;

Memorandum in Support of Objection ("Defendants' Objection") that no contractual
basis for the award of attorneys fees exists. More specifically, Defendants argue:
[T]he plaintiff alleged and the court believed that the plaintiff could rescind
the contract based upon a due diligence period contained in the contract
notwithstanding no evidence was presented of any problems with the real
property. In any event, the court granted summary judgment and the
contract became a nullity. As such, there was no contract. Thus, no
contractual basis exists for the award of fees since there was 'no contract'
according to the grant of summary judgment.
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(Defendants' Objection, p. 2). Defendants' argument is without support for several
reasons. First, Plaintiff did not seek rescission of either Agreement. In fact, Plaintiff
sought enforcement of the Agreements, specifically the provisions requiring the return of
the earnest monies. (Verified Complaint, ~~ 27-33). The Court has never ruled the
Agreements were rescinded. The Court found the Agreements clear and unambiguous
and interpreted the plain language to require the return of the earnest monies.
Second, Defendants rely on case law where no contract relationship existed to
support as award of attorney's fees. Defendants specifically cite to Management
Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 809 P.2d 487, 119 Idaho 626 (1991), which appears

as follows in Defendants' brief:
[h Javing dismissed the contract claims, the action could not have
been one "to recover on a contract." We affirmed the action of the trial
court in Day, stating that "to recover attorney fees under the statute, the
action must be one to recover on the contract, not merely and action arising
from a transaction relating to the purchase or sale of goods." 115 Idaho at
1018,772 P.2d at 224. Based upon the interpretation of the statute in Day,
the trial court's grant of attorney fees against appellants must be reversed;
there being no contract between appellants
(Defendants' Objection, p. 2). Defendants' reliance upon Management Catalysts is
misplaced. Here, in no way did the Court dismiss Buku's contract claims. In fact, the
entire basis of the Court's decision was that Buku was entitled to have the Agreements
between Buku and Defendants enforced, and pursuant to the terms of the contract, Buku
was entitled to a return of its earnest monies. The Court specifically enforced the
Agreements.
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REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

The attorney's fees provisions of both the Clark Agreement and the Peterson
Agreement state as follows:
23. Attorneys fees. The prevailing party in any action to enforce
this agreement shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees and
costs.
(See Complaint, Ex. A, ,23; Ex. B, , 23). Nowhere in that provision is there any

exception for a scenario where the sale does not close. It applies to "any action to enforce
this agreement." Defendant's argument that the Agreements are a nullity beeause the sale
of Defendants' property did not close completely contradicts the Court's decision, the
terms of the contract itself, and the actual claims pled in this case. Based on the parties
Agreements, Buku is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to contract.
B.

Buku is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs as a result of a Commercial
Transaction
Defendants argue that Buku is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs because

there was "no transaction" and that therefore Idaho Code § 12-120 cannot apply. Again,
Defendants' arguments ignore the Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Buku based upon the plain and unambiguous language of the Agreements. Defendants
cite Edwards v. Edwards, 842 P.2d 307,122 Idaho 971 (Ct. App. 1992) in support of
their argument. However, that case did not deal with a contract for the purchase and sale
of property to be developed. Edwards v. Edwards involved an action for a declaratory
judgment, in which the plaintiff requested a ruling as to the validity and enforceability of
two written agreements to develop and sell property owned by the plaintiffs children and
4-
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I
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I

his mother's estate. Id., 842 P.2d at 307, 122 Idaho at 971. The agreements themselves
were between plaintiff and his parents, and plaintiffs mother and the trust plaintiff
managed on behalf of his mother and four of his children. Id. Both agreements provided
that the plaintiff would develop and promote certain tracts of land owned by his parents
and his children, and that he would receive 50% of the net profit. Id. Ultimately, the
court found in favor of the children, and the children requested attorney's fees, in part,
under § 12-120(3). Id., 842 P.2d at 308, 122 Idaho at 972. The court denied the request
made under § 12-120(3), concluding that the statute did not authorize attorney's fees
because the action sought declaratory relief, rather than a monetary award. Id. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, on the basis that neither party was
attempting to recover against the other on the basis of any "integral" commercial
transaction and that the purpose of the declaratory judgment action was to ascertain
whether there existed a binding, contractual relationship between the parties under each
of the two disputed agreements. 842 P.2d at 308-09, 122 Idaho at 972-73. There was no
money or transaction involved in the agreements at issue in Edwards. Rather, they simply
involved a promise between two parties to eventually develop some property. See
generally, Id.
The situation in Edwards is entirely different from the scenario in the current case,
in which the contract involved a transaction for the sale of property, which, pursuant to
the terms of the Agreements themselves, was to potentially be purchased for the purpose
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of developing the property. No party sought a declaratory judgment, but enforcement of
the Agreements. As Buku noted in its Memorandum of Costs and Fees, Idaho courts
have, on numerous occasions, recognized the applicability of this provision to commercial
real estate transactions such as the one at issue in the agreements here. See, i.e., Dennett
v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,31-32,936 P.2d 219,230 (Ct. App. 1997); Farm Credit Bank of

Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274-75, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369-70 (1994); Herrick v.
Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,306,900 P.2d 201,214 (Ct. App. 1995). Consequently, Buku
is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

C.

Buku's Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs is Timely
Defendants also argue that Buku's request for attorney's fees and costs was

untimely. This issue is moot at this point in time. No final judgment has been entered in
this matter. This fact is confirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court, which suspended the
proceedings in Defendants' appeal:
On February 25,2011, this Court received a Notice of Appeal filed by
Appellant November 17,2011 in District Court which appealed the
Memorandum Decision re: Motion for Summary Judgment and the
Judgment re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered by Honorable Dane
H. Watkins. Jr. filed February 3, 2011. It appears that a Judgment set forth
on a separate document has yet to be entered as provided by LR.C.P. 58(a)
as clarified by the Court's recent decisions in Spokane Structures v.
Equitable Investment, 148 Id 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) and TJT, Inc. v.
Mori, 148 Id 825, 230 P.3d 435 (2010), and this appeal is premature. As
provided by LA.R. 17(e)(2), this appeal shall be suspended until entry of
judgment or order that on its face states that the order is the final decision of
the District Court and represents a final determination of the rights of the
parties. Therefore, it good cause appearing,
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IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the matter of entry of judgment as
required by LR.C.P. 58(a) be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the District
Court and proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED to allow for the
entry of a judgment, at which time this appeal shall proceed.
(Order Suspending Appeal, Docket No.3 8561). Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(5), Buku was not required to submit its memorandum of costs and
attorney's fees until fourteen days after entry of the Final Judgment. Because no Final
Judgement has been entered, Buku's memorandum of costs and fees is timely.

II. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Buku respectfully requests an award of attorney's fees in
an amount of$27,093.61 and costs in an amount of$724.82. Buku further requests leave
to file a supplemental memorandum for attorney's fees to recover fees incurred since the
filing of the original memorandum of costs and fees.

Dated this

~

18 day of April, 2011.

~~~

DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,
P.L.L.C.
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.
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On April 12, 2011, Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark ("Clarks") and
Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson ("Petersons") filed a Defendants'
Statement Re: Final Judgment ("Statement") and a proposed Final Judgment
("Defendants' Final Judgment") in this matter. The Statement argued that Plaintiffs
proposed Final Judgment should not be entered for various reasons and that Defendants'
Final Judgment should be entered, rather than the proposed Final Judgment provided to
the Court by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now provides this Memorandum in Support of Entry of
Plaintiffs Proposed Final Judgment in response to the Statement and Defendants' Final
Judgment.
I. ARGUMENT

A.

No Final Judgment has been Entered
Defendants' continual argument that the "Judgment re: Motion for Summary

Judgment" was a "Final Judgment" has no support and contradicts the Idaho Supreme
Court's explicit directives for the Court to enter a "final judgment." Defendants provide
in their Statement that:
[t]he defendants timely appealed the document entitled "Judgment"
believing it to be the final position of the court. After that time, the
Supreme Court of Idaho requested a final judgment of the court and offered
no directions. It is assumed that all parties believed this was a final
judgment. The only possible portion of the document that may have been in
question was a "certification" pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The defendants can only assume when a document states
"Judgment", it is the final opinion of the court.
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(Statement, p. 2). Defendants' position that the judgment resulting from Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment was the final judgment in this matter is incorrect and fails
to apply Idaho Supreme Court authority. The Idaho Supreme Court has defined a final
judgment as "an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of
the controversy, and represents a final determination of the right of the parties. It must be
a separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." TJT, Inc. v.

Mori, 148 Idaho 823,203 P. 3d 4325,436 (2010) (quoting Camp v. East Fork Ditch
Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867, 55 P. 3d 304, 327 (2002)). The judgment relating only to the
summary judgment does not match that definition. Further, Defendants' assumption that
when a document states "Judgment" it is the fmal opinion of the court in a matter has no
basis. Again, Defendants fail to cite to the Court binding authority, which was cited in
the Supreme Court's Order Suspending Appeal. The two cases provided in the Court's
Order Suspending Appeal explain that the granting of a summary judgment is not a "Final
Judgment" because it does not address the relief requested:
Rule 54(c) states that "every fmal judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled. (Emphasis added). The
relief to which a party is entitled is not the granting of a motion for
summary judgment. The Rule refers to the relief to which the party is
ultimately entitled in the lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the lawsuit.
The granting of a motion for summary judgment is simply procedural step
towards the party obtaining that relief.

Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inc., LLC, 148 Idaho 616,619,226 P. 3d 1263,
1266 (2010). In other words, Plaintiff did not plead for the grant of summary judgment.
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Plaintiff pled the return of the earnest monies and requested prejudgment interest.
Summary judgment was simply a procedural step towards obtaining the relief.
Moreover, the Judgment was not entitled "Judgment" but "Judgment re: Motions
for Summary Judgment." Clearly, based upon this title alone, the Court was not
disposing of all matters of the case by issuing the judgment. It only pertained to the
Court's decision on the Motions for Summary Judgment. In addition, that Idaho Supreme
Court has already affIrmatively stated that the Judgment entered by the Court on February
3,2011, is not an appealable fmaljudgment. As such, the Supreme Court remanded
Defendants' Appeal until a fmal, appealable judgment, which represents the Court's final
determination of the rights of the parties, is entered. (See Order Suspending Appeal,
Docket No. 38561). Consequently, no Final Judgment has been entered.
B.

The Relief Request by Plaintiff was the Return of the Earnest Monies with
Interest

Defendants argue that the Court cannot enter the proposed Final Judgment
submitted by Plaintiff because ''the judgment documents submitted to the court contain
information never explained or elucidated by the court in its memorandum decision."
(Statement, p. 2). Further, Defendants argue "[i]fthe court were now to 'change' its
judgment, it would be tantamount to a motion to reconsider which neither party
requested." (Statement, p. 2). In order to make such an argument, Defendants again
ignore Supreme Court authority and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In Spokane
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Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, the Idaho Supreme Court explained the

information necessary in a fmal judgment based on the relief requested:
The "relief to which the party ... is entitled" must be read in connection with
other rules. Rule 8(a)( 1) provides, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief ... shall contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, (3) a demand for judgment for the relief
to which he deems himself entitled." The "demand for judgment for the
relief to which he deems himself entitled" obviously refers to the relief that
the party seeks in the lawsuit.
148 Idaho at 619; 226 P. 3d at 1266.
In order to determine what relief was requested, the Court must look to the
Plaintiffs Complaint. See id. Plaintiff specifically requested the following relief:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the above-named Defendants
as follows:

5-

a.

For a money judgment in the principal amount of$317,000.00 against
Petersons and $25,000.00 against Clarks based on Plaintiffs' claim for
refund of earnest money under contract or in any additional amount to be
determined at the trial of this matter;

b.

For an award of prejudgment interest in an amount to be determined upon
judgment;

c.

For an award of reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of$3,000.00 if this
matter is concluded by default, and a greater amount should be awarded if
this matter is contested;

d.

For an award of costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter; and

e.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the
premIses.
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(Verified Complaint, p. 9-10). Consequently, the Final Judgment must then set forth the
relief granted or denied based on the Court's ruling.
Plaintiffs proposed Final Judgment does not contain information "never explained
or elucidated by the court in its memorandum decision." The Judgment re: Motions for
Summary Judgment entered by the Court specifically ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to
the return of the earnest monies. This is a quantifiable amount, based upon the terms of
the Agreements: $317,000 as against Defendants Petersons and $25,000 as against
Defendants Clarks, as was pled by Plaintiff. Additionally, although unnecessary pursuant
to Idaho case law (see, i.e, Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chemical Co., Inc., 100
Idaho 785, 788, 605 P.2d 963, 966 (1980)), Plaintiff specifically pled pre-judgment
interest on these amounts. (See Verified Complaint, ~ ~ 45-47, and Prayer for Relief).
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104, a party is entitled to prejudgment interest at a rate of
twelve percent per year in cases of money due on an express contract. I.C. § 28-22-104;
see also Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617,67 P.3d 93,96 (2003). Plaintiff is
not asking the Court to "change" its judgment or reconsider its judgment. Rather, it is
asking the Court to apply its decision regarding the Motions for Summary Judgment so
that a Final Judgment, granting or denying the parties' requested relief, can be entered.
Because the Court found Plaintiff is entitled to the return of its earnest monies, which are
quantifiable amounts pursuant to express contracts, Plaintiff, by statute, is entitled to
prejudgment interest on those amounts.
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Regarding Defendants' alternative argument regarding the "lack of direction" by
the Supreme Court, and looking to the complaint in this matter as the "starting point" to
review what was originally requested, Defendants yet again have argued that Plaintiff had
requested that the Agreements be rescinded and the parties returned to their status quo.
(Statement, p. 2-3). Defendants fail to cite any pleading or brief wherein Plaintiff asked
for rescission of the Agreements. Plaintiff specifically requested that Defendants be
required to return the earnest monies, pursuant to the Agreements. (Verified Complaint,
~~

9-10 and Prayer for Relief ). The Agreements were not rescinded based upon the

Court's decision, as Plaintiff discussed at length in its Memorandum in Support of Award
of Costs and Fees.
Finally, Defendants argue "[i]fthe court now adds language to the ''judgment''
which was not discussed in the memorandum decision, how can either party defend or
argue its position to the higher court." Nothing in Plaintiffs proposed Final Judgment is
inconsistent with the Court's Judgment Re: Motions for Summary Judgment. Again, as
mentioned above, the Final Judgment proposed by Plaintiff simply puts into judgment
form the relief requested. Further, if Defendants disagree with the terms of the Final
Judgment, they can amend their notice of appeal to include whatever additional issues
Defendants have with the contents of the Final Judgment.
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c.

Plaintiff is Entitled to Prejudgment Interest

Defendants assert that the award of prejudgment interest is discretionary, and cite
to Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 178 P.3d 639 (2007) in support of this argument.
Defendants' reliance upon Ross is misplaced, in that it actually supports the award of
prejudgment interest in the case at hand, where the amount due is clear pursuant to the
terms of the Agreements.
In Ross, the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically noted:
Idaho statutory law, Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award of
prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law
likewise calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust
enrichment. Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Iaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343,
(Ct. App. 1987). Under either statute or the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment, however, prejudgment interest is allowed only where the
damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process.
Id; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706, 727 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct. App.
1986). This limitation is based upon "equitable considerations," Farm Dev.
Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d 298,300 (1970), which
presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the
amount owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately
found to be due. See 22 AmJur.2D Damages § 654 (1988). However,
"where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by
mere mathematical processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to
judgment, "for in that event the interest in fully compensating the injured
party predominates over other equitable considerations." Farm Dev. Corp.,
93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Clove Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 900, 452 P.2d 993,
1004 (1969)). See also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2, 128
Idaho 805, 814,919 P.2d 334, 343 (1996); Davis v. Pro!'l Bus Serv., Inc.,
109 Idaho 810,817,712 P.2d 511, 518 (1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706-07,
727 P.2d at 897-98.
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment
8-
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without incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and
prejudgment interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc. v.
Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751, 682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct. App. 1984).
Rather, damages are unascertainable where some factor necessary to
calculate the amount of damages must be determined by a trier of fact.
Conversely:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if
believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with
exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion.
Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed sum,
claims for money had and received, claims for money paid
out, and claims for goods or services to be paid at an agreed
rate.

Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d
555,561 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993), ajJ'd, 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994).
There need be no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justifY the
award of prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920,478 P.2d
at 300; Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323,
326 (Ct. App. 1992).
Ross, 145 Idaho at 276-77, 178 P.3d at 641-42. Ross makes it clear that where the sum
due is capable of mathematical computation, prejudgment interest should be awarded
pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104. Defendants seems to be confusing the court's
discussion in Ross regarding the abuse of discretion standard applicable to a lower court's
determination as to whether a there is a sum due capable of mathematical computation
with the award of prejudgment interest being discretionary. See id., 145 Idaho at 277, 178
P.3d at 642. This is simply not the case. When the amount due is capable of
mathematical computation, as it obviously is here-in fact the Agreements specifically
state the amounts due-the award of prejudgment interest is appropriate pursuant to
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statute. From the time they signed the Agreements, Defendants were aware of the
amounts they were required to return to Plaintiff in the event that the Agreements did not
close. They cannot now claim that these amounts were not ascertainable and that they
therefore do not have to pay prejudgment interest after keeping Plaintiffs money for
several years.
Defendants also complain that "plaintiffs [sic] did not timely prosecute this action.
More than one year passed (1/27/2010 to 2103/2011) between the successful defense by
the defendants here-in of the first summary judgment motion filed by the plaintiffs. In
these economic times, who would not want to receive a 12% return on money when
financial institutions are anywhere between 1% and 3% return on money." (Statement, p.
5). Defendants knew that they could be subject to paying prejudgment interest based
upon Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, and the existence of Idaho Code § 28-22-104.
Defendants could have requested a trial setting at any time in order to reduce the amount
of time prejudgment interest could accrue. However, Defendants chose not to do so.
Further, Defendant's response to Plaintiffs first summary judgment required additional
discovery, which the parties conducted the year between each ruling on summary
judgment. In that discovery, Plaintiff established Defendants' allegations as unsupported
and irrelevant. Further, and more importantly, Defendants fail to acknowledge that this
situation is one of their own doing. If they had returned the earnest monies in the first
place, they would not now be in the position of having to pay interest on the funds which
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should have been returned. They could have returned the funds under protest and still
sought specific performance of the Agreements. The fact of the matter is, the question of
prejudgment interest is not a matter of whether its application would be "fair" to
Defendants or Plaintiff. Idaho Code § 28-22-104 specifically provides for the award of
prejudgment interest in instances where the amount is readily ascertainable, as it is here.
There is no consideration of "fairness." However, if "fairness" were truly a
consideration, one has to consider the fairness of the fact that Defendants kept and
benefitted from Plaintiff's earnest monies for a period of almost three and a half years.
Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest because the dollar amount is spelled out by the
contracts and was specifically pled.

II. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter Plaintiff's proposed
Final Judgment in this matter.

DATED this

2k..ifay of April, 2011.

~L~~
~
DeAnne Casperson, E
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COURT MINUTES
CV-2008-0000941

Buku Properties L L C vs. Raoel H Clark, etal.
Hearing type: Oral Argument
Hearing date: 4/25/2011
Time: 1:30 pm
Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Courtroom: Large Courtroom #3
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle
Party: Buku Properties L L C, Attorney: DeAnne Casperson
Party: Angus Peterson, Attorney: Robin Dunn
Party: Betty Peterson, Attorney: Robin Dunn
Party: Janet Clark, Attorney: Robin Dunn
Party: Raoel Clark, Attorney: Robin Dunn

01:30 PM

Case called and all parties are identified; Attorney: DeAnne Casperson, and
client, Jeremy Magara, Attorney: Robin Dunn and his clients,
No Court reporter in present.

01:31 PM

Mr. Dunn makes comments to the Court regarding the issue of not having a
court reporter.

01:32 PM

Ms. Casperson begins to make her comments to the court regarding the
Summary Judgment and Attorney's Fees.

01:43 PM

Judge Watkins makes inquiry and Ms. Casperson responds.

01:45 PM

Mr. Dunn beings his argument(s).

02:00 PM

Ms. Casperson makes further argument.

02:07 PM

The Court will issue a decision at a later time.

02:09 PM

Adjourned

Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARI(, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
v.

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.
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FINAL JUDGMENT

Case No. CV-08-941

FINAL JUDGMENT

On February 3,2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision Re: Motions for
Summary Judgment ("Memorandum") and a Judgment Re: Motions for Summary
Judgment ("Judgment"). The Memorandum and Judgment granted Plaintiff Buku
Properties, LLC's ("Buku") Second Motion for Summary Judgment and disposed of all
remaining issues in the case in favor of Buku. Pursuant to the Memorandum and
Judgment, Buku is entitled t6 the return of earnest money in the amount of $317,000.00
from Defendants Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson ("Petersons") and
$25,000.00 from Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark ("Clarks"), plus
prejudgment interest at the legal rate of interest of 12% per annum from December 19,
2007 through the date of entry of this Judgment, and post-judgment interest at the rate of
judgment interest of 5.625% from and after the date of entry of this Final Judgment until
such sums are satisfied.
THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS FINAL JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE as
follows:
1.

Judgment is entered on behalf of Buku against Petersons, jointly and

severally, in the amount of $444,355.94, consisting of $317,000.00 in principal plus
prejudgment interest accrued to April 25, 2011, in the amount of$127,355.94. Such
judgment amount of$444,355.94 shall accrue interest from and after the date of entry of
this Judgment at a rate of 5.625% per annum or $68.48 per day until such Judgment is
satisfied.

2-
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2.

Judgment is entered on behalf of Buku against Clarks, jointly and severally,

in the amount of$35,043.94, consisting of$25,000.00 in principal plus prejudgment
interest accrued to April 25, 2011, in the amount of$10,043.94. Such judgment amount
of $35,043 .94 shall accrue interest from and after the date of entry of this Judgment at a
rate of 5.625% per annum or $5.40 per day until such Judgment is satisfied.
3.

Petersons' and Clarks' counterclaims against Buku are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

DATED this ;J.'.S"" day of April, 2011.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
"l/A

I hereby certify that on this/j~ ( day of April, 2011, I served a copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand
delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct
copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED: FINAL JUDGMENT

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

( 1First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Courthouse Box

DeAnne Casperson
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo,
P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130

( / l'irst Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail
( /Courthouse Box
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON.

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,

Plaintiff,
vs.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN
PETERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -2008-941
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

----------------------------~)
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2007, Buku Properties, LLC (hereafter, "Buku") entered into a Purchase
and Sale Agreement with Raoel and Janet Clark (hereafter, "Clarks") for the purchase of 80.17
acres of real property for the price of $1,044,075.18. Pursuant to the agreement with Clarks,
Buku tendered $25,000 in earnest money to Clarks on October 15,2007.
On August 30, 2007, Buku entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Jerry and
Betty Peterson (hereafter, "Petersons") for the purchase of 73 acres of real property for the price
of$980,000. Pursuant to the agreement with Petersons, Buku tendered $327,000 in earnest
money to Petersons on August 30,2007. The purchase and sale agreements will hereinafter be
referred to collectively as "Agreements."
During a four month due diligence period provided for in the Agreements, Buku learned
of a proposed zoning change that would have affected the value of the properties and hindered
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Buku's intended use of the properties. As a result, Buku refused to close by the date specified in
the Agreements, and Buku requested the Clarks and Petersons refund the earnest money.
Clarks and Petersons both refused to refund the earnest money, so on November 6,2008,
Buku filed suit. On December 10, 2008, Clarks and Petersons filed a Counterclaim seeking
specific performance, alleging breach of contract and other equitable claims, and asking this
Court to dismiss Buku's complaint with prejudice.
On October 6,2009, Buku filed for Summary Judgment. On November 13,2009, Clarks
and Petersons filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike portions of an
affidavit.
On January 27,2010, the Court (Judge Moller) issued a memorandum decision which (1)
granted summary judgment for Buku regarding Defendants' Idaho Consumer Protection Act
counterclaim, (2) denied Buku's motions for summary judgment regarding issues surrounding
enforcement of the Agreements, and (3) denied Defendants' motion to strike. Judge Moller's
decision did not address Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On November 16, 2010, Buku filed a second motion for summary judgment asking this
Court to dismiss all of Defendants' counterclaims and rule in its favor on its claim for
reimbursement of the earnest money. On February 3, 2011, this Court issued a memorandum
decision and judgment granting Buku's motion for summary judgment.
On February 24,2011, Buku filed a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs supported
by the affidavit of Deanne Casperson. On March 8, 2011, Defendants filed an objection to
Buku's request for fees and costs. On April 18, 2011, Buku filed a reply brief in support of its
request for fees and costs. On April 25, 2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding Buku's
request for fees and costs.
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II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

An award of attorney fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb v.

Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 526,148 P.3d 1267,1272 (2006). The amount of attorney fees and costs

awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,435, 111 P.3d 110,
120 (2005).

III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Attorney Fees

Buku claims it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the Agreements and
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. Because this Court finds Buku is entitled to
attorney fees pursuant to § 12-120(3), the Court need not address whether the Agreements or
other statutes provide a basis for an award of attorney fees.
Clarks and Petersons argue an award of attorney fees under § 12-120(3) is improper
because the gravamen of this lawsuit did not arise out of a "commercial transaction." Moreover,
Defendants argue the fees requested by Buku are unreasonable because Buku was not the
prevailing party. I
i. Commercial Transaction
Section 12-120 provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any
civil action arising from a "commercial transaction." Clarks and Petersons cite Edwards v.
Edwards, 122 Idaho 971,842 P.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1992) in support of their argument that this

1 Clarks and Petersons also argue Buku's request for fees and costs should be denied because it was untimely and
Buku did not file a "motion" for fees and costs. LR.C.P 54(d)(5) provides for a fourteen day window following the
entry of judgment wherein the prevailing party may filed a "memorandum of costs." Whereas Buku filed a
"Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs," which detailed Buku's claimed expenses, and whereas a final
judgment is yet to be entered in this matter, Clarks' and Petersons' arguments are without merit.
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case did not arise out of a commercial transaction. In Edwards, the Idaho Court of Appeals
stated,
As we stated in Idaho Newspaper [§ 12-120(3)] does not extend to all actions
where a commercial relationship exists, but rather, "the lawsuit still must seek
resolution of a dispute arising from a commercial transaction between the
parties." 117 Idaho at 424, 788 P.2d at 239 (emphasis original). With respect to
the statute, our Supreme Court recently observed:
[T]he award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the
test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the
lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. To hold otherwise
would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional
remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually
every lawsuit filed.

Brower v. E.1 DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,
349 (1990).
Edwards, at 972,842 P.2d at 308.
In a fairly recent decision, the Idaho Supreme Court commented on Edwards, stating as
follows:
First, the Edwards case has no application here because there was no
commercial transaction which constituted the "gravamen" of the suit. Here, the
gravamen of both Freiburger's declaratory judgment action and J-V-B's
counterclaim was the enforceability of a covenant contained in an employment
agreement. The term "commercial transaction" is defined in § 12-120(3) as "all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus,
"[wJhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type
embraced by section 12-120(3), ... that claim triggers the application of the
statute. " Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812
(1995). There must, however, be a nexus between the commercial transaction and
the lawsuit. Id. There is no question that a "commercial transaction" as defmed in
I.e. § 12-120(3) is involved here. Both parties entered into an employment
agreement which contained a restrictive covenant. Freiburger brought this action
seeking ajudicial declaration regarding his potential contractual obligations under
the Covenant. This obligation is clearly grounded in a "commercial" contract.

Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 111 P.3d 100 (2005).
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In this case, Buku entered into the Agreements with Clarks and Petersons for the purpose
of completing a commercial real estate transaction. The properties Buku contracted to buy from
Clarks and Petersons was farm land. There is no evidence that Buku was buying the land for
personal or household purposes. There is no evidence that Clarks or Petersons thought Buku was
buying the land for personal or household purposes. To the contrary, the record indicates Clarks
and Petersons knew that Buku intended to develop the property. Buku brought this action to
enforce the provisions of the Agreements that provided for the return of earnest money if Buku
was not satisfied with the condition ofthe properties. Thus, in bringing this action, Buku alleged
the existence of a contractual relationship of the type contemplated by § 12-120(3) and Buku's
claim for reimbursement of the earnest money triggers application of the statute.
ii. Prevailing Party

Defendants concede Buku prevailed on its second motion for summary judgment.
However, Defendants assert Buku's request for fees is excessive and unreasonable because
Defendants "prevailed on the first motion and the events leading up to that decision."
Defendants' Brief at 5. Accordingly, Defendants assert Buku would only be entitled to the 68.9
hours of work that were completed after July 8, 2010, the date Buku began preparing for is
second motion for summary judgment.
Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner
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after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the
resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 2

The Idaho Supreme Court has identified three areas of inquiry that a court should
consider when deciding whether a party "prevailed."
(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues
between the parties; and (c) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on
each of the issues or claims. If the court determines that a party prevailed only in
part, it may apportion the costs and attorney fees among the parties in a fair and
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.

Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411,659 P.2d 160,165 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).

In determining which party has prevailed, the Supreme Court of Idaho provided the
following guidance:

In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d
130, 133 (2005).

In this case, Buku prevailed on its claim of entitlement to reimbursement of the earnest
money. All of Clarks' and Petersons' counterclaims were denied. This Court concludes Buku
was the prevailing party when looking at the outcome of the case from an overall view.

2 Rule 54(d)(1)(B) only speaks of costs. However, Rule 54(e)(1), which pertains to attorney
fees, incorporates the Rule 54(d)(1)(B) definition of prevailing party.
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iii. Clarks and Petersons did not Prevail in Part
Clarks and Petersons argue this Court should reduce Buku's fee award because, while
Buku prevailed on all substantive claims, they prevailed in all aspects of the case leading up to
Buku's second motion for summary judgment.
This Court disagrees with the assertion that Clarks and Petersons prevailed in the case
prior to Buku's second motion for summary judgment. Prior the Buku's second motion for
summary judgment, both parties filed motions for summary judgment and neither was granted.
Additionally, Clarks and Petersons filed a motion to strike portions of an affidavit filed in
support of Buku's first motion for summary judgment. That motion was denied. The blanket
assertion by Clarks and Petersons that they prevailed in every aspect of the case prior to Buku' s
second motion for summary judgment is inaccurate.
As stated above, this Court in its sound discretion may determine that each party
prevailed in part. Upon so finding, the Court may apportion the costs between and among the
parties in a fair and equitable manner. See Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791 P.2d
1313,1318 (Ct. App. 1989). In Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (et. App. 2008)
Nguyen was found to be the prevailing party at trial and was awarded attorney fees. Bui asserted
it was error to award attorney fees incurred by Nguyen for preparation and presentation of the
claims that the Buis successfully defended against. In response to that argument, the Idaho Court
of Appeals stated:
This Court rejected a similar argument in Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79,
741 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1987). In that case, the plaintiffs had contracted with the
defendant for the construction of a home and advanced a sum of money. They
elected not to proceed on the project and asked the defendant to return their
money less his out-of-pocket expenses. Litigation ensued when the plaintiffs
believed that the defendant did not return a sufficient sum. The plaintiffs'
complaint alleged causes of action for violation of the Consumer Protection Act,
fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. A jury found for the plaintiffs
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
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upon their theories of unjust enrichment and violation of the Consumer Protection
Act. The trial court determined that attorney fees were statutorily awardable only
for the Consumer Protection Act violation, and awarded attorney fees that it
calculated were attributable to the attorney's work on this theory only. We
determined that this was an error. We noted that the plaintiffs had advanced four
alternative theories of recovery in an attempt to obtain only one type of relief-the
return of their pre-payment. We held that the trial judge improperly split the
single "claim" upon which the plaintiffs had prevailed into prevailing and
nonprevailing "theories." In a later case, Burns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho
623, 818 P.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1990), we contrasted the circumstance where there
truly are multiple claims for differing relief that can be parsed in awarding
attorney fees, such as distinguishing between a successful claim for injunctive
relief and an unsuccessful claim for damages.
Even if Nguyen's various theories should be characterized as separate
claims, apportionment of his attorney fees is not necessarily required. For
example, in Decker v. Homeguard Systems, a Div. of Intermountain Gas Co., 105
Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (Ct. App. 1983), the defendant argued that it was
inappropriate to award attorney fees to the plaintiffs on all of their twenty-eight
causes of action when all but six were dismissed before submission to jury. The
district court noted that although the plaintiffs had failed on a number of causes of
action, they "basically prevailed" on the principal complaints that they had
pursued against the defendant. We determined that the district court acted within
its discretion in deciding not to apportion attorney fees among the successful and
unsuccessful claims. Similarly, in Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687,
682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984), where the plaintiff argued that the district court
should have awarded him attorney fees for successfully defending against a
counterclaim, we said:
[T]he mere fact that a party is successful in ... defeating a single claim
does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim.
The rule does not require that. It mandates an award of fees only to the
party or parties who prevail "in the action." ....
. . . [W]hile the judge in his sound discretion must consider "the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties ... and the extent to which each party prevailed upon
each of such issue or claims," [I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(B),] he is not compelled
to make a discrete award of fees on each claim.
Id. at 693, 682 P.2d at 646. The propriety of this approach was confirmed by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving,
Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005), where the Court said:

In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims
and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
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"in the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and detennined
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.

Id at 193-94, 191 P.3d at 1113-14.
In this case, Buku's first motion for summary judgment was denied in part because of a
perceived factual dispute. The fact that Clarks and Petersons survived that motion, however,
does not equate to them having prevailed on any issue or claim. Even if Clarks and Petersons
had prevailed on some claim or issue, this Court would not be obligated to apportion fees
between the parties. As discussed above, Buku prevailed on its first cause of action seeking
return of the earnest money, and all of Clarks' and Petersons' counterclaims were denied.
This Court cannot conclude Clarks and Petersons prevailed "in the action" in any sense.

iv. Reasonable Award
Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to consider certain
factors when determining the amount of attorney fees to award. Although this Court "is not
required to make 'specific fmdings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors in Rule
54(e)(3), it is required to consider those factors when detennining the amount of the fees to
award." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc., v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P.3d
475,483 (2004); Perkins v. Us. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427, 430,974 P.2d 73, 76 (1999).
The Court may also "consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate." Hines v.

Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P.2d 20, 28 (1997); see also Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho
425,435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005).
In Sun Valley, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the Idaho Court of Appeals for the
proposition that the district court may, when considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, draw from
"the court's own knowledge and experience" and "the record of the case," but it is also
"incumbent upon a party seeking attorney fees to present sufficient infonnation for the court to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
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consider factors as they specifically relate to the prevailing party or parties seeking fees." Sun
Valley, 139 Idaho at 769,86 P.3d at 483 (quoting Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706
P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct. App. 1985)).
Buku adequately documented its time and labor spent on this case and provided that
information to this Court in an affidavit filed on February 24, 2011. Defendants do not object to
Buku's manner of documentation, method of calculation, fee rate, or amount of work.
As the prevailing party, Buku is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for time and labor
spent in this case. This Court has reviewed Buku's memorandum of fees and costs with its
supporting affidavit. In accordance with the above discussion regarding commercial transactions
and prevailing parties, and considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, Buku should be awarded
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of$27,093.61.

B.

Costs

LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) states that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the
prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court."
Having concluded Buku is a prevailing party under LR.C,P, 54(d)(1)(B), costs as a matter
of right should be awarded to Buku in the amount of $724.82.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Attorney's fees are awarded to Buku in the amount of $27,093.61.
Costs as a matter of right are awarded to Buku in the amount of $724.82.

IT IS SO ORDERED
"Q
4\

DATED this ,

day of April 2011.
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copy of the foregoing document upoiI the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
DeAnn Casperson
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

RobinD. Dunn
DUNN LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C.
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COMES NOW PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC ("Plaintiff"), by and through its attorney
of record Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submits this Memorandum of
Supplemental Attorney's Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is filing simultaneous with this Motion the
Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees
and Costs.

I. ARGUMENT
On February 3, 2011, this Court issued its decision, granting summary judgment to
Plaintiff. Before a Final Judgment was entered, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. On or
about February 22,2011, Plaintiff filed its Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. In
addition, Plaintiff sent a proposed Final Judgment to the Court for consideration. On March 28,
2011, the Court held a status conference to address the Final Judgment and appeal issues. As a
result of that conference, the Court granted leave to Defendants to submit its objections to the
proposed Final Judgment and ordered a hearing on April 25, 2011, to address the Memorandum
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and the Final Judgment.
After the filing of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and proposed
Final Judgment, Defendant filed the following:
a.

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Request for Fees and Costs; Memorandum in
Support of Objection;

b.

Defendant's Statement Re: Final Judgment.

"Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Request for Fees and Costs; Memorandum in
Support of Objection" contained various arguments stating that Plaintiff was simply not entitled
to attorneys' fees or costs, including that the contract upon which relief was granted to Plaintiff
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had been nullified by the Court and no longer existed, that the sale of the property at issue was
not a commercial transaction, and that it was simply not fair for Plaintiff to be awarded attorneys'
fees in this matter, despite prevailing. Defendants also argued that they were the prevailing party
in this matter, at least in part. Nowhere in Defendants' briefing did Defendants make any
argument regarding the reasonableness of the amount Plaintiff requested in attorneys' fees and
costs. Additionally, "Defendant's Statement Re: Final Judgment," essentially argued that the
summary judgment entered by the Court in this matter was a Final Judgment, despite the fact that
the Idaho Supreme Court had suspended the appeal filed by Defendants in this action due to the
fact that no fmal judgment had been entered. (See Order Suspending Appeal, Supreme Court
Docket No. 28561-2011).
Because Defendants filed the above pleadings, Plaintiff had to file both a Reply
Memorandum in Support of Attorneys Fees and Costs, as well as a Memorandum in Support of
Entry of Final Judgment. Additionally, Plaintiff's counsel had to attend the hearings on those
matters. Responding to Defendants' briefmg proved to be difficult and time intensive due to the
nature of Defendants' briefmg.
Plaintiffhas incurred additional costs and attorneys' fees in responding to Defendants'
pleadings and arguments. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of the additional costs
and fees incurred in responding to these additional pleadings and arguments. Plaintiff has
incurred an additional $ 4,638.00 in attorneys fees and $ 33.70 in costs from February 22,2011,
to present, in this matter, as itemized and set forth in the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in
Support of Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed simultaneous
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herewith. Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to a supplemental award as a result of briefing and
arguments necessary to respond to Defendants' briefmg and objections.
Because Plaintiff has already been determined the prevailing party, Plaintiff does not
believe a hearing is necessary. Plaintiff asserts the Court could make a determination on the
supplemental award of fees and costs based on the briefing.

II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this
Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs so that Plaintiff may be compensated
for the additional expense Defendants' actions have caused Plaintiff to incur, in the amount of
$ 4,638.00. Plaintiff requests such sum in addition to the costs and attorneys' fees originally
awarded by this Court in the amount of$27,818.43.

Itv~

DATED this ~ day of May, 2011.

't;kne Casper'So'n, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this lttv'-day of May, 2011, I served a copy ofthe following
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

(
(

) First Class Mail
)ftand Delivery
Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Courthouse Box

(0

~G~~~/
DeAnne Casperson

G:IWPDATAICAHl149181PIdgslFees.Increase.MOT.wpd:ah
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698)
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV -08-941

AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Defendants.
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK,
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
husband and wife,
Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Counter-Defendants
STATE OF IDAHO
)
)ss.
County of Bonneville
)
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DEANNE CASPERSON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a member of the law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.,

counsel for Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Plaintiff'), in this matter.
2.

This Affidavit is made on my own personal knowledge, except to the extent of

allegations made on information and belief, and in support of Plaintiff s Memorandum of
Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
3.

I have reviewed the time and cost records of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo,

P.L.L.C. maintained on the above matter, and represent that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, the following items of costs and expenses, in addition to those previously claimed, are
claimed in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(5) and Rule 54(e)(1),
and were necessarily and exceptionally expended and incurred in the above entitled action on
behalf of Plaintiff:
Costs of Right (Rule 54(d)(1)(c))'
Date

Item

Cost

NIA

NIA

TOTAL
11
Discretionru:y Costs (Rule 54(d)(1 )(c )).

$0.00

Date

Item

Cost

03/28/11

Travel expense - Travel to Rigby, Idaho for hearing

$16.85

04/25/11

Travel expense - Travel to Rigby, Idaho for hearing

$16.85

TOTAL

$33.70

111.

2-

Total Costs of Right and Discretionary Costs:

$33.70.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

4.

The above-listed costs represent the costs incurred from February 23,2011, to the

date herein.
5.

Since February 23,2011, the law fIrm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

has expended approximately 27.8 hours in providing a defense to various pleadings fIled by
Defendants. An itemization of the additional legal services incurred since February 23,2011,
provided by Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. in connection with such matters is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A". The law fIrm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. has invoiced
Plaintiff for the legal services itemized on Exhibit "A" attached hereto the total amount of
$4,638.00, which is allocated among the following attorneys at the following effective billing
rates:
Name

Hours

Effective Rate

Total Fees

Charles A. Homer

0.50

$235.00

$117.50

DeAnne Casperson

12.70

$195.00

$2,476.50

Amanda E. Ulrich

14.60

$140.00

$2,044.00
$4,638.00

TOTAL
6.

The sum of $4,638.00 represents a reasonable sum for fees for additional services

provided by the law fIrm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. in prosecuting the aboveentitled action on behalf of Plaintiff. The sum of $33.70 represents additional costs incurred in
the above-entitled action allocated for the benefIt of Plaintiff.
7.

I have practiced law in Idaho continuously since April 24, 2003. I graduated from

law school in 1999 and practiced law in both Missouri and Kansas before returning to Idaho. I
am familiar with the prevailing charges in this community for legal work similar to that
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Lf·

perfonned by the attorneys in this case. It is my opinion that the prevailing charges in this
community for like work are equal to or higher than those indicated above, and that the attorney's
fees are reasonable and necessary.

I"t'---'

DATED this _ll_ day of May, 2011.

DeAnne Caspers~

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

t

Iltv day of May, 2011.
')

Jt U\ /0J.-Gij·',,-L'otA~·t-Vl!Jlh /)

otary P1!tWic for Idaho
~
Residing at •//tt;uw f;::t'/ I If}
My Commission Expires:
10 !,;;-;?II <I

u,

)
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ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~\tctay of May, 2011, I served a copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

AFFIDA VIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS

ATTORNEYS SERVED:
Robin D. Dunn
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

( ) First Class Mail
( ) jiand Delivery
( v) Facsimile
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Courthouse Box

G:\WPDAT A\CARI 149181P1dgslFees.increase.DC.AFF. wpd:ah
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL
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-<.....

Date
__ Attorney
Feb 24/2011 AEU
---Feb 24/2011 ----_._-CAH
DC
Feb 28/2011 --.----.
Mar 8/2011' DC
--"
Mar '-10/20{1-- DC
- - - . - - - . ---_.-.- ..-_._"--_.
-----~-~~--

~---

"-~.--'"-

Mar 25/2011 AEU
!

.-------

Mar 28/2011

DC

Apr 7/2011

AEU

--'
Mar 29/2011 D C------

Apr 12/2611- AEU-~pr 12/201J_= DC

Apr 14/2011_ AEIT-----·
Apr 18/2011 AEU
-----DC
~r 18/2011
Apr 19/2011 AEU
AEU-'Apr 20/201.1.._1-=----_.
Apr~20!..!..... -DC
------,
Apr~1/2011

AEU

Apr 25/2011

AEU

~r

25/2011. ,DC

M,!L.§/.2°1.!__

AEU

.JII!ay 10/29 11 AEU

------_._-_._------"---"-

Explanation
Intraoffice conference with CAH; Revise and edit Final Judgment
Interoffice conference to review and revise proposed Judgment to be issued in connection with Summary Judgment
Edit and revise Final Judgment;e-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera about status.
Review response to request for attorneys fees by Mr. Dunn.
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding status.
Intraoffice conference with DC; Recalculate judgment amounts based upon April 25, 2011 hearing date; Draft
correspondence to Robin Dunn; Revise Final Judgment to reflect judgment amounts for April 25, 2011
Intra-office conference regarding status conference; Prepare for status conference by reviewing final judgment calculations
and attorneys fee issues; travel to and from Jefferson County for status conference.
Review letter to Mr. Dunn regarding Final Judgment.
Draft Reply Memorandum in Support of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Review new pleadings from Defendants regarding final judgment
Edit and revise reply brief in support of attorneys fees.
Make final edits to Reply Memorandum in Support of Costs and Fees
Draft Reply Memorandum in Support of Final Judgment
..Edit and revise brief in support of motion for attorneys' fees.
Finish drafting Memorandum in Support of Entry of Final Judgment
Revise and edit Memorandum in Support of Entry of Final judgment
Edit and revise memorandum in support of final judgment; research cases cited in Stay Order; finalize brief for filing.
Research application of prejudgment interest where funds have been deposited with the court; Revise and edit final draft of
reply memorandum
Update Final Judgment calculation; Research supersedeas bond issues; Pull research regarding "prevailing party" analysis
E-mail correspondence with client regarding hearing; prepare for hearing on attorneys' fees and final judgment; attend and
argue hearing on final judgment and attorneys' fees.
Review time records to determine attorneys fees incurred subsequent to filing of motion for attorneys fees; Review
Memorandum Decision and Order from the Court regarding attorneys fees; Review final judgment
Draft Amended Final Judgment to Include Attorneys Fees; Draft Motion to Supplement and Increase Award of Attorneys
Fees and Costs; Draft Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Supplement and Increase Award of Attorneys
Fees and Costs; Research recording of judgments .

;§

Hours

2.1
0.1
2.1
0.7
1.9
0.3
1
-.--0.2
2.5
1.4
3.6
1.1
0.8
3.8
0.8

2.8

-_.

..--- --.

---._---._-_._---

-----_. -.--------------_._._-------.

---,-_..-.- "- ---'''--''-

x

J:Ll

0.6

TOTAL HOURS

27.80

Totals for CAH
Totals for DC
Totals for AEU

0.50
12.70
14.60

Fees Totals
117.50
2,476.50
2,044.00

27.80

4,638.00

--------"-.
--- ..-----

~

0.5
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.1

.-

......-

'-.-- r--

- - - ' - - ' -------- _."-_..

Costs

--,"

Mar30/20H
- - - - -.. 1-...
Apr.2~!.2Q.!l

_

..

__

..._----

--.

Travel Expense 3/28111 to Rigby for hearing
Travel Expense 4/25/11 to Jefferson County to attend hearing on final judgment

-

----_..

16.85
16.85

---_._---

33.70

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899
Paul D. Ziel, Esq., ISB #7497
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV-08-941

OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

------------------------)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Counter-Plaintiffs,
)
)
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company; and
JARAMIE MAGERA, an individual,
Counter-Defendants,
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r
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Attorneys for Defendants / Counter-Plaintiffs

vs.

L::

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------------------)
OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL AnORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS -1-

COMES NOW, defendants, by and through the undersigned attorney, and objects to
that Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs for multiple reasons. Those
reasons are as follows:

1.

Through no fault of the defendants, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded
the "Judgment" for a determination of "Final Judgment". Both parties
were forced to do additional briefing on various issues.

2.

The Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs does not fall
under any exceptions or rules allowing attorney fees. More specifically,
Idaho Code §12-120(5), has a provision for additional attorney fees in
collection of debt. This is not one of those instances.

3.

The supplemental attorneys' fees and costs were incurred by both sides for
the benefit of final determination which might have been determined in the
original judgment. Once again, through no fault of either side, additional
fees were incurred to resolve the "Final Judgment" issue.

4.

The undersigned objects as the fees are not reasonable under Rule 54 and
the subdivisions thereof.

5.

This objection is based upon the case law, statutory scheme and the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 54.

DATED this

I&

day of May, 2011.

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of May, 2011 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by:
Hand Delivery to plaintiff
~

Postage-prepaid mail to judge

-2QL

Facsimile Transmission 523 9518

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Courtesy Copy: Hon. Dane Watkins
District Judge
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442
(208) 745-9202 (t)
(208) 745-8160 (f)
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Robin D. Dunn, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho
Limited liability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff/Respondent,
)
vs.
)
)
)
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS
)
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants/Appellants.
)

Case No. CV-08-941
AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Docket No. 38561-2011

-------------- )
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants appeal against the above named Respondent to

the Idaho Supreme Court from the Summary Judgment entered in the above entitled action
on the 3rd day of February, 2011, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, presiding. Upon
remand, a second amended judgment entitled: "Final Judgment" was dated April 25, 2011
with the hand-written notation below the date, "Nunc Pro Tunc" and a certificate of mailing

dated April 29, 2011. The district court also entered a document entitled "Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs" dated "49 day of April, 2011" [sic] with
mailing, per the clerk, of 29 day of April, 2011.
2.

The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment/ order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant
to

Rule 11(a)(l) I.A.R.

3.

The issues on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following:
a.

Did the court error in interpretation of the real estate contract between
the parties?

b.

Did the court error in granting summary judgment which excluded
equitable remedies of the defendants?

c.

Were there ambiguous terms in the contract which allowed parol
evidence?

d.

Did the court error in using information outside the "four comers" of
the contract when the decision indicated the contract was not
ambiguous?

e.

Were the defendants' equitable remedies precluded by the court's
ruling in Summary Judgment which required a return of earnest
money?

f.

Was the court incorrect in awarding prejudgment interest along with
fees and costs?

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

6.

The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
-Any minute entries-

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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-All pleadings by both parties-All affidavits of both parties-First Summary Judgment Decision (Denial) of Honorable Gregory
Moeller
-Second Summary Judgment Decision (Approval) of Honorable Dane
Watkins
-Final Judgment of Honorable Dane Watkins.
7.

The undersigned certifies:
a.

That a copy of the notice of appeal has NOT been served on the

reporter since a transcript is not requested;
b.

That the Appellants have made contact with the clerk of the district

court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's
record;
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

paid or will be paid;
d.

That appellate filing fee has been paid on the first notice of appeal

prior to this Amended Notice of Appeal; and
e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2011.

DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by:

Hand Delivery
xx

Postage-prepaid mail
Facsimile Transmission

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
Attorney for the Defendants/Appellants
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Jefferson County Clerk
Jefferson County Courthouse
210 Courthouse Way, Ste. 120
Rigby, ID 83442
DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Honorable Dane Watkins
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
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Clerk of the Courts
(208) 334-2210

2011 AUG -, PrJ 3:
"

P.O. Box 83720
rf~ise, Idaho 83720-0101

DIS Ti~iCT GOUR T

1t.FFE ,QSON COUNT'f.IDAHO

CHRISTINE BOULTER, CLERK
Attn: NANCY
JEFFERSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
210 COURTHOUSE WAY STE 100
RIGBY, ID 83442

CLERK'S RECORD DUE DATE SET
Docket No. 38561-2011

BUKU PROPERTIES,
LLC v. RAOEL H.
CLARK

Jefferson County District Court
#2008-941

The CLERK'S RECORD must be filed in this office by 09-29-11.

For the Court:
Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of the Courts

07/28/2011
BY: KML
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY

BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

)

~-

)
)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
CLARK, ANGUS JERRY PETERSON )
and BETTY JEAN PETERSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant,
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011
.Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS

------------------------------)
I, Christine Boulter, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for Jefferson County, do hereby certifY that the following is a list of the exhibits,
offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated:

NO.

DESCRlPTION
None

SENT/RETAINED
none

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 24th day of August, 2011.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES ,LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

) SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011
)

) Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941

-vs-

)

RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C.
)
CLARK,ANGUS.ffiRRYPETERSON )
)
and BETTY .ffiAN PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, Christine Boulter, Clerk of the District Court of the in Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Jefferson, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction
and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated to
be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross Appeal, and
any additional documents requested to be included.
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31
of the Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court this 24th day of August, 2011.

CHRISTINE BOULTER
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF .JEFFERSON
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC,

)
)
) SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) .Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941
-vs)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
RAOEL H. CLARK and .JANET C.
CLARK,ANGUS.JERRYPETERSON )
and BETTY .JEAN PETERSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant,
)
)

I, Christine Boulter, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Jefferson, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of
Record as follows:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

Robin D. Dunn
P.O. Box 277
Rigby, ID 83442

DeAnne Casperson
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court this 24th day of August, 2011.

CHRISTINE BOULTER
Clerk of the Court
Jefferson County, Idaho
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